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ABSTRACT

The Effect of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Diffusion on Corruption and
Transparency (A Global Study) (May 2013)
Leebrian Ernest Gaskins, MBA, West Virginia University;
Chair of Committee: Dr. Nereu F. Kock

Is the diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICTs) the “magic
bullet” for effectively reducing corruption? Can government transparency be increased by ICT
diffusion? Does ICT diffusion increase governmental transparency, thereby reducing corruption?
A few previous studies have measured the relationship between ICTs, transparency, and
corruption. Generally, such studies focus on the role of electronic governance (e-governance) in
facilitating state-citizen interactions and how e-governance acts as a corruption deterrent. This
study digresses from past literature by directly exploring the effects of the ICT environment,
using the Networked Readiness Index (NRI), and diffusion of two specific ICTs (e.g. the number
of Internet users per 100 people and mobile cellular phone users per 100 people) on corruption
and transparency through structural equation modeling.
This study also examines how macroeconomic and national sociocultural variables
mediate and moderate the relationships of ICTs on transparency and corruption. The results show
that for each increase unit in NRI, transparency increased by 9.423% and corruption decreased
by 14.017%. Furthermore, increasing access to the Internet by 27 people per 100 persons
increased transparency by 17.581% and reduced corruption by 15.239%. Additionally, each unit
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increase in per capita GDP results in an increase in transparency by 7.068% and a decrease in
corruption by 10.507%. Conversely, increases in FDI and mobile cellular diffusion demonstrated
marginal results on increasing transparency and reducing corruption. Implications of these
findings as well as avenues for further research are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Corruption, along with possible remedies and measures for fighting corruption, has been
studied academically in a multitude of ways over the past sixty years (Akçay, 2006; Arvas &
Ata, 2011; Donchev & Ujhelyi, 2009; Leff, 1964; Macrae, 1982; Mauro, 1995; McMullan, 1961;
Myrdal, 1970a; Nye, 1967; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999, 2008; Svensson, 2005). The wideranging definition used by the World Bank, Transparency International, and most scholars is that
corruption is the abuse of public power for private benefit or profit (Amundsen, 1999; Andvig,
Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener, & Søreide, 2000; Gray & Kaufmann, 1998; Rose-Ackerman,
1996). Corruption, as similarly addressed in this paper, is the use of public office or power for
personal gain. In its many forms, corruption leads to the misallocation of public resources,
thereby creating bias against efficient projects and practices (Macrae, 1982).
Corrupt practices not only make public power and governance less efficient, such as the
management of public resources, but they also adversely affect countries’ competitiveness and
human development (Akçay, 2006). Studies have shown that the effect of corruption on human
development is more evident in some countries than others (Waheeduzzaman, 2005). In some
countries, for instance, high levels of corruption reduce the productivity of public sector
investments (Tanzi, 1995). International investment such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
into countries perceived as “corrupt” is substantially less than in countries without this
perception (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Countries with higher levels of corruption suffer from
less than optimal economic development (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002;
Wei, 2000). Corruption has a profound mitigating effect on economic development variables
This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Information Technology for Development.
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such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. Mauro (1995) found that the reduction of
corruption is associated with a significant increase in GDP per capita. This finding is quite
important as GDP per capita is one of the most widely used macroeconomic indicators of a
country’s standard of living (Ringen, 1991). Similarly, as corruption increases, personal income
decreases (Alam, 1995; Husted, 1999).
The literature cited above demonstrates that corruption has a diminishing effect on
macroeconomic variables. Corruption’s effect on macroeconomic variables such as FDI and
GDP per capita is particularly important since macroeconomic and technology development
variables are interrelated. For example, there is evidence that FDI impacts information and
communication technologies (ICTs) proliferation and development (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003;
Gholami, Lee, & Heshmati, 2006; Suh & Khan, 2003). Specifically, Lee, Gholami, and Tong
(2005) demonstrated a dual causal relationship between investments in ICT and inflows of FDI.
In the study by Lee et al. (2005), the dual causality relationship suggested that increased FDI
inflows positively affected ICT investment and proliferation, and ICT investment and
proliferation attracted more FDI inflows. There is reason to believe that any variable affecting
FDI inflow would, in turn, affect ICT development. For example, FDI is substantially less in
countries perceived as “more corrupt” (Campos, Lien, & Pradhan, 1999; Habib & Zurawicki,
2002). Therefore, countries perceived as corrupt would have substantially less FDI inflows.
These reduced FDI inflows also would negatively affect ICT investment and proliferation.
A greater percentage of the world’s population now has availability and access to ICTs
such as Internet and mobile cellular technologies (Haddon, 2004). This increased availability of
ICTs has inspired researchers to look into ways such technologies can improve economic and
human development (Gascó-Hernández, Equiza-López, & Acevedo-Ruiz, 2007; Rahman, 2007).
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Access to mobile communications and the Internet has enabled citizens to participate more
directly in the political and social institutions and environment of their countries. Citizens are
interacting more directly with their governments, elected officials, and other citizens through
such means as e-governance (M. Backus, 2001), online political activism (Hill & Hughes, 1998),
Internet political mobilization (Krueger, 2006), and online information gathering about political
issues (Krueger, 2002).
Since corruption negatively affects economic and human development, ICTs have
fostered academic interest as a tool in reducing corruption and increasing democracy (Soper,
2007). The Internet’s potential for reducing corruption is “promising and obviously vast” (Vinod,
1999, p. 10). Past studies have examined the effects of e-governance on corruption (Hoque,
2005; Pathak & Prasad, 2005; Pathak, Singh, Belwal, Naz, & Smith, 2008; Pathak, Singh,
Belwal, & Smith, 2007) and the effects of e-governance and social media on transparency
(Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010). These studies suggest that increased access to information
through ICTs has a positive effect on transparency and reduces corruption.
While governments and scholars are researching ways to fight corruption, ordinary
individuals armed with access to cellular phones, personal computers, and the Internet have
begun a wave of participatory journalism targeted at corruption in society (Katz & Lai, 2009).
For example, in Goa, India, an anonymous citizen uploaded to the Internet an eight-minute video
of a drug dealer talking about his connections to high-ranking anti-narcotic police (MSNIndia,
2010). In Kenya, citizens have caught and filmed traffic cops collecting bribes from motorists
(NTV, 2010). In the case of India and Kenya, citizens are acting as anti-corruption agents by
bringing corrupt practices and officials into public awareness. Such cases illustrate that citizens
have taken on the role of government in fighting corruption. Likewise, Hay and Shleifer (1998)
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found that in the absence of strong governmental anti-corruption efforts, private enforcement by
citizens becomes a surrogate for public justice.
Vinod (1999) stated that increasing education and expanding economic freedoms are
among the top actions in reducing corruption. ICT promotes greater governmental transparency
by removing information barriers and asymmetry (Sturges, 2004). Mobile technologies and
Internet access enables citizens to become more informed with relevant information about their
government and society. The access and expansion of relevant information concerning
governmental issues promotes greater transparency (García-Murillo, 2010). Also, the diffusion
of ICTs has been shown to foster civil and political freedoms (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003).
The diffusion of ICT affords citizens increased networking capacity and political
awareness while reducing information transaction costs (Pirannejad, 2011). Usage of ICTs to
organize, communicate, and raise awareness have been seen in such movements as the Arab
world’s “Arab Spring” and Mexico’s narcobloggers (Hofheinz, 2005; Shirk, 2010). In countries
such as India, Kenya, and Mexico, citizens are using ICTs to expose and fight governmental
corruption and civilian crime (M. Backus, 2001). Indeed, Soper (2007) demonstrated that a
negative relationship exists between investment in ICT and political corruption levels in
emerging economies.
1.2 Research Question
Some previous studies have examined the relationship between ICTs and corruption.
Such studies have focused on the role of e-governance facilitating state-citizen interactions,
thereby increasing governmental accountability and transparency (Andersen et al., 2010; M.
Backus, 2001; Bertot et al., 2010; Pathak et al., 2008; Shim & Eom, 2009) and how ICTs can
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improve economic and human development by reducing information asymmetry (Forestier,
Grace, & Kenny, 2002; Gascó-Hernández et al., 2007; Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Rahman, 2007).
No research has yet examined if the relationship between the ICT environment, diffusion
of specific ICTs, and the two macroeconomic variables of FDI and Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita has any potential effects on increasing transparency and reducing corruption.
Therefore, this study attempts to fill a gap in the literature by directly examining the effects of
the relationship of the ICT environment, diffusion of specific ICTs, FDI and GDP per capita on
corruption and transparency through structural equation modeling.
1.3 Significance and Purpose of Study
Research on how ICT diffusion and environment can be used to increase governmental
transparency and reduce corruption is important for several reasons. First, as suggested by Soper
(2007), research into using ICTs to increase transparency and reduce corruption provides the
“best scientific advice possible to world leaders who are seeking to lift their citizens…”(p. 8).
ICTs have the ability to support the free exchange of information, thereby informing citizens
about their government and society. ICTs promote greater transparency by removing information
barriers and asymmetry (Sturges, 2004) and fostering civil and political freedoms (BaliamouneLutz, 2003). Indeed, there is a trend in many developed countries towards publishing information
on the Internet concerning governmental issues (García-Murillo, 2010).
Secondly, the ability of ICTs to reduce corruption can expand economic freedom. As
Vinod (1999) stated, increasing economic freedom and education is among the top actions in
reducing corruption. There is less than optimal economic development in countries with higher
levels of corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Wei, 2000). Also,
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corruption reduces economic freedoms by placing a burden on the economy. Every dollar worth
of corruption in developing countries, when viewed as a form of illegal taxation, equates to $1.67
worth of economic burden (Vinod, 1999). The economic burden of corruption in developing
countries compounds over time and is more distortionary than actual taxes (Vinod, 1999).
Therefore, a reduction of corruption would have a significant impact in the reduction of
economic disparity.
The purpose of this study is to do as Pirannejad (2011) suggests: future research on how
specific ICTs affect political development, especially in the context of how people monitor and
hold their government accountable. First, this study attempts to fill a gap in the existing research
advocated by Pirannejad (2011) by investigating the effects of the ICT environment and the
diffusion of two specific ICTs on corruption and transparency. Secondly, this study sets forth a
robust path model of the ICT environment, the diffusion of two specific ICTs, and two
macroeconomic variables to examine the relationship among ICTs and macroeconomic variables
in providing greater government transparency and reducing corruption. As of yet, no other
research has examined such a relationship using a robust path modeling. Therefore, this study
attempts to provide a significant contribution to the existing body of research by investigating the
effect of the ICT environment and the diffusion of two specific ICTs on corruption and
transparency in the context of two macroeconomic variables.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 Corruption
Corruption has been a topic for writers and scholars since antiquity. The writer of the
Arthashastra, an ancient Indian text written around 4 BCE, talks about the eventuality of
corruption and the need to minimize it (Kautalya & Rangarajan, 1992). The academic study of
corruption has been explored in several different ways over the past sixty years in international
business, economics, and political science literature (Akçay, 2006; Arvas & Ata, 2011; Donchev
& Ujhelyi, 2009; Leff, 1964; Macrae, 1982; Mauro, 1995; McMullan, 1961; Myrdal, 1970a;
Nye, 1967; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999, 2008). Such explorations on the topic of corruption
have included: what corruption is, what the different types of corruption are, how corruption
affect governments and their citizenry, and possible anti-corruption remedies and measures.
According to Myrdal (1970a), sparse serious academic attention was given to the topic of
corruption prior to his seminal works as the topic was considered “taboo” (p. 227). Myrdal
(1970a) suggested that empirical research should be done to “establish the general nature and
extent of corruption… and any trends that are discernible” (p. 231). Earlier examination into
systemic corruption focused on the moral, cultural, and historical causes and effects of
corruption, while later studies began to examine institutional and political aspects of corruption
(Galtung & Pope, 1999).
Several researchers have previously undertaken the task of defining corruption such as
Myrdal (1970a), Heidenheimer (1970), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Macrae (1982), Colander
(1984), and Ades and Di Tella (1999). Most authors admit that defining and conceptualizing
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corruption is difficult, thereby hindering research in the area (Farrales, 2005; Peters & Welch,
1978). There are a wide range of activities described in the research literature that can be
classified as corrupt practices, from advantageous influence over and lobbying on government
and political agents, to outright illegal activities such as bribery, extortion, and fraud.
Furthermore, operationalizing corruption has proven difficult since corrupt behavior does not
lend itself to direct, unbiased, and measurable observation (Andvig et al., 2000). Rose-Ackerman
(1978) stated that corruption must be examined using political science and modern economics.
This approach combines the economist’s models of self-interested behavior with the political
scientist’s understanding of bureaucratic incentive structures.
Rose-Ackerman (1978) examined corruption through extending the principal-agent
model found in the economics and political science research literature. The principal-agent
model arises from the division of labor and exchange (Smith, 1776). The principal is someone
who wishes for some action to be done but cannot or does not perform the action. The principal
enlists the services of the agent to perform the desired action on the principal’s behalf (Laffont,
2003). In political science, the principal consists of voters who enlist elected officials as agents
to govern on the electorate’s behalf. In the Rose-Ackerman (1978) principal-agent model,
corruption is primarily bribery of an agent who is an elected or appointed official. The principal
of this agent is the electorate or some supervisor who specifies desired outcomes. As monitoring
of the agent is costly, in terms of time and resources, the agent has some freedom to place his
own interest above that of the principal. A third person who can benefit from the agent’s action
or inaction offers the agent an incentive (e.g. a bribe) to influence his actions. The benefits of
these incentives are not usually passed on to the principal. These incentives do not necessarily

9
subvert the principal’s objectives, and in some cases, the principal may be more satisfied with
the agent’s performance.
Another relevant model of corruption is that of Macrae (1982) in which corruption is
defined as an “arrangement” (p. 678) involving “a private exchange between two parties (the
‘demander’ and the ‘supplier’), which (1) has an influence on the allocation of resources either
immediately or in the future, and (2) involves the use or abuse of public or collective
responsibility for private ends” (p. 678). Thus, corruption is the use of public office or power for
personal gain. In contrast to the Rose-Ackerman (1978) model, which examines corruption
through the principal-agent problem, Macrae (1982)’s model of corruption explores a supply and
demand relationship for the reallocation of public resources for private gain. Hence, corruption
allows the misallocation of public resources, thereby creating bias against technological
advances and efficient projects and practices (Mauro, 1995).
Corruption, according to Myrdal (1970a), has one defining aspect being the “difference in
mores as to where, when, and how to make personal gain” (p. 233). Myrdal (1970a) further states
that corruption introduces “irrationality” (p. 233) in government planning and fulfillment. Such
irrationality influences development in such a way as to deviate from the intended plan and
fulfillment for personal gain. Corruption, thereby, hampers the decision-making and execution
processes at all levels of government (Myrdal, 1970a). Nye (1967) defined corruption as
“behavior [that] deviates from the formal duties of a public role of private-regarding …
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of privateregarding influence” (p. 416). Nye (1967)’s definition speaks of formal rules and duties and is
expansive, including such practices as nepotism, misappropriation, conflicts of interest, and
bribery.
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A widely utilized definition of corruption put forth by Heidenheimer, Johnston, and Le
Vine (1989) and Rose-Ackerman (1978) is that corruption is a transactional relationship between
public and private sector agents by which collective goods or services are converted
(illegitimately) into private gains. Scholars in the study of corruption focus on one of two types
of corruption: bureaucratic or political (Farrales, 2005). Furthermore, Huntington (1968a) posed
that political corruption can exist in two forms. Some scholars propose that any valid assessment
of corruption must include political dimensions (Hope & Chikulo, 2000; Johnston, 1997).
Political corruption is generally viewed as the practice of using wealth, power, or status to
influence the political system in order to gain political advantage. Conversely, another form of
political corruption is when politicians use political influence and advantage to gain private
wealth, power, or status. Political corruption usually takes place with highly placed or elected
officials and is furthered by policy or legislation formation tailored to benefit the corrupt officials
(Moody-Stuart, 1997). Bureaucratic corruption is the corrupt behavior in the administration of
public policy. It seeks to influence governmental processes, such as obtaining permits or
avoiding tariffs, or paying government enforcement officials.
Corruption can also be defined in economic and social terms. Economic corruption
involves the exchange of tangible goods in a market-like situation such as bribes or rent-seeking
(Andvig et al., 2000). Rent-seeking is often classified as a type of economic corruption. This
type of corruption involves misuse of public power to derive excess earnings by the elimination
of competition (Ades & Di Tella, 1999). Rent-seeking is not necessarily banned by legislation or
shunned by society’s moral obligation. However, it reduces public wealth in favor of private gain
and generally proves economically wasteful and inefficient (Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman, 2000).
Social corruption is understood best as an integrated part of clientelism, nepotism, class or group
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favoritism. In such social corruption, there is an exchange of material benefit based on some
criteria having a large social or cultural implication (Briquet & Sawicki, 1998).
Amundsen (1999) put forth five main manifestations of corruption: bribery,
embezzlement, fraud, extortion, and favoritism. The first and most quintessential manifestation
of corruption is bribery. Bribery is a payment, usually to a government official, to receive some
governmental benefit. Bribery has many effective forms such as kickbacks and pay-offs. The
second manifestation of corruption is embezzlement. While embezzlement is not strict
corruption, its practice deprives the government of funds. It is similar to bribery except that it
typically does not involve the private sector. The third manifestation of corruption is fraud. This
type of corruption involves the manipulation or distortion of information or fact by public
officials. Fraud, similar to the Rose-Ackerman (1978) principal-agent model, involves an agent
(e.g. public official) who carries out the directives of his principals (e.g. supervisors). The agent
manipulates the flow of information for some illegal gain that may or may not benefit the
principal (Eskeland, Thiele, & World Bank, 1999). The fourth type of corruption manifestation is
extortion. Similar to bribery, this method extracts benefits by way of coercion, violence, or threat
of force. Bribery and extortion are equivalent to extra taxes levied by – but not collected for – the
government (Wei, 1997). The fifth manifestation of corruption is favoritism. This mechanism of
corruption allows the differential access to governmental power or state resources regardless of
merit. This method of corrupt behavior can be examined as enfranchising (e.g. preferential
treatment, cronyism, and nepotism) or disenfranchising (e.g. discrimination) based on some
criteria having a large social or cultural implication (Briquet & Sawicki, 1998).
The wide-ranging definition used by the World Bank, Transparency International and
most scholars is that corruption is the abuse of public power for private benefit or profit
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(Amundsen, 1999; Andvig et al., 2000; Gray & Kaufmann, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Most
literature examines governmental corruption, which is the relationship between the public and
private entities engaged in corrupt behaviors. However, there exists corruption among private
businesses and non-governmental organizations (Andvig et al., 2000). This private sector
corruption exists with or without the involvement of a government official or political advantage.
Corruption is difficult to measure directly. Peters and Welch (1978) and Farrales (2005)
noted that defining and conceptualizing corruption is difficult, thus hindering research in the
area. There are a multitude of activities that can be classified as corrupt practices which makes
operationalizing of corruption difficult. Corrupt practices would have to be measured by an
unbiased observer familiar with rules and policies in a given context. Most corrupt behavior does
not lend itself to such direct, unbiased, and measurable observation (Andvig et al., 2000).
One observable measure of corruption is court cases. Such judiciary data on corruption is
collected on an international basis by the United Nations’ Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Division (United Nations, 1999). In such court cases, legal officials determine whether
transactions or exchanges were actually corrupt. While court cases can provide an observable
measure, Andvig et al. (2000) pointed out several issues with using such observations. First,
using such court cases as an indication or prevalence of corruption relies on the honesty of the
local judiciaries. Intraregional and international differences obviously exist in the honesty of
judiciaries which make such observations problematic in a cross-country analysis. Secondly,
local policing, judicial and political priorities usually determine which cases are prosecuted. Goel
and Nelson (1998) suggest that court cases on corruption represent more of the judicial
efficiency rather than corruption prevalence in a country. Police and other investigatory agencies
reporting on corruption provide an additional observable measure of corruption. The quality of
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information from such agencies, however, is quite inconsistent and biased (Andvig, 1995;
Duyne, 1996).
News reports and other investigative journalistic methods are another way to measure and
fight corruption (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005). However, using such news reports and
investigative journalism as an observable measure of corruption is problematic. News and media
reports of corruption can show bias in a similar fashion to court cases and policing reports.
Media and news reports tend to give priority to high-profile or sensational cases. This selective
priority creates a bias that may not examine or expose the more pervasive everyday corrupt
activities. Furthermore, reported stories often are a factor of press freedom which are not uniform
among countries (Nixon, 1960). Therefore, the effectiveness of a free press on reducing
corruption largely relies on the measure of press freedom (Brunetti & Weder, 2003). Also, public
exposure of corruption and crime can be dangerous for the reporting journalists (Archibold,
2012). Corrupt and criminal officials typically do not care for such negative exposure due to
repercussions from law enforcement or other criminal elements. Sources of corruption are
strongly influenced by such biases as media attention, public opinion, and press freedom, making
it difficult to use such stories in a cross-country comparison.
Though corruption is difficult to define, conceptualize, and operationalize (Farrales,
2005; Peters & Welch, 1978), there have been attempts to develop an empirical measure of
corruption. These attempts to develop an empirical measure of corruption as based on the
perception of corruption rather than the actual instances or experiences of corruption. There is
some academic debate on whether a perception-based measure can adequately compare to an
experience-based measure (Donchev & Ujhelyi, 2009; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007,

14
2010). However, the indices listed below became the de facto empirical measures of corruption
used in academic research (Lambsdorff, 1999a; Lancaster & Montinola, 1997).
Business International Corporation (BI) created one of the first corruption perception
measurements. BI was a business advisory firm founded in 1953 which assisted American
companies in foreign business operations. BI surveyed its network of international
businesspeople, journalists, and country specialists, determining whether or not and to what
extent businesses were engaged in corruption transactions. BI also gathered survey data on such
factors as political risk, commercial hazard, and level of corruption in various countries. This
perceived level of corruption was measured on a scale from 0 to 10. BI undertook efforts to make
ranks consistent among respondents. Using the BI data for fifty-two countries, Mauro (1995)
conducted the first quantitative study of corruption using an econometric model. Mauro (1995)’s
study examined the effect of corruption on the economic growth rate. As a result, Mauro (1995)
found that corruption lowered investment, which in turn lowered economic growth.
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) contains another well-known corruption
perception measurement. The ICRG has been published since 1980, making it the longest
country risk analysis dataset. The ICRG measures several country factors, but the one most
related to corruption is the ICRG bureaucratic quality scale. The scale measures expert opinions,
from 1 to 6, and shows how efficiently and predictable bureaucrats operate (S. Johnson,
Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobatón, 1998). The ICRG is published by the Political Risk Services
Group and provides a monthly political, economic, and financial risk ranking for 140 countries.
The Political Risk Services Group, founded in 1979, is one of the earliest commercial providers
of political and country risk data to companies doing international business. The ICRG also
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contains the rule-of-law scale, from 0 to 6, measuring the strength and application of law and
order in the country.
Arguably the most well-known and widely-used index of corruption is the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International (TI) which is an international nongovernmental organization founded in 1993 that monitors and reports on political and corporate
corruption in international development (Andvig et al., 2000; Brown, 2006; De Maria, 2008;
Lambsdorff, 1999b; Svensson, 2005). The CPI measures the perceived degree of corruption that
exists among public officials and politicians (Lambsdorff, 1999a). The CPI is the most widely
disseminated and popular index among policymakers. It is a composite index including survey
data from country experts, businesspeople, global analysts, and experts who are residents of the
evaluated countries (Svensson, 2005). The CPI focuses on perceptions of public sector
corruption. This index ranks countries on a scale from 10 (representing a very clean/very little
corruption government) to 0 (representing a highly corrupt government). TI uses 17 different
surveys and polls from 10 independent organizations: Freedom House (FH); Gallup International
(GI); The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); Institute of Management Development (IMD);
International Working Group (developing the Crime Victim Survey); Political and Economic
Risk Consultancy (PERC); Political Risk Service (PRS); The Wall Street Journal - Central
European Economic Review (CEER); World Bank and University of Basel (WB/UB); and
World Economic Forum (WEF). The CPI is widely-used as there is a high degree of correlation
between the 17 polls and surveys used (Lambsdorff, 1999a). The use of several different survey
instruments and the high inter-correlation between instruments results provide a major strength
to the CPI. The surveys cover a wide range of corrupt behaviors and practices, and they do not
distinguish between bureaucratic and political corruption (Lambsdorff, 1999a).
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The CPI is an index ranking and should be understood as such. Lambsdorff (1999b)
points out several caveats to understanding the CPI. First, countries for which at least three
surveys were available are represented in the index. Several countries are not included for lack of
available data. Secondly, the index is a perception of corruption and not based on a standardized
estimation of the level of corruption. For example, the 2010 CPI ranked Mexico as 3.1 and
United Arab Emirates was ranked 6.3. This does not imply that the United Arab Emirates is half
as corrupt as Mexico. The index is best used in observing trends over time and comparing
relative positions of countries to one another (Galtung, 1998).
While corruption is considered difficult to measure, corruption indexes are highly
correlated with one another. For example, the CPI and BI indexes for 1996 and 1998 were highly
correlated at 0.967 and 0.966 (Andvig et al., 2000; Treisman, 2000). The BI and CPI indexes
show a similar high correlation to the ICRG (Andvig et al., 2000). While there are differences
among the surveys and their methodologies, the high correlation implies that levels of perceived
corruption are consistent among countries (Lambsdorff, 1999a).
Some scholars suggest that corruption has been the norm throughout human history
(Klitgaard, 1988; Neild, 2002). Huntington (1968a) stated that lack of political or economic
opportunities creates an environment by which people use wealth to buy power or pursue wealth
by use of political power. One hypothesized cause of bureaucratic corruption is that government
officials and civil servants maximize expected income (Becker & Stigler, 1974). Corrupt
behavior is generally punished by job loss which provides a disincentive to engage in such
behavior. However, bureaucratic corruption is more prevalent when the bribe levels are relatively
high, the probability of detection is low, and/or the punishment for corrupt behavior is slight
(Becker & Stigler, 1974).
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Another hypothesis, the fair wage-effort, expounds that government officials and civil
servants may forego corrupt behavior if their official government wages are high enough
(Akerlof & Yellen, 1990). Tanzi (1995) found that low wages invite corruption and lead to
societal acceptance of the practice. According to Becker (1968)’s seminar work, “Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach,” individuals, including government officials, make
rational decisions between criminal and legal actions based on the probability of detection and
severity of the punishment. Based on Becker (1968)’s considerations, the lack of appropriate
wages, stronger investigatory agents, and harsher punishments, foster an environment for
corruption.
Political science scholars view corruption as being caused by deficits in the democratic
systems such as power-sharing, accountability and transparency, governmental checks and
balances (Doig & Theobald, 1999). Corruption, in the view of political scientists, is seen as a
lack of functioning democratic state, ethical leadership and good governance (Hope & Chikulo,
2000). Friedrich (1989) stated that corruption is inversely proportional to the amount of
democracy. There exists a correlation between non-democratic rule and corruption (Amundsen,
1999). It is important to note that in non-democratic regimes, corruption’s impact is somewhat
mitigated by the level of functionality and control of the government (Girling, 2002). In regimes
where the government exercises tighter control over the political environment and economy, the
level of corruption is also controlled. This control makes the corruption more predictable and
less economically and developmentally destructive (Campos et al., 1999).
Political scientists have examined internal and external political factors that cause and
promote corruption. The internal view put forth by Myrdal (1970b) is that modernization
promoted industrialization and economic and development growth. Corruption was the result of
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a failed or incomplete modernization process which left the countries in a mixed state between
traditionalism and modernism. Corruption, in this view, would decrease as markets and
government became more modern and efficient. The external political factor view puts forth that
corruption is a product of external states and multinational corporations exploiting the
underdeveloped countries, thereby creating and fostering corruption (Blomström & Hettne,
1984).
Another political science area of corruption research has developed called the “neopatrimonial” approach. Scholars such as Hope and Chikulo (2000) and Coolidge and RoseAckerman (2000) state that in African and several small countries, the core characteristic of
governance is founded on personal relationships. These relationships form the foundation of the
political system, and there exists a weak distinction between public and private interests and
affairs (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Briquet & Sawicki, 1998). Such government constructs
are characterized by high-ranking government officials engaging in rent-seeking behaviors that
produce excessive intervention into the economy. This intervention, thus, creates and prorogates
monopolies, inefficiencies, contradictory government regulations that obstruct overall economic
growth (Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman, 2000).
Most of the world’s current bureaucratic structures existing today are a result of Western
European influences. The notions of the legal authority model of governance and public office
are very much European constructs (Weber, 1958). In legal authority governance, there is a
tremendous non-ambiguous distinction between public office and private interest. This
distinction is important in the modern study of corruption since the popular definition of
corruption is based on using public office for private gain. The modern European form of
bureaucratic governance developed over a long process in such countries as England and Spain

19
as a result of long political struggles that eventually became codified and embedded in European
cultural and political thought (Scott, 1969). The European model of governance was further
developed by the late nineteenth century movement for government accountability (Scott, 1969).
In some cases, the copying or patterning of European government and bureaucratic
structure to other countries occurred in a “schizophrenic” fashion (de Sardan, 1999, p. 47). Many
countries, either by choice or by force, adopted European bureaucratic processes such as
governance through legal authority and accountability through public oversight. However, in
several of those countries, such methods of governance and accountability were not the norm.
For example, in Africa and South Asia, such European bureaucratic structures based on legal
authority were adopted out of the legacy of colonialism in spite of conflicting cultural or political
norms (de Sardan, 1999). The adoption of such European bureaucratic structures in these
countries were fraught with problematic issues such as viewing the colonial government as
illegitimate, mistrusting and becoming increasingly frustrated with government officials, and
disenfranchising the governed (R. Cohen, 1980).
The effects of corruption are widely debated in international business literature. Some
authors suggest that corruption provides some economic benefit (Huntington, 1968b; Leff,
1964). Some authors have identified corruption as one of the major reasons for the decline and
fall of the Roman Empire (MacMullen, 1988; Murphy, 2007; Stinger, 1985). Corruption
produces a heavy burden on the poorest in a society who are less able to navigate the system of
corruption for equal gains and distorts the state’s ability to operate efficiently and effectively
(Doig & Theobald, 1999). This excess burden and lack of efficiency and effectiveness manifests
itself as the inability to redistribute resources, implement public policy, and collect taxes.
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Corruption negatively impacts foreign and domestic investments, thus hampering
economic growth and development (Ades & Di Tella, 1996; Macrae, 1982; Mauro, 1995;
Robertson & Watson, 2004). Vinod (1999) pointed out that every $1 of corruption, when viewed
as illegal taxation, created a $1.67 burden on the economy. Conversely, some forms of
corruption have been found to be beneficial. Bribes, for example, can expedite bureaucratic
processes, improve economic efficiency, and incentivize government employees to work harder.
Bardhan (1997) stated that corruption might increase bureaucratic efficiency by speeding up the
process of decision making in the presence of rigid regulation. By bribing government officials,
firms can avoid such “inconveniences” as import tariffs or license requirements and provide
“motivation” to hardworking government officials. In this case, corruption can be viewed as a
tax on business operations. However, the research shows that the disadvantage of this type of
corruption greatly outweighs its potential benefit. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) demonstrate that
bribes have a higher cost than taxes due to their inherent uncertainty and secrecy. Firms utilizing
this form of corruption typically spend more time negotiating with bureaucrats, thereby
increasing the cost of capital (Kaufmann & Wei, 1999). Corruption, in the form of bribery,
creates an economic societal gap between those who are financially able to pay for access to
government resources and those who are not.
Corrupt practices not only make public power less efficient but also adversely affect
countries’ competitiveness and human development (Akçay, 2006). The effect of corruption on
human development has shown to be more evident in some countries than others
(Waheeduzzaman, 2005). For example, many sub-Saharan peasant farmers engaged in
subsistence crop production as a means of avoiding corruption which ultimately led to a reduced
living standard (Bates, 1981). Other studies have demonstrated that corruption has a mitigating
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effect on economic development. International investment in the form of foreign direct
investment (FDI) into countries perceived as “more corrupt” is substantially less than countries
without this perception (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Thus, countries with higher levels of
corruption suffer from less than optimal economic development. The detrimental effect of
unpredictable corruption has been found to be economically significant (Wei, 2000). A higher
level of corruption coupled with higher level of uncertainty caused by the corruption reduces FDI
inflows (Campos et al., 1999).
Given the effects of corruption, significant time and energy has been placed into reducing
or eliminating it. The Chinese Qin dynasty penal code had specific provisions and punishments
for corruption (Lambsdorff, 1999a). The Council of Areopagus had, among its other duties, a
requirement to report corrupt behavior (Wilson, 1989). Acemoglu and Verdier (2001), Akerlof
and Yellen (1990) and Tanzi (1995) suggest that public wage changes should be prominently
discussed as part of anti-corruption policy. Corruption thrives on information asymmetry. One
method of reducing corruption has been to reduce the information asymmetry by means of
newspaper articles informing the public. There is evidence that such methods have a positive
impact on the reduction of corruption (Chowdhury, 2004; Reinikka & Svensson, 2005). For
example, a Ugandan newspaper campaign provided parents with public funding information on
local schools (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005). By providing parents with such vital information
regarding the handling of public funds, there was a significant reduction in the misallocation of
such funds and an increase in student enrollment and learning.
Political scientists see corruption as a lack of democracy (Doig & Theobald, 1999;
Friedrich, 1989; Hope & Chikulo, 2000). Following this logic, increasing democracy would
reduce corruption. Two mechanisms to increase democracy have been suggested: 1) strengthen
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democratic institutions such as legislative and judicial bodies to provide more oversight and
control, and 2) strengthen the civil and public sectors such as the media. Increasing democracy
does have a correlation for reducing levels of corruption, but such correlation has proven to be
weak (Amundsen, 1999; Paldam, 2004). In some countries, the democratization process, moving
from a controlled authoritarian regime to a loosely controlled quasi-democratic government, has
led to increased corruption (Harriss-White & White, 1996). Treisman (2000) found that the
degree of democracy was not correlated to the perception of corruption. Rauch and Peter (2000)
found that democratization through improving public institutions and bureaucratic processes,
especially predictability, reduces corruption.
A view put forth by Myrdal (1970b) suggested that modernization promoted
industrialization which leads to economic development and growth. The view also holds that
economic development and modernization would permeate through government and society,
thus eliminating corruption. This view of modernization is similar to those held by other scholars
that modern technologies are liberating and democratizing (Khan, 1998; Leon, 1984).
2.2 Information and Communication Technologies and Corruption
An important tool in modern communication and information sharing is Information and
Communication Technology (ICT). ICTs consist of two parts: devices and systems, which are
used to access, store, communicate, manipulate and share information (Melody, Mansell, &
Richards, 1986). ICT devices are instruments such as cellular phones, televisions, and computers
that are used by an individual to communicate over a network or system. ICT systems are
interconnected devices and associated infrastructure such as networks used to facilitate
communication and information sharing.
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Technological innovations such as mass production and miniaturization have lowered the
cost of ownership of several ICT devices such as computers and mobile cellular phones.
Furthermore, technological advances such as proliferation of telecommunication satellites and
broadband data communications have increased the global reach of ICT networks while reducing
the cost of access. These reductions in cost have made ownership of ICT devices and availability
of ICT systems available to a greater percentage of the world’s population. ICT diffusion
increases knowledge diffusion by facilitating and improving efficiency of communication
(Jovanovic & Rob, 1989).
However, the reduced cost and increased availability of ICTs, such as mobile cellular
phones and Internet access, have not led to uniform adaption throughout the world. This lack of
uniform adoption is known as the digital divide (Norris, 2001). The digital divide is a term given
to the inequality between groups in their knowledge of, access to, and use of ICTs (Chinn &
Fairlie, 2007). There has been much scholarly debate on the exact nature and causes of the digital
divide (Chinn & Fairlie, 2007; Crenshaw & Robison, 2006; Guillén & Suárez, 2005; Norris,
2001; Sharma, Ng, Dharmawirya, & Lee, 2008; Warf, 2001; Warschauer, 2002). Some authors
have put forth such factors as income inequality, regulatory environment, foreign and domestic
investment, cultural differences and quality of the technology as reasons for the digital divide
(Dasgupta, Lall, & Wheeler, 2001; Erumban & de Jong, 2006; Jakopin & Klein, 2011; Wallsten,
2005). For example, Gholami et al. (2006) demonstrated that increases in FDI leads to growth in
ICT investment and capacity by offering host countries more access to technology (OECD,
1991) and domestic investment (Agrawal, 2003). Jakopin and Klein (2011) showed that
regulatory quality and market environment significantly affect Internet diffusion.
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Much research and debate exists on the nature, extent, and reasons for the digital divide.
However, there is more consensus among scholars on the effects of ICTs on improving
transparency and governance. (Avgerou, 1998; Krueger, 2002; Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Soper,
2007). ICTs have proven to be tools in democratization (Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Soper, 2007),
factors in economic growth (Avgerou, 1998), methods to help the poor (Forestier et al., 2002),
and devices that facilitate and improve political involvement (Krueger, 2002, 2006; Norris,
2001). Geiger and Mia (2009) showed that mobile phone diffusion has a significant positive
effect on economic growth and poverty reduction.
One important use of ICTs, and the main focus of this study, is the reduction of
corruption. ICTs show great promise in increasing transparency and reducing corruption by
improving governance. Vinod (1999) stated that the Internet’s potential is “promising and
obviously vast” (p. 10) for reducing corruption. Research has shown that there is a negative
relationship between ICT investment and the level of political corruption in emerging
economies. Soper (2007) showed that a negative relationship exists between the level of ICT
diffusion and corruption. Additionally, Vinod (1999) stated that the top five actions in reducing
corruption, in order of importance, are as follows: 1) reducing bureaucratic overhead (e.g. red
tape), 2) increasing judiciary efficiency, 3) increasing GNP per capita, 4), increasing education
and economic freedoms, and 5) reducing inequalities in income. ICTs such as Internet access and
mobile cellular phones have the potential to do several of these actions, including informing
citizens of relevant information regarding government and society. The trend in several
developed countries includes having more transparency by publishing information on the
Internet concerning governmental issues (García-Murillo, 2010). Baliamoune-Lutz (2003)
showed that ICT diffusion fosters civil and political freedoms. Furthermore, Sturges (2004)
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showed that access to ICT promotes greater governmental transparency by removing information
barriers and asymmetry.
Increased access to the Internet and mobile communications has enabled citizens to
participate more directly in the political and social matters of their countries. This increased
participation in government, in the form of e-governance, has reduced bureaucratic overhead
while increasing governmental efficiency and transparency (Andersen et al., 2010; M. Backus,
2001; Bertot et al., 2010). In several countries, Internet access has become a surrogate for
judiciary efficiency. In countries such as India, Kenya, and Mexico, citizens are using ICTs to
draw attention to governmental corruption and civilian crime that would otherwise go unreported
or unprosecuted (M. Backus, 2001).
Citizens engaging in societal participation have used ICTs to organize, communicate, and
raise awareness in such ways as the Arab Spring Revolution in the Arab world and news
webloggers who expose Mexico’s narcotic traffickers atrocities. Pirannejad (2011) found that
diffusion of ICT increases citizens’ networking capacity and political awareness while reducing
their transaction costs. Soper (2007) showed that a negative relationship exists between ICT
investment and the level of political corruption in emerging economies. Hay and Shleifer (1998)
noted that private enforcement of public laws is a market response to poor governmental control.
Some examples of this participation are e-governance and news blogging (Katz & Lai, 2009).
2.3 Research Hypotheses
Based on the above presented literature review, several research hypotheses were
addressed in this study. Stated below are those research hypotheses and supporting literature.
Following the presentation of the research hypotheses and supporting literature, a theoretical
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model is presented. This theoretical model shows the specific predicted relationships between the
independent, mediating, and dependent variables. The expected direction of each hypothesized
relationship is shown as either positive (+) or negative (-).
As stated in the above literature, there is a digital divide that exists between groups in
their knowledge of, access to, and use of ICTs (Chinn & Fairlie, 2007). Foreign and domestic
investment and income inequality have been contributing factors for the digital divide (Dasgupta
et al., 2001; Erumban & de Jong, 2006). As shown in previous research, macroeconomic
variables such FDI and GDP per capita have an impact on ICT investment and capacity
(Gholami et al., 2006; Kshetri & Cheung, 2002; OECD, 1991; Suh & Khan, 2003). For example,
FDI presents host countries with access to newer technology (OECD, 1991). The increase in FDI
inflows also increases domestic investment in ICT (Agrawal, 2003). Furthermore, Gholami et al.
(2006) demonstrated that ICT investment and capacity increases with the inflow of FDI.
Similarly, Kshetri and Cheung (2002) showed that rapid mobile cellular phone diffusion in China
was due to large FDI inflow and rapid economic growth.
As stated earlier, Vinod (1999) suggested that two of the top five actions in reducing
corruption were increasing GNP per capita and increasing education and economic freedoms.
While GNP and GDP are closely related, there are some important differences. GNP measures
all output generated by a country based on ownership of the means of production. In comparison,
GDP measures all output generated by a country based on geographic location of the means of
production. There are some scholars who suggest that the GNP, instead of GDP, is the most
accurate measure of economy well-being and market activity (Brezina, 2012; Stiglitz, 2009).
However, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (1991) has stated that “virtually all other countries
have already adopted GDP as their primary measure of production” (p. 8). According to Ringen
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(1991), GDP per capita is the most widely used macroeconomic indicator of a country’s standard
of living. Dewan, Ganley, and Kraemer (2005) found that GDP per capita had a positive effect
on ICT diffusion.
A measure of the ICT environment among countries is the Networked Readiness Index
(NRI) published in the Global Information Technology Report by the World Economic Forum
together with INSEAD (French name "INStitut Européen d'ADministration des Affaires", or
European Institute of Business Administration). The NRI measures the degree to which a country
is positioned to utilize its ICT infrastructure for international competitiveness (Dutta, Lanvin, &
Paua, 2003). The NRI is made of two parts: an index score and a rank. The index score is the
numerical combination of the various ICT-related component and subcomponent indexes. There
are three major component indexes in the NRI: environment, readiness, and usage (Dutta et al.,
2003). The environment component examines the market, political, regulatory, and infrastructure
environment that facilitate ICT development. The readiness component index reflects the
preparedness of individuals, governments, and businesses to employ ICT resources to their
fullest potential. Lastly, the usage component index indicates the level of usage among
individuals, governments, and businesses. The NRI rank score is the particular country’s
numerical rank based on its index score.
The NRI provides an index for measuring the ICT environment and the level of ICT
diffusion. GDP per capita and FDI should have a positive effect on NRI based on the research by
Dewan et al. (2005) and Gholami et al. (2006). This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: FDI has a positive effect on networked readiness.
Hypothesis 1b: GDP per capita has a positive effect on networked readiness.
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As previously stated, the NRI measures the degree by which a country is ready to use its
ICT infrastructure. A component of the NRI is the usage of ICTs such as computers, telephone,
and Internet usage. This usage component of the NRI also includes the diffusion of Internet
access and mobile cellular phone usage among the country’s population.
Access to the Internet and mobile cellular phone usage are important ways for citizens to
more readily participate in their country’s political and social matters. For example, egovernance has reduced bureaucratic overhead while increasing governmental efficiency and
transparency (Andersen et al., 2010; M. Backus, 2001; Bertot et al., 2010). Furthermore, Geiger
and Mia (2009) showed that mobile phone diffusion has a significant positive effect on economic
growth and poverty reduction.
The difference between Internet access and mobile cellular phone as separate ICT
modalities is slowly disappearing. Baliamoune-Lutz (2003) stated that differences between
communication technology (e.g. mobile phones) and information technology (e.g. the Internet)
have become blurred. While the Internet is an indicator of information technology, consumers
can access data and information via mobile phones (H.-W. Kim, Chan, & Gupta, 2007). For
example, in Japan, approximately 40% of the population accesses the Internet via mobile phones
(Kenichi, 2004).
Based on the above literature, the state of ICT infrastructure, as measured through the
NRI, should have a positive effect on the diffusion of Internet access and mobile cellular phones.
Jakopin and Klein (2011) found that regulatory quality and market environment, two
components of the NRI, significantly benefit Internet diffusion. Also, based on the finding of

29
Kenichi (2004), mobile cellular phone diffusion should lead to an increase diffusion of Internet
access. This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Networked readiness has a positive effect on Internet diffusion.
Hypothesis 2b: Networked readiness has a positive effect on mobile phone diffusion.
Hypothesis 2c: Mobile phone diffusion has a positive effect on Internet diffusion.
ICT has been shown to promote greater governmental transparency by removing
information barriers and asymmetry (Sturges, 2004). Diffusion of ICTs raises citizens’
participation in governance by increasing networking capacity and political awareness while
reducing their transaction costs (Pirannejad, 2011). ICTs such as Internet access enables citizens
to stay informed with relevant information about their government and society. E-governance
and social media, which rely heavily on the Internet, also promote openness and transparency in
government (Bertot et al., 2010). Additionally, García-Murillo (2010) found that access and
diffusion of relevant information concerning governmental issues promotes greater transparency.
S. M. Johnson (1998) and Cuillier and Piotrowski (2009) demonstrated that the Internet
expands public access to government information. Jakopin and Klein (2011) found that Internet
diffusion significantly predicts governmental transparency, as measured by the Voice and
Accountability indicator of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. Based on the
above cited research, Internet diffusion and mobile cellular diffusion should positively affect the
level of transparency. These premises lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: Internet diffusion has a positive effect on transparency.
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Hypothesis 3b: Mobile phone diffusion has a positive effect on transparency.
Some authors have put forth the positive effects of ICTs on improving transparency and
governance (Avgerou, 1998; Krueger, 2002; Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Soper, 2007). ICTs have
been shown to be a tool in democratization (Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Soper, 2007) and a device
that facilities and improves political involvement (Krueger, 2002, 2006; Norris, 2001).
ICTs improve governance by increasing transparency and reducing corruption. There
exists a negative relationship between ICT investment and the level of political corruption in
emerging economies (Soper, 2007). Baliamoune-Lutz (2003) showed that ICT diffusion fosters
civil and political freedoms. Access to ICTs promotes greater governmental transparency by
removing information barriers and asymmetry (Sturges, 2004). In addition, increased
government participation by citizens in such forms of e-governance has been shown to increase
transparency while reducing bureaucratic overhead (Andersen et al., 2010; M. Backus, 2001;
Bertot et al., 2010).
Increased transparency through initiatives such as e-governance has been shown to be an
effective anti-corruption tool (Bertot et al., 2010). A lack of transparency can exacerbate
corruption-related problems (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Similarly, Brunetti and Weder (2003)
found a strong association between transparency through greater press freedom and less
corruption.
The main focus of this study is to explore the relationships between ICT diffusion and
corruption. Given the above stated research and the goals of this study, the relationship between
the diffusion of specific ICTs and reduction of corruption will be examined. This leads to the
following hypotheses:

31
Hypothesis 4a: Internet diffusion has a negative effect on corruption.
Hypothesis 4b: Transparency has a negative effect on corruption.
Hypothesis 4c: Mobile phone diffusion has a negative effect on corruption.
The diffusion of ICTs, levels of transparency, and levels of corruption is not uniform
throughout the world. One common thread set forth in prior research attempting to explain the
non-uniform diffusion of technology and differences in transparency and corruption among
countries are national culture differences and technology quality (Erumban & de Jong, 2006;
Husted, 1999; Kenichi, 2004; Luo, 2008; Moghadam & Assar, 2008; Paldam, 2004).
In order to account for the effects of national culture differences, various studies
examining ICT effects use the Hofstede Cultural Dimension framework (Erumban & de Jong,
2006; Moghadam & Assar, 2008; Straub, Keil, & Brenner, 1997; Stulz & Williamson, 2003).
The Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices are the result of work by Geert Hofstede involving
cultural dimensions of a society and how these dimensions affect behavior (Hofstede, Hofstede,
& Minkov, 2010). Hofstede’s analysis of national cultures identified four anthropological
systematic differences: power distance (PDI), individualism (IDV), uncertainty avoidance (UAI)
and masculinity (MAS) (Hofstede, 1984). In 1991, Hofstede added the additional cultural
dimension of long term orientation (LTO) (Hofstede, 1997).
The Hofstede Cultural Dimension framework has been used extensively in prior research.
Erumban and de Jong (2006) found that power distance and uncertainty avoidance, two
dimensions of the Hofstede Cultural Dimension framework, directly influence ICT adoption.
Similarly, Straub et al. (1997) suggest that power distance and uncertainty avoidance may
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account for differences in e-mail usage. Furthermore, de Mooij and Hofstede (2002) state that
culture replaces such things as personal income and national wealth in consumer consumption
patterns and that Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance was related to such things as embracement of
the Internet and the ownership of computers and mobile cellular phones. Given the potential
influences of national cultural differences, dimensions of the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions
framework were used as national culture control variables.
2.4 Theoretical Model
The literature cited in the above review suggests there are complex relationships that
exist between key macroeconomic variables, ICT indices, corruption, and transparency. A deeper
understanding and explanation of these relationships provide the foundation for this study. A
brief description of the key and control variables is presented below. These key and control
variables are discussed in further detail in section 3.3 Variable Description.
This study used seven key variables and five control variables in the theoretical model.
The independent macroeconomic key variables in the theoretical model are Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) and Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita). The independent
macroeconomic key variable of FDI is the net inflow of investment (measured in current U.S.
dollars) into a domestic economy by foreign investors. The independent macroeconomic key
variable of GDP per capita measures the gross domestic product divided by the midyear
population.
The intervening key ICT variables in the theoretical model are Networked Readiness
Index (NRI), Internet diffusion, and Mobile diffusion. The intervening key ICT variable of NRI
measures the degree to which a country is positioned to use its ICT infrastructure for
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international competitiveness. The intervening key ICT variable of Internet diffusion measures
the distribution of Internet access within a country. The intervening key ICT variable of Mobile
diffusion measures the dispersion of mobile cellular phone access within a country. The
intervening and dependent governance key variable of Transparency measures the degree to
which governmental officials and processes are visible and accountable to those who are
governed. This study’s main dependent governance key variable of Corruption measures the
degree of corrupt practices in a country’s public sector.
This study also utilized five control variables. Four of these control variables were used
as national culture control variables to examine potential cultural factors influencing the main
dependent variable. These national culture control variables included the Hofstede Cultural
Dimension indices of Power Distance, Individualism vs. Collectivism, Long- vs. Short-Term
Orientation, and Uncertainty Avoidance. The national cultural control variable of power distance
(H-PDI) measures the extent to which less powerful members of society accept and/or expect
unequal distribution of power. The national cultural control variable for individualism versus
collectivism (H-IDV) measures the extent to which individuals are incorporated into groups. The
national cultural control variable for long- versus short-term orientation (H-LTO) measures the
future orientation of a society. The national cultural control variable for uncertainty avoidance
(H-UAI) measures the degree of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. The year was also used
as a control variable. The control variable of year was included as a twelfth variable in order to
control for potential multiple year effects. The control variable of year is not considered to be a
key variable, but it is shown in the theoretical model.
Figure 2.1 presents the hypothesized relationships between the key and control variables
in a theoretical model based on supporting literature cited. As shown in Figure 2.1, the
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theoretical model illustrates these relationships along with their predicted effects. Figure 2.1 also
shows the control variables used in the study. The theoretical model shows the expected
direction of each hypothesized relationship and the expected effect of each relationship between
dependent, mediating and independent variables as either positive (+) or negative (-).

Figure 2-1. Theoretical model with hypotheses and predicted effects.

The theoretical model used in this study will be analyzed using path analysis. This
theoretical model hypothesizes complex and intervening relationships. By using path analysis,
indirect and total effects of variables within the model can be examined. Additionally, the model
contains two or more variables pointing at one variable. Such multivariate adjustments may
affect how the hypotheses are interpreted.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The research design and methodology are explained in this section. In the first part of this
section, an overview of the sample countries used in the study is provided. In the second part of
this section, the variables used in the study are presented along with a focus on data collection
and data sources. In the third part of this section, a detailed description of each variable is
provided. In the fourth part of this section, the methods used to prepare the data for analysis such
as completeness and multicollinearity tests are described. Finally, in the fifth and final part of
this section, the method of data analysis is described.
3.1 Sample Design
As of 2012, there were 193 existing sovereign states and countries (United Nations,
2012). This study examined 121 countries of those 193 countries. Table 3-1 provides a list of the
countries selected for analysis in this study. Countries were selected for inclusion in the study
based on data availability of the key variables. The countries used in this study are representative
of a diverse range of economic and political structures. The key and control variables used in this
study are enumerated and described in section 3.3: Variable Description. This study used multiyear data for these key and control variables collected over a period from 2006 to 2010.
The study excludes 72 sovereign states and countries. These sovereign states and
countries were excluded due to lack of data availability of the key variables (Messner, 1992).
Key variable data was collected from several multinational datasets from various sources such as
the World Bank World Development Indicators, World Economic Forum Global Information
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Technology Report, World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, and Transparency
International.

Table 3-1. List of countries used in this study.
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic

Denmark
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia

Lesotho

Romania

Lithuania

Russia

Luxembourg
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar

Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Tanzania
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
USA
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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3.2 Data Collection
Data for the key and control variables was collected by country and year using several
online databases for the 121 countries used in this study. Table 3-2 summarizes the key and
control variables and their related data sources. Data for the macroeconomic variables of FDI
and GDP per capita used in this study were collected from the World Bank World Development
Indicators. Data for the ICT variables of Internet diffusion and Mobile diffusion used in this
study were collected from the World Bank World Development Indicators. Data for the ICT
variable of NRI used in this study was collected from the World Economic Forum Global
Information Technology Report.

Table 3-2. Data sources for variables.
Variable
Transparency

Measure
Voice and Accountability Indicator

Corruption
Internet diffusion

Corruption Perceptions Index
Internet users (per 100 people)

Mobile diffusion

Mobile cellular subscriptions per
100 people
Foreign direct investment, net
inflows (balance of payments,
current US$)
Networked Readiness Index

FDI

NRI
GDP per capita
H-PDI
H-UAI
H-LTO
H-IDV

Gross Domestic Product per capita
(current US$)
Power Distance Index
Uncertainty Avoidance Index
Long-Term Orientation Index
Individuality Index

Source
World Bank Worldwide
Governance Indicators
Transparency International
The World Bank World
Development Indicators
The World Bank World
Development Indicators
The World Bank World
Development Indicators
World Economic Forum Global
Information Technology Report
The World Bank World
Development Indicators
Hofstede Dimension Data Matrix
Hofstede Dimension Data Matrix
Hofstede Dimension Data Matrix
Hofstede Dimension Data Matrix
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Data for the variable of Transparency used in this study was collected from the World
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. Data for the variable of Corruption used in this study
was collected from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Data for the
national culture control variables of Power Distance Index, Uncertainty Avoidance Index, LongTerm Orientation Index, and Individuality Index used in this study was collected from the
Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores gathered through the Geert Hofstede Dimension Data
Matrix as presented in Cultures and Organizations 3rd edition (Hofstede et al., 2010). The total
dataset consisted of 605 rows. Table 3-3 presents the key and control variables with the number
of data items collected for each year.

Table 3-3. Number of data items collected for each variable by year.
Variable
Transparency
Corruption
Internet diffusion
Mobile diffusion
FDI
NRI
GDP per capita
H-PDI
H-UAI
H-LTO
H-IDV

2006
121
120
119
119
120
121
120
75
75
86
75

2007
121
120
119
119
120
118
120
75
75
86
75

2008
121
121
119
119
120
120
120
75
75
86
75

2009
121
121
119
118
120
119
120
75
75
86
75

2010
121
120
120
120
120
116
120
75
75
86
75

Total
605
602
596
595
600
594
600
375
375
430
375

3.3 Variable Description
This study explored the hypothesized relationships between macroeconomic, ICT,
governance and sociocultural variables using the key and control variables as listed in Table 3-3.
These relationships are put forth in the theoretical structural model as presented in Figure 2.1.
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The independent and mediating variables in the theoretical model are Foreign Direct Investment,
Gross Domestic Product per capita, Networked Readiness Index, Internet diffusion, Mobile
diffusion, and Transparency. The intervening or mediating variables in the theoretical model are
Networked Readiness Index, Internet diffusion, Mobile diffusion, and Transparency. Finally, the
main dependent variable in the theoretical model is Corruption. The national culture control
variables used in this study were Hofstede’s Cultural Dimension indices of Power Distance,
Individuality, Long-Term Orientation, and Uncertainty Avoidance. A further enumeration and
detailed description of the key and control variables are presented below. Representations in the
data analysis and structural models of these key and control variables are presented in
parentheses.
The macroeconomic variable of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the net inflow of
investment, measured in current U.S. dollars, into a domestic economy by foreign investors.
These investment inflows are shown in the balance of payments as financial transfers, including
the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, short-term and long-term capital. Data for
the variable of FDI was captured through foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current
U.S. $) indicator from the World Bank World Development Indicators which is reported in
current U.S. dollars. The foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current U.S.$) indicator as
contained in the World Bank World Development Indicators data were supplied by the
International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments database and supplemented by data from the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and other official national sources.
The FDI data values are quite large and varied -- ranging from hundreds of thousands to
hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars. The large and varied values of the FDI data tend to increase
variance. One method used in stabilizing variance is logarithmic data transformation (Bland,
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2002). Logarithmic data transformation is the process of converting a data value into its
logarithmic value using some base such as the natural base (℮). Logarithmic transformations of
data can transform non-linear relationships into linear ones and normalize positively skewed
distributions (Sokal & Rohlf, 1969). Such logarithmic transformation allows easier handling and
interpretation of data values with a high degree of variance (Zar, 1999). A general logarithmic
transformation could not be performed because a few of the FDI data values were negative.
Therefore, the logarithmic transformation was performed on the absolute value of the FDI data
values. Depending on the sign of the original FDI data value, a logarithmic transformed value
was multiplied by a constant of +1 or -1 to represent its original sign. For example, negative FDI
data values, which represent divestiture or disinvestment, were represented by multiplying the
logarithmic transformation value by negative 1.
The macroeconomic variable of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita)
measures the gross domestic product divided by the midyear population. Data for the variable of
GDP per capita data was captured through the gross domestic product per capita (current U.S. $)
indicator from the World Bank World Development Indicators and was measured in current U.S.
dollars. The gross domestic product per capita (current U.S.$) indicator data as contained in the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators was supplied by the World Bank national accounts
data and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD ) National Accounts
data files.
GDP per capita is the most widely used macroeconomic indicator of a country’s standard
of living (Ringen, 1991). There are some scholars who suggest that the GNP, instead of GDP, is
a more accurate measure of economy well-being and market activity (Brezina, 2012; Stiglitz,
2009). However, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1991) has stated that “virtually all other
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countries have already adopted GDP as their primary measure of production” (p. 8). Studies
researching the relationships between macroeconomic and ICT variables generally use GDP or
GDP per capita to measure economic activity and growth (Addison & Heshmati, 2004; Dewan et
al., 2005; Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002).
The ICT variable of Networked Readiness Index (NRI) measures the degree to which a
country is positioned to use its ICT infrastructure for international competitiveness. Data for the
variable of NRI was captured through the Networked Readiness Index index score as published
in the Global Information Technology Report by the World Economic Forum together with
INSEAD (French name "INStitut Européen d'ADministration des Affaires", or European
Institute of Business Administration). The Networked Readiness Index as published in the Global
Information Technology Report is comprised of two parts: an index score and a rank. In this
study, only the index score was used as the measure of analysis. The index score is a composite
of three component indexes: environment, readiness, and usage. The environment component
index and its subcomponents examine the market, political, regulatory, and infrastructure
conditions that facilitate or hamper ICT growth. The readiness component index and its
subcomponents examine the readiness and preparedness of individuals, governments, and
businesses to utilize ICT resources. The usage component index and its subcomponents examine
the levels of usage among individuals, governments, and businesses. The composite index,
ranging from 1.0 (worst) to 7.0 (best), provides a method for a) calculating the relative and
overall development and use of ICT in countries and b) understanding the strengths and
weaknesses of a country’s ICT readiness to compete in a global environment. The rank is the
particular country’s numerical rank based on the index score.
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This study utilized two variables to measure ICT diffusion. These two ICT variables
include Internet diffusion and Mobile diffusion. The ICT variable for diffusion of Internet
(Internet diffusion) measures the distribution of Internet access within a country. Data for the
variable of Internet diffusion data was captured through the Internet users (per 100 people)
indicator from the World Bank World Development Indicators. The Internet users (per 100
people) indicator measures the number of persons per 100 people of a country’s population who
have access to the Internet. Data for the Internet users (per 100 people) indicator as contained in
The World Bank World Development Indicators were supplied by the International
Telecommunication Union’s World Telecommunication/ICT Development Report and World
Bank estimates. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is a special agency of the
United Nations responsible for global information and communication technologies
coordination.
The ICT variable of mobile cellular diffusion (Mobile diffusion) measures the dispersion
of mobile cellular phone access within a country. Data for the variable of Mobile diffusion was
captured through the Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) indicator of the World Bank
World Development indicators. This indicator measures the number of persons per 100 people of
a country’s population who have subscriptions to public mobile telephone services using cellular
technology. These service subscriptions provide access to the public switched telephone
network. Prepaid and post-paid subscriptions were included in the indicator.
Data for the Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) indicator as contained in the
World Bank World Development Indicators were supplied by the International
Telecommunication Union’s World Telecommunication/ICT Development Report and database,
and World Bank estimates.
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The governance variable of Transparency (Transparency) measures the degree to which
governmental officials and processes are visible and accountable to those who are governed.
Data for the variable of Transparency was captured through the Voice and Accountability (VA)
indicator of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. The Voice and Accountability
(VA) indicator forms one of six World Bank governance indicators. The Worldwide Governance
Indicators are a set of six indicators for 215 world economies. These six indicators are: Voice
and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness,
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.
The Voice and Accountability (VA) indicator measures the extent to which a country’s
citizens are able to participate in their governance by examining several aspects of a country’s
political processes, including civil liberties, political rights, and a free media (Kaufmann, Kraay,
& Mastruzzi, 2009). As presented in Table 3-4, the Voice and Accountability (VA) indicator is a
composite of twenty representative and non-representative data source types such as government
and public sector (GOV), non-governmental organizations (NGO), commercial business
information providers (CBIP), and surveys of households and firms (SURVEY). The Voice and
Accountability (VA) indicator, ranging from around ‐2.5 to 2.5, measures countries’
accountability and citizen participation in relation to the global average (equaling zero).
This composite indicator served as a measure for transparency in this study since public
voice and methods of accountability in a society create a perception of more transparency
(Andrea & Antonio, 2007). The variable of Transparency served as a dependent and intervening
variable in this study.
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Table 3-4. Voice and Accountability (VA) indicator data types and sources.
Source
Type*
African Electoral Index (IRP)
NGO
Afro-barometer (AFR)
GOV
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)
NGO
Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and Political Terror Scale
GOV
(HUM)
Economist Intelligence Unit Risk-wire & Democracy Index (EIU)
CBIP
Freedom House (FRH)
NGO
Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads (CCR)
NGO
Gallup World Poll (GWP)
SURVEY
Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators (WMO)
CBIP
Global Integrity Index (GII)
NGO
IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments (IFD)
GOV
Institute for Management and Development World Competitiveness Yearbook SURVEY
Institutional Profiles Database (IPD)
GOV
International Budget Project Open Budget Index
NGO
Latino-barometro
SURVEY
International Research and Exchanges Board Media Sustainability Index
NGO
Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide (PRS)
CBIP
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index (RSF)
NGO
Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer
SURVEY
World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (GCS)
SURVEY
Note: “type” refers to the nature of the data source. Data sources for Voice and Accountability
are from government and public sector (GOV), non-governmental organizations (NGO),
commercial business information providers (CBIP), and surveys of households and firms
(SURVEY).

The governance variable for Corruption (Corruption), the main dependent variable in this
study, measures the degree of corrupt practices in a country’s public sector. The data for the
variable of Corruption was captured through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from
Transparency International. This index measures the degree of corruption that exists among
public officials and politicians (Lambsdorff, 1999a). The CPI is the most disseminated among
policymakers and is a composite index that includes survey data from country experts,
businesspeople, global analysts, and experts who are residents of the evaluated countries
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(Svensson, 2005). The CPI focuses on perceptions of public sector corruption – the use of public
office for private gain.
The CPI index ranks countries on a scale from 10 (representing a very clean/minutely
corrupt government) to 0 (representing a highly corrupt government). On the CPI scale, countries
with lesser perceptions of corruption score higher. Thus, the CPI scale lends itself to be
interpreted as ‘the absence of corruption’ perception index. To make the CPI values reflect the
presence of corruption, a data transformation was performed on the CPI data. The original CPI
values were multiplied by the constant of negative 1 to inverse the scaling while preserving the
rank of the values. This data transformation resulted in highly corrupt countries having a higher
value than those with lower levels of perceived corruption.
Given the potential important influences of sociocultural values on corruption and ICT
diffusion, this study included four Hofstede’s Cultural Dimension indices as national culture
control variables. Husted (1999) found that corruption was significantly correlated to the
Hofstede cultural dimensions of power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance.
According to Myrdal (1970a), corruption is defined, in part, by sociocultural mores and values.
Furthermore, many scholars suggest that corruption can be defined in sociocultural terms
(Friedrich, 1989; Johnston, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1996). Also, several authors such as N.
Rosenberg (1972), Erumban and de Jong (2006), Moghadam and Assar (2008), Jakopin and
Klein (2011), suggest that sociocultural values influence individuals in a society in a way that
facilitates or impedes technology adaptation and diffusion. For example, Erumban and de Jong
(2006) found that countries with high power distance and uncertainty avoidance have lower ICT
adoption rates.
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This study used the Hofstede’s Cultural Dimension indices of Power Distance (H-PDI),
Individuality (H-IDV), Long-Term Orientation (H-LTO), and Uncertainty Avoidance (H-UAI)
as national culture control variables to address potential influences of sociocultural factors. Data
for the national culture variables were imputed from the Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores for
each country used in the study. The Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores were gathered from the
Geert Hofstede Dimension Data Matrix as presented in Cultures and Organizations 3rd edition
(Hofstede et al., 2010). The Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices are the resulting work of Geert
Hofstede research into cultural dimensions of a society and how these dimensions of culture
affect behavior. In 1967, Hofstede began a large scale survey study on differences in cultural
values of employees in different subsidiaries of IBM Europe. Hofstede compared answers of tens
of thousands of employees in over 40 countries. The analysis of the surveys identified four
anthropological systematic differences in national cultures: power distance, individualism,
uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity (Hofstede, 1984). In 1991, Hofstede added the additional
cultural dimension of long term orientation (Hofstede, 1997).
The Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices contained power distance, individualism,
uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and long term orientation scores for 110 countries and
regions. However, there were some countries that had missing scores within Hofstede-defined
regions. These missing scores were replaced with regional data scores. For example, Egypt did
not have scores for the four Hofstede cultural dimension indices. However, Egypt is classified
within a region of Arab countries which had regional Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores.
Therefore, Egypt’s missing country scores were replaced by the Arab regional scores. This
method of imputation of missing data using regional scores was the first method used to achieve
completeness of the Hofstede Cultural Dimension data. After this missing data method was
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applied, the cultural dimension data was examined for completeness and further missing data
treatments were employed. These further missing data treatments are outlined and detailed in
section 3.4 Data Preparation. A description of each Hofstede Cultural Dimension index used in
this study follows. The year for the country observations was also used as a control variable.
The national cultural control variable for power distance (H-PDI) measures the extent to
which less powerful members of society accept and/or expect unequal distribution of power.
Societies which score higher in this Hofstede dimension value suggest that societal inequality is
more widely accepted by those who are governed. Data for the variable of power distance was
captured through Hofstede Cultural Dimension Power Distance index. The national cultural
control variable for individualism (H-IDV) measures the extent to which individuals are
incorporated into groups. Societies which score higher in this Hofstede dimension, value
personal rights and freedoms over collectivistic values (e.g. group loyalty). Data for the variable
of individualism was captured through Hofstede Cultural Dimension Individualism vs.
Collectivism Index. The national cultural control variable for long-term orientation (H-LTO)
measures the future orientation of a society. Societies which score higher in this Hofstede
dimension are seen as more future-oriented and foster more pragmatic views such as persistence.
Short-term orientation societies promote past and present values such as tradition, saving face,
etc. Data for the variable of long-term orientation was captured through Hofstede Cultural
Dimension Long- vs. Short-Term Orientation Index. The national cultural control variable for
uncertainty avoidance (H-UAI) measures the degree of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.
Societies with higher scores in this Hofstede dimension generally have more rules and laws and
are less tolerant to unplanned change. Data for the variable of uncertainty avoidance was
captured through Hofstede Cultural Dimension Uncertainty Avoidance Index.
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3.4 Data Preparation
A primary step before data analysis can be done is data preparation. One of the first steps
in data preparation is examining the dataset for completeness. This examination involves
reviewing the dataset for missing data and assessing the reason for such missing data. Missing
data can have a significant effect on research results. Missing data analysis is not generally the
main focus of scientific inquiry but must be addressed to prevent results that are “biased,
inefficient (lacking in power), and unreliable.” (Schafer & Graham, 2002, p. 147). A general rule
is to have no more than 10% of data missing in any column used in the data analysis; a more
relaxed rule for the missing data threshold is 20% (Allison, 2001; Hair, Anderson, & Tatham,
1987; Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).
This study combines data elements from several multinational datasets from various
sources such as the World Bank World Development Indicators, World Economic Forum Global
Information Technology Report, World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, and
Transparency International. As reported by Messner (1992), there tends to be missing data in
cross-national research because national government often does not report such critical statistics
consistently. Given the multinational datasets used in this study and the possibly of missing data,
an analysis for missing data was conducted on the dataset. As presented in Table 3-5, the
independent, mediating, and dependent variables were well within the 10% allowable missing
data threshold as suggested by Hair et al. (1987). However, several Hofstede Cultural Dimension
index variables exceeded both the 10% and 20% missing data thresholds. Given this amount of
missing data in the Hofstede Cultural Dimension index variables, a method of handling missing
data needed to be applied to the dataset.
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Table 3-5. Percentage of missing data values by variable (N=605).
Variable
Percentage of missing data
Transparency
0.000%
Corruption
0.496%
Internet diffusion
1.488%
Mobile diffusion
1.653%
FDI
0.826%
NRI
1.818%
GDP per capita
0.826%
H-PDI*
38.017%
H-UAI*
38.017%
H-LTO*
28.926%
H-IDV*
38.017%
Note: ‘*’ denotes variables with missing data values over the 10% and 20% missing data
thresholds as suggested by Hair et al. (1987)

There are several ways to address missing data in the statistics literature (Allison, 2001,
2003; Enders & Bandalos, 2001; Honaker & King, 2010; Little, 1988; Little & Rubin, 1987;
Olinsky, Chen, & Harlow, 2003; Roth, 1994; Schafer & Graham, 2002). The phenomenon of
missing data values is known as the missingness of the data (Hawthorne & Elliott, 2005;
Lauritzen, 1995; Little, 1988). First, the reason for the missing data must be determined in order
to select the appropriate missing data treatment. There are three categorical reasons for missing
data: missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), or missing not at
random (MNAR) (J.-O. Kim & Curry, 1977; Little, 1988; Little & Rubin, 1987).
The first possible categorical reason for missing data is MCAR. Missing data is
considered MCAR if the data values missing are independent of the other variables of interest or
some unobserved variable. MCAR is also known as uniform non-response since values are
missing independently of any other variable in the study (Wang & Fitzmaurice, 2006). As the
names suggests, MCAR data is completely missing due to random chance. Stated another way, in
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MCAR, any data value has approximately the same probability of being observed or unobserved
as any other data value. For example, a researcher distributes and collects 200 paper surveys and
10% of those surveys are returned completely blank. If the blank surveys were randomly not
completed, the missing data from those blank surveys could be considered MCAR. Data that is
MCAR reduces statistical power but does not produce bias since the missing data is not related to
other variables.
The next possible categorical reason for missing data is MAR, which is an alternative to
MCAR. In MAR, missing data-values are not dependent on the missing data item itself (Heitjan
& Basu, 1996). A special case of MAR is known as uniform non-response within class (Robins,
1997). In the special case of MAR uniform non-response within class, data values are missing
based on a particular class or group within the dataset. According to Heitjan and Basu (1996),
MCAR and MAR are “ignorability conditions” (p. 1) that allow particular interpretations to be
safely made without complex missing data models. For example, in MAR, unobserved data
values can be intuitively based on observed data values of similar data rows (Schafer & Graham,
2002). Using the aforementioned example, a researcher distributes and collects 200 paper
surveys and 10% of those surveys are returned partially blank (e.g. some questions were
skipped). If the unanswered questions in the surveys were randomly not completed, this missing
data could be considered MAR.
The last possible categorical reason for missing data is known as MNAR. For MNAR, the
conditions of MCAR and MAR do not hold. In MNAR, data-values are missing not at random.
In the case of MNAR, data is missing based on the nature or value of the missing figures. Data
that is MNAR requires more complex missing data treatments and modeling. Also, determining
and compensating for the underlying reasons for the missingness proves to be more problematic.
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The best way to obtain estimates of the missing data without introducing additional bias is to
create a model to mimic the missingness in the data (Dunning & Freedman, 2007). Using the
aforementioned example, a researcher distributes and collects 200 paper surveys and 10% of
those surveys are returned partially blank (e.g. some questions were skipped). The researcher
reviews the surveys and discovers that a particular group (e.g. women under thirty) skipped a
particular question (e.g. income). This commonality existing between the group and the
unanswered question signifies that the data is MNAR.
As shown in Figure 3.5, the Hofstede Cultural Dimension data was missing for 28% to
38% of the counties in this study. The independent, mediating, and dependent variables in this
study did not need a missing data treatment applied as these variables were within the 10%
allowable missing data threshold as suggested by Hair et al. (1987). To determine the best
method of handling the missing Hofstede Cultural Dimension data, the reason for why the data
was missing must be categorized into one of the three causes as suggested by Little and Rubin
(1987). In other words, were the missing cultural dimension values for countries in Hofstede’s
study related to the actual values of those cultural dimensions, or were they associated with some
other variable of interest?
According to Hofstede (1984), the cultural dimensions data that was missing for several
countries was a result of no IBM subsidiaries existing in those countries at the time of the
original data collection. The missing Hofstede Cultural Dimension data could be MNAR if IBM
selected countries in which to place subsidiaries based on some cultural dimension variable or
other unobserved variable. It is quite plausible for a global country such as IBM to exercise
diligence in placing its subsidiaries. While the explanation of selection bias by IBM is plausible,
at the time of Hofstede’s data collection, IBM had subsidiaries in more than seventy countries
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(Hofstede, 1984). For the purpose of this study, it must be determined if there is a selection bias
in the Hofstede cultural dimensions data. To determine if IBM selected countries in which to
place subsidiaries based on some cultural dimension, the observed Hofstede cultural dimension
data was analyzed for non-normal distribution.
A test for non-normal or asymmetrical distribution is essentially a skewness test using the
adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized moment coefficient (Doane & Seward, 2011). The test for
skewness exposes whether observed data values are asymmetrically distributed around the mean.
The test for skewness produces a skewness statistic that can be used to determine the degree of
asymmetry in the distribution of data. A distribution of data that is relatively symmetrical
produces a skewness statistic of near zero. A negative skewness statistic indicates more values
lay above the mean. A positive skewness statistic indicates more data values lay below the mean.
If IBM selected countries in which to place subsidiaries based on some cultural dimension, there
is a high probability that such a selection bias would skew the observed data values toward the
IBM-preferred bias.
Doane and Seward (2011) suggest using the adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized
moment coefficient to test for skewness. The adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized moment
coefficient includes an adjustment for sample size and is readily available in software packages
such as Minitab, Excel, SPSS, SAS and (Doane & Seward, 2011). The skewness statistic (S)
produced by the adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized moment coefficient must be compared to a
threshold of allowable skewness. Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) suggest calculating the “standard
error of skewness – Ss” (p. 79) by using

√

where N is the numbers of observed data

values. The probability of a large degree of skewness can be evaluated by using the z distribution
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of

as suggested in Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). A z value in excess of ±2.58

would indicate a significant degree of skewness in the distribution of data.
Presented in Table 3-6 are the results of the normal distribution test on the Hofstede
cultural dimension data. These results were calculated using Microsoft Excel 2010. Other
variables in this study were not tested for normal distribution as these variables were within the
10% allowable missing data threshold as suggested by Hair et al. (1987). Hofstede Cultural
Dimension data was tested for symmetric distribution to determine if IBM used some selection
bias in choosing countries in which to place subsidiaries. If IBM had exercised some bias in the
selection of countries, the observed data values would display this bias through an asymmetric
distribution of the Hofstede Cultural Dimension index data values
As presented in the results shown in Table 3-6, the Hofstede Cultural Dimension index
variables of power distance index (H-PDI) and long term orientation (H-LTO) did not present a
significant degree of asymmetric distribution based on the z-distribution threshold of z = ±2.58.
The Hofstede Cultural Dimension index variables of uncertainty avoidance (H-UAI) and
individualism (H-IDV), did present asymmetric distribution over the threshold of z = ±2.58 as
suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996).

Table 3-6. Results of normal distribution test on Hofstede data.
Variable
Mean
Median
St. Dev.
S
Ss
z
H-PDI
59.680
64
21.077
-0.151
0.126
-1.197
H-UAI
66.307
68
22.815
-0.361
0.126
-2.857
H-LTO
46.592
45.466
22.951
0.294
0.118
-2.485
H-IDV
42.933
38
23.4112
0.346
0.126
2.739
Note: The skewness statistic (S) was produced by the adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized
moment coefficient. The standard error of skewness Ss and z distribution calculations were
produced as suggested in Tabachnick and Fidell (1996).
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The findings as presented in Table 3-6 suggest that IBM subsidiaries had a tendency to be
located in countries with higher values of uncertainty avoidance and lower values of
individuality. The asymmetric distribution found in the two Hofstede Cultural Dimensions
suggests that the Hofstede missing data values may not be MCAR. However, these findings do
not necessarily demonstrate that the Hofstede Cultural Dimension missing data is MNAR. The
Hofstede Cultural Dimensions index variables of power distance (H-PDI) and long term
orientation (H-LTO) did not present a significant degree of asymmetric distribution.
One explanation for some of the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions indices possessing an
asymmetric distribution is that some cultural dimensions are naturally asymmetrically
distributed. If some cultural dimensions are naturally asymmetrically distributed, then the
missing cultural dimension data values were unrelated to the unobserved value. This explanation
makes the assumption that the missing Hofstede Cultural Dimensions are MAR within a class of
countries. Specifically, the missing Hofstede Cultural Dimension data is unobserved for the class
of countries that did not have IBM subsidiaries. As stated by Robins (1997), MAR within class
data values are missing based on a particular group within the dataset.
The assumption of MAR for the missing Hofstede Cultural Dimensions data allows
particular interpretations to be safely made without utilizing complex missing data models
(Heitjan & Basu, 1996). A more complex missing data treatment would be required if the
Hofstede Cultural Dimensions data were MNAR. Collins, Schafer, and Kam (2001) have
demonstrated that under most missing data cases, even an erroneous assumption of MAR has
“only a minor impact on estimates and standard errors” (p. 6). It is important to note that
unobserved MAR data values can be intuitively based on observed data values of similar data
rows (Schafer & Graham, 2002).
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This study used two missing data treatments: removal of non-complete data rows through
listwise deletion and data imputation through a modified version of mean substitution. The most
common and least complex treatment of missing data is listwise deletion. Listwise deletion is
also known as complete-case analysis (Schafer & Graham, 2002). This treatment requires the
deletion of non-complete cases (i.e. data rows missing one or more data values) until the level of
missing data is within an acceptable threshold. Statistical power may be affected by using
listwise deletion as a missing data treatment due to the reduction of the sample size and
introduction of bias if the data is not MAR or MCAR (King, Honaker, Joseph, & Scheve, 1998;
Roth, 1994). While this treatment affects statistical power and may introduce bias, it is one of the
preferable methods for addressing missing data (Olinsky et al., 2003).
The listwise deletion missing data treatment was applied to the data used in the study by
removing all data rows which did not contain values for all four Hofstede Cultural Dimension
index variables. This application resulted in the deletion of 145 data rows or 23.967% from the
original 606 data rows in the dataset. The data treated using listwise deletion treatment was
denoted as LD in this study. Presented in Table 3-7 are the resulting missing data percentages by
variable after the application of the listwise deletion treatment. As presented in Table 3-7, after
the listwise deletion treatment, all variables were within the relaxed 20% missing data threshold
(Allison, 2001; Hair et al., 1987; Hair et al., 2010).
The two basic methods of handling missing data are removal of incomplete cases or
imputation of missing data elements within incomplete cases (Little & Rubin, 2002). Although
removal of non-complete cases through listwise deletion is the most common and least complex
treatment for missing data, J.-O. Kim and Curry (1977), Roth (1994), and King et al. (1998)
suggest that alternate methods for handling missing data should be explored.
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Table 3-7. Missing data percentages after listwise deletion (N=461).
Variable
Transparency
Corruption
Internet diffusion
Mobile diffusion
FDI
NRI
GDP per capita
H-PDI
H-UAI
H-LTO
H-IDV

Missing data percentage
0.000%
0.652%
1.087%
1.304%
1.087%
1.087%
1.087%
18.478%
18.478%
6.522%
18.478%

The alternative to removing missing data from the dataset is to substitute missing values
to form a complete case or data row. This process of missing data substitution is known as
imputation (Schafer & Graham, 2002). As noted by Little and Rubin (2002), there are several
methods of imputation. Some methods of imputation such as hot/cold-deck imputation employ
random data value substitution (Sande, 1983) or intuitively-based substitution using observed
data values of similar data rows (Schafer & Graham, 2002). Such substitution methods select
existing data values from within the existing dataset to replace missing data values. Random data
value substitution is a straightforward and less complex method for handling missing data
(Reilly, 1993). In this study, however, such random substitution has a high probability of
assigning Hofstede Cultural Dimensions values that may be vastly different than the actual
unobserved values for a given country. A different imputation method needed to be explored that
would estimate data values similar to those actual unobserved values.
Another method for handling missing data is through imputation via mean substitution
(Dodeen, 2003). Typically, mean substitution is performed by calculating the mean for an entire
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set of values of a variable. This calculated mean is substituted for the missing values of that
variable in the dataset. Using mean substitution creates a “group average” that is substituted for
the missing data values. In most cases, mean substitution has proven to be more accurate than
listwise deletion (Chan & Dunn, 1972; Chan, Gilman, & Dunn, 1976; Raymond & Roberts,
1987). In this study, mean substitution essentially creates world averages for each Hofstede
Cultural Dimension index. These world averages would then be applied to all countries with
unobserved Hofstede Cultural Dimension index values. As Hofstede Cultural Dimension values
are missing for 28% to 38% of the countries used in this study, these calculated world averages
would be applied to a significant number of countries. It is unreasonable to assume that up to
38% of the countries would have the same Hofstede Cultural Dimension values and those values
would be the same as the world averages. Therefore, the mean substitution method has high
probability of assigning world-average Hofstede Cultural Dimension values that may be vastly
different than the actual unobserved values for a particular country.
Fortunately, a further examination of the Hofstede Cultural Dimension studies provides
an indication on how data imputation through a modified version of mean substitution could
adequately handle the missing cultural dimension data values. Hofstede’s studies demonstrated
that cultural similarities that influenced behavior of societies could be categorized by nations and
regions (Hofstede, 1984, 1997). Some countries in the Hofstede Cultural Dimension score matrix
do not have scores for all four of Hofstede cultural dimensions used in this study. However, in
the Hofstede Cultural Dimension index, cultural dimension data values are provided for regional
country groups as well. In these regional groups, each component country can be assigned the
regional score as its individual country’s Hofstede Cultural Dimension index value. For example,
Nigeria did not have scores for all four Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices. However, Nigeria
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is classified in the regional group of West African countries. The regional group of West African
countries includes Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Therefore, the scores for the regional group
of West African countries could be used in place of the missing Hofstede Cultural Dimension
data values for these three countries.
This study employed a modified version of mean substitution using the calculated mean
cultural dimension scores of regional groups to address missing Hofstede Cultural Dimension
index values. Countries used in this study were assigned to regional groups according to the
United Nations (UN) geoscheme. This geoscheme was developed by the UN for statistical
analysis of world regions (United Nations, 2000). Each UN geoscheme region has an associated
area code as its identifier within the UN statistical analysis model. For the countries used in this
study, there were sixteen UN geoscheme regions as presented in Table 3-8.

Table 3-8. United Nations geoscheme regions (with area codes).
Caribbean (052)
Central America (013)
Central Asia (143)
Eastern Africa (014)
Eastern Asia (030)
Eastern Europe (151)

Middle Africa (017)
Northern Africa (012)
Northern Europe (154)
South America (068)
South-Eastern Asia (035)
Southern Africa (018)

Southern Asia (034)
Southern Europe (039)
Western Africa (011)
Western Asia (145)

A mean score for each Hofstede Cultural Dimension was computed using available
cultural dimension scores of regional component countries based on the UN geoscheme. A mean
score for each UN geoscheme region was imputed for regional component countries missing data
values. For example, Algeria is in the UN geoscheme for Northern Africa. Algeria did not have
three of the four Hofstede cultural dimension scores used in this study. However, the Northern
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Africa UN geoscheme region contained two other countries, Egypt and Morocco, which had
cultural dimension scores for the four Hofstede cultural dimensions. These available scores were
averaged per dimension and imputed for the missing three cultural dimension scores of Algeria.
This method of imputation using calculated regional mean scores of UN geoscheme
regions produced scores for all but two UN geoscheme regions used in this study. Central Asia
and Middle Africa were the only two UN geoscheme regions that did not have country-level
Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores from which to compute regional cultural dimension scores
through this method. The data using this modified mean substitution method was denoted as
regional mean substitution (RMS) in this study. This RMS imputation method was preferable
and advantageous over listwise deletion as it reduced missing data without reducing the overall
sample size. The missing data percentages by variable after using RMS missing data treatment
are presented in Table 3-9. As shown, all variables were well within a 10% missing data
threshold as suggested by Hair et al. (1987).

Table 3-9. Missing data percentages after regional mean substitution (N=605).
Variable
Transparency
Corruption
Internet diffusion
Mobile diffusion
FDI
NRI
GDP per capita
H-PDI
H-UAI
H-LTO
H-IDV

Missing data percentage
0.000%
0.496%
1.488%
1.653%
0.826%
1.818%
0.826%
4.132%
4.132%
3.306%
4.132%
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3.5 Data Validation
An analysis for multicollinearity was also performed on the data. Multicollinearity exists
when correlations among two or more independent or explanatory variables are strong. When
two or more variables are highly correlated, it may be an indication that variables which are
supposed to measure different constructs actually measure the same construct (Kline, 2010).
Multicollinearity exposes variables that may measure the same construct in a statistical model
(i.e. redundant variables). While multicollinearity may not affect the reliability of a statistical
model, it may not give accurate results on the significance of the effects of individual variables
within such a model (Kock, 2012).
One possible indicator of multicollinearity is a high Pearson correlation coefficient (r)
between two or more variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). High correlation coefficients among
variables in the model may signify multicollinearity (Kock, 2012). Correlation coefficients (r)
can range be from -1 to + 1. The closer the correlation coefficient is to ±1, the stronger the
correlation. A correlation coefficient of zero suggests there is no relationship. A general “rule of
thumb” (Farrar & Glauber, 1967, p. 82) for correlation coefficients that may indicate
multicollinearity are those where r ≥ .8. Using WarpPLS 3.0, a structural equation modeling
software package discussed in greater detail in section 3.5 Data Analysis, a correlation matrix
was generated with the data using both missing data treatments. WarpPLS 3.0 automatically
calculated the correlation matrix as part of its data analysis (Kock, 2012).
Table 3-10 shows the correlation matrix with corresponding coefficients and associated
p-values for data using regional mean substitution missing data treatment. Using the regional
mean substitution missing data treatment, NRI and corruption had a correlation coefficient of r =
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-0.888 with a significance level of p <.001. NRI and Internet diffusion had a correlation
coefficient of r = 0.849 with a significance level of p <.001. GDP per capita and Internet
diffusion had a correlation coefficient of r = 0.828 with a significance level of p <.001. Also,
GDP per capita and NRI had a correlation coefficient of r = 0.829 with a significance level of p
<.001. Table 3-11 shows the correlation matrix with corresponding coefficients and associated pvalues for data using the listwise deletion missing data treatment. Using the listwise deletion
missing data treatment, NRI and corruption had a correlation coefficient of r = -0.907 with a
significance level of p <.001. NRI and Internet diffusion had a correlation coefficient of r =
0.857 with a significance level of p <.001. Analysis of the correlation matrixes using both
missing data treatments showed correlation coefficients among variables greater than r = 0.800.
The presence of a high correlation coefficient between two or more variables is a possible
indicator of multicollinearity. However, such high correlation coefficients do not conclusively
signify multicollinearity. High correlation coefficients are generally conflated with collinearity
(Douglass, Clader, Christy, Michaels, & Belsley, 2003 & Michaels, 2003; Graham, 2003). Yet,
strongly correlated variables can have a low degree of collinearity (Hamilton, 1987). Also, using
correlation matrices to assess multicollinearity only exposes potential bivariate collinearity.
Correlation matrices only compare variables in a pairwise fashion. Often, two or more variables
in a model may have collinear relationships which are not easily detected through such pairwise
analysis possible from correlation matrices (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). While analysis of
correlations provides a valuable indicator of multicollinearity, additional tests for
multicollinearity need to be performed.
Another method for assessing multicollinearity is the calculation of variance inflation
factors (VIFs). Unlike testing for collinearity through generating correlation matrices, the
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calculation of VIF value assesses the amount of multicollinearity among all variables in a model
simultaneously. VIF values quantify the amount of inflation of variance due to a particular
variable in the model. The VIF value for a given variable is the amount of inflation of variance
caused by collinearity with other variables in the model (Kline, 2010; Kutner, Nachtsheim, &
Neter, 2004).
High VIF values may signify a high degree of multicollinearity. The threshold for high
VIFs is based on the type of variables used in a model. For example, the recommended VIF
threshold when using formative latent variables is VIF=3.3 (Cenfetelli & Bassellier, 2009). This
study does not use formative latent variable measurement, so this more restrictive threshold does
not need to be applied. For studies without latent variables, such as this study, a more relaxed
threshold recommendation of VIF=5 or VIF=10 has also been proposed in the multivariate
analysis literature (Hair et al., 1987; Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2010; O'Brien, 2007).
There are two forms of collinearity which can be tested through calculating VIF values:
lateral and vertical collinearity. Lateral collinearity refers to predictor-criterion collinearity.
Lateral collinearity occurs when independent variables (i.e. predictor variables) are collinear
with the dependent variable (i.e. criterion variables) (Kock & Lynn, 2012). Vertical collinearity
refers to predictor-predictor collinearity.
Vertical collinearity occurs when independent variables (i.e. predictor variables) are
collinear with other independent variables. Using WarpPLS 3.0 to calculate VIF values through a
full collinearity test assesses vertical and lateral collinearity simultaneously (Kock, 2012). Also,
full collinearity VIF testing is a common method for testing bias that provides more conservative
results than exploratory factor analyses (Kock & Lynn, 2012; Lindell & Whitney, 2001).

Table 3-10. Correlation matrix for RMS treated data.
Transparency Corruption

Internet
Mobile
diffusion diffusion

FDI

Transparency
1
Corruption
-0.757***
1
Internet
0.682***
-0.793***
1
diffusion
Mobile
0.495***
-0.570***
0.766***
1
diffusion
***
***
***
FDI
0.301
-0.432
0.471
0.387*** 1
NRI
0.671***
0.651*** 0.555***
-0.888***
0.849***
GDP per
0.686***
-0.788***
0.722*** 0.505***
0.828***
capita
H-PDI
-0.614***
0.644*** -0.507*** -0.312*** -0.157***
H-UAI
0.022
0.160***
0.065
0.187*** 0.002
***
***
***
H-LTO
0.212
-0.234
0.366
0.289*** 0.259***
H-IDV
0.547***
-0.601***
0.551***
0.380*** 0.314***
Year
-0.013
0.003
0.185***
0.299*** -0.059
Notes: Correlations between variables higher than 0.800 are denoted in bold.
***
denotes p-value <0.001
**
denotes p-value <0.01
*
denotes p-value <0.05

NRI

1
0.829***

GDP per
capita

H-PDI

H-UAI

H-LTO

H-IDV

1

-0.536*** -0.501*** 1
-0.125**
0.082*
0.226*** 1
***
***
0.354
0.302
-0.094*
0.092*
0.531*** 0.536*** -0.63*** -0.123**
0.035
-0.003
0
0

1
0.303*** 1
0
0
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Table 3-11. Correlation matrix for LD treated data.
Transparency Corruption

Internet
Mobile
Diffusion Diffusion

FDI

NRI

GDP per
capita

H-PDI

Transparency 1
Corruption
-0.782***
1
Internet
0.740***
1
-0.847***
Diffusion
Mobile
0.505***
-0.486***
0.644***
1
Diffusion
FDI
-0.010
-0.019
-0.009
-0.027
1
***
***
***
***
NRI
0.714
0.545
0.069
1
-0.907
0.857
GDP per
0.675***
0.774***
0.469*** -0.020
0.772*** 1
-0.812***
capita
H-PDI
-0.553***
0.589***
-0.498*** -0.228*** 0.005 -0.508*** -0.523*** 1
H-UAI
0.090
0.195***
-0.130**
0.083
-0.066 -0.240*** -0.152** 0.197***
***
***
***
***
H-LTO
0.199
-0.173
0.329
0.304
0.011
0.307*** 0.166*** -0.027
H-IDV
0.594***
-0.593***
0.589***
0.293*** -0.016
0.525*** 0.560*** -0.619***
Year
-0.006
0.007
0.192***
0.321*** -0.084
0.013
0.010
0
Notes: Correlations between variables higher than 0.800 are denoted in bold.
***
denotes p-value <0.001
**
denotes p-value <0.01
*
denotes p-value <0.05

H-UAI

H-LTO

H-IDV

1
0
-0.178***
0

1
0.119*
0

1
0
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A full collinearity test was performed that calculated the VIF values of each variable. The
full collinearity test was performed on the data using each missing data treatment. WarpPLS 3.0
automatically calculated the VIF values for the data as part of its data analysis (Kock, 2012).
Table 3-12 presents the VIF values for each variable in the data using both missing data
treatments.
The highest VIF value was 9.478 for corruption in the data using the listwise deletion
missing data treatment. In general, the data using the listwise deletion missing data treatment had
higher VIF values than the data using the regional mean substitution missing data treatment.
Data using each missing data treatment had VIF values over the recommended threshold of
VIF=5. However, using the more relaxed threshold of a VIF=10 as suggested by Hair et al.
(1987) and O'Brien (2007), the VIF values for the data using both missing data treatments did
not exhibit serious bias due to multicollinearity problems. Also, the variables that contribute to
the high VIF values in Table 3-12 are not included in the same variable block in Table 3-13 or
Table 3-14.

Table 3-12. Variance inflation factors by variable and missing data treatment.
Variable
Transparency
Corruption
Internet diffusion
Mobile diffusion
FDI
NRI
GDP per capita
H-PDI
H-UAI
H-LTO
H-IDV
Year

Data using RMS
2.784
8.741
6.325
2.523
1.045
8.004
3.081
2.120
1.349
1.336
2.148
1.286

Data using LD
3.672
9.478
6.749
2.059
1.036
8.089
3.303
1.954
1.415
1.310
2.126
1.337
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Additionally, block VIF values for each missing data treatment were calculated by
WarpPLS 3.0. Block VIF values measure the degree of vertical collinearity. WarpPLS 3.0
outputs the VIF values for each latent variable block. A latent variable block is each variable
with two or more predictors. The calculated VIFs produced by WarpPLS 3.0 represent the latent
variables on each column (predictors), with reference to the latent variables on each row
(criteria). This study does not utilize latent variables, so the output from WarpPLS 3.0 comprises
the VIF values produced for each variable block.
Table 3-13 presents the block VIF values for the data using the RMS missing data
treatment for each variable block. Using the RMS missing data treatment, Transparency
(predictor) to Corruption (criteria) showed a VIF value of 4.588. Also, Internet diffusion
(predictor) to Corruption (criteria) showed a VIF value of 4.566.
All other VIF values for the data using the RMS missing data treatment were less than
3.3. Table 3-14 presents the block VIF values for the data using the LD missing data treatment
for each variable block. Using the LD missing data treatment, Transparency (predictor) to
Corruption (criteria) showed a VIF value of 4.769. Also, Internet diffusion (predictor) to
Corruption (criteria) showed a VIF value of 4.320. All other VIF values for the data using the
RMS missing data treatment were VIF less than 3.3. In the block VIF calculations, values of 3.3
or lower suggest that no vertical multicollinearity exists within the data (Kock, 2012). However,
in the multivariate analysis literature, a conservative recommended threshold for VIF values
when analyzing models without latent variables is VIF=5 as suggested by Hair et al. (1987).
Using this recommended threshold of VIF=5, the VIF values for the data using both missing data
treatments suggest that no vertical multicollinearity exist.

Table 3-13. Block VIF values using RMS.
Transparency Corruption

Internet
Mobile
Diffusion Diffusion
1.858
1.858
4.566
1.831

FDI

NRI

GDP per
capita

H-PDI H-UAI H-LTO H-IDV

Year

Transparency
Corruption
4.588
2.804
1.084
1.250
2.512 1.096
Internet
1.886
1.886
Diffusion
Mobile
Diffusion
FDI
NRI
1.407
1.407
GDP per
capita
H-PDI
H-UAI
H-LTO
H-IDV
Year
Notes: These VIFs are for the latent variables on each column (predictors), with reference to the latent variables on each row (criteria).
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Table 3-14. Block VIF using LD.
Transparency Corruption

Internet
Mobile
Diffusion Diffusion
1.652
1.652
4.320
1.606

FDI

NRI

GDP per
capita

H-PDI H-UAI H-LTO H-IDV

Year

Transparency
Corruption
4.769
2.009
1.104
1.143
2.228 1.154
Internet
1.486
1.486
Diffusion
Mobile
Diffusion
FDI
NRI
1.366
1.366
GDP per
capita
H-PDI
H-UAI
H-LTO
H-IDV
Year
Notes: These VIFs are for the latent variables on each column (predictors), with reference to the latent variables on each row (criteria).
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Additionally, Stone-Geisser Q-squared coefficients were calculated for each of the
endogenous variables in the study’s path model (Geisser, 1974; Stone, 1974). The resulting Qsquared coefficients are shown for each missing data treatment in Table 3-15. The Q-squared
coefficient is used to assess the predictive validity of each variable block in a path model.
Endogenous variables with acceptable predictive validity have Q-squared coefficients of greater
than zero (Kock, 2012). Each of the endogenous variables in the study’s model exhibited Qsquared coefficients greater than zero, thereby presenting acceptable predictive validity.

Table 3-15. Stone-Geisser Q-squared coefficients.
RMS
LD

Transparency
0.486
0.557

Corruption
0.795
0.815

Internet Diffusion Mobile Diffusion
0.789
0.475
0.779
0.376

NRI
0.738
0.738

3.6 Data Analysis
The theoretical model for this study as shown in Figure 2.1 was constructed based on the
hypotheses as stated in Section 2.3. This theoretical model is a path model that formalized the
hypothesized relationships among the macroeconomic, ICT, governance, and sociocultural
variables as listed in Table 3-3. This theoretical model was statistically analyzed using path
analysis with WarpPLS 3.0, a structural equation modeling software package. WarpPLS 3.0 is
specially designed to identify nonlinear relationships among variables of a theorized model by
conducting linear and non-linear (or “warped”) regression analysis (Kock, 2012).
Path analysis is a statistical analysis method used to explore relationships among
observed variables within a defined network or model (Hatcher, 1994). Developed in the 1930s
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by Sewall Wright, path analysis was used in his agricultural research and has now been applied
to other complex modeling fields (Dodge & Marriott, 2003; Wright, 1934). Path analysis is an
extension of multiple regression analysis. In multiple regression analysis, coefficients of
association are calculated among multiple independent variables and one dependent variable.
These coefficients are generally in the form of standardized partial regression coefficients
(Rencher, 1998; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991) where the corresponding P values indicate the
significance of the relationship (Kock, 2011a). Indeed, path analysis extends multiple regression
analysis by forming a composite structural model of several separate multiple regression models.
Path analysis allows the tracing of complex paths in a model to discover how one variable affects
another. This capability of path analysis allows direct and indirect effects to be explored. Also,
path analysis can reveal the proportional strengths of direct and indirect relationships within a
model.
Path analysis is a special case of structural equation modeling (SEM) (Maruyama, 1998).
SEM is a second-generation statistical analysis technique increasing utilization in social science
research due to its ability to assess theoretical models (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Kline, 2010).
Due to its powerful predictive ability, SEM has been used in a wide variety of disciplines,
including management (Cheng, 2001; Shook, Ketchen, Hult, & Kacmar, 2004), marketing
(Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 2000), information systems
(Gefen, 2000; Qureshi & Compeau, 2009), and finance and economics (Chang, Lee, & Lee,
2009; Titman & Wessels, 1988). In typical SEM analysis, reflective or formative manifest
variables (indicators) are constituent parts of (e.g. load upon) latent variables (constructs). The
observable or manifest (endogenous) variables serve as underlying components of the
unobservable or latent (exogenous) variables. In SEM models, there are two or more indicators
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associated with each construct. SEM analysis employs a measurement model and a structural
model. In SEM analysis, the measurement model assesses the loadings and reliability estimates
(e.g. Cronbach’s alpha) of the indictors on their associated constructs within the model. Scores
for each construct are calculated based on the weighted averages of their component indicators.
Once the scores for each construct are calculated, the structural model is basically a path model
with constructs as variables and the association between variables as paths within the model. In
path analysis, the measurement model found in SEM is excluded. The measurement model is not
required since one indicator is associated upon one construct.
The software selected to conduct the path analysis for this study’s theoretical model was
WarpPLS 3.0. A structural equation modeling software package, WarpPLS 3.0 is specially
designed to identify nonlinear relationships among variables of a theorized model by conducting
linear and non-linear (or “warped”) regression analysis (Kock, 2012). WarpPLS 3.0 was selected
specifically for its ability to examine non-linear relationships. The majority of social and
economic phenomena exhibit non-linear relationships such as the law of diminishing returns (A.
Rosenberg, 1992). In fact, these types of non-linear relationships usually take the “form of U and
S curves” (Kock, 2011a, p. 2). WarpPLS 3.0 utilizes algorithms that attempt to identify such
non-linear or U-curve relationships between variables within a model. This study utilized
WarpPLS 3.0’s non-linear (denoted in the software as a Warp2) algorithm to calculate statistical
results such as path coefficients (standardized betas) with related P values and R-squared (R2)
coefficients. The calculated individual path coefficients can be interpreted as standardized beta
coefficients of ordinary least squares regressions. By examining these path coefficients and R2
coefficients of the path model, the overall strength and predictive power of the model can be
determined.
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Path analysis has several requirements concerning the nature of the data analyzed
(Hatcher, 1994). First, all endogenous (dependent) variables must be measured on a continuous
interval scale and have at least a minimum of four values. However, exogenous (independent)
variables can be measured on a categorical scale level, if dummy-coded. This restriction does not
apply to WarpPLS 3.0 since the software uses resampling techniques (Kock, 2012). Secondly,
the path model variables should be free of multicollinearity. Third, path analysis generally
requires large sample sizes (n>200) (Hatcher, 1994). Data resampling techniques, for instance
bootstrapping and jackknifing, remove data requirements such as large sample size and
endogenous variables having a minimum of four values. As noted in the WarpPLS 3.0 software
manual, the non-linear (e.g. Warp2) algorithm is sensitive to outliers present in the data.
Therefore, as recommended by the WarpPLS 3.0 software manual, P values were estimated
using both bootstrapping and jackknifing techniques. A good model fit generally has path
coefficients with corresponding significant P values, high R2 coefficients based on accepted
thresholds, and each construct having high internal reliability above .70 (Barclay, Higgins, &
Thompson, 1995).
WarpPLS 3.0 has three techniques for resampling data: bootstrapping, jackknifing, and
blindfolding. Bootstrapping creates a number of resamples containing a random arrangement of
rows from the original data. Bootstrapping generates stable resample path coefficients with large
sample sizes and works well with non-parametric data (Nevitt & Hancock, 2001). This study’s
sample size falls within the acceptable limits for using the bootstrapping technique (Nevitt &
Hancock, 2001). Jackknifing, an alternative to bootstrapping, resamples by removing one
different row from each resample. This technique of resampling works best with small sample
sizes and data with outliers (Hinkley, 1977; Osborne, 2008). Blindfolding is a resampling
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technique that creates resamples by replacing a certain number of rows in each resample with the
means of their respective columns. Blindfolding has a tendency to perform somewhere between
jackknifing and bootstrapping (Kock, 2012). In the results section, the results of the theoretical
model’s path analysis using data with both missing data treatments and resampling methods
applied are presented.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of the hypothesized relationships
between macroeconomic, ICT, governance and sociocultural variables using the key and control
variables as listed in Table 3-3. This chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis of
those variables in a path model. In the first section of this chapter, the descriptive statistics of the
key and control variables are provided and explained. The second section shows results of the
path analysis of the theoretical model. The third section of this chapter reports the model fit
indices. The fourth section of this chapter reports the results of hypotheses testing.
The theoretical model used in this study is a path model that formalized the hypothesized
relationships among the key macroeconomic, ICT, governance and sociocultural variables. The
theoretical model used in this study is presented in Figure 2.1. This theoretical model was
statistically analyzed using path analysis with WarpPLS 3.0, a structural equation modeling
software package specially designed to identify nonlinear relationships among variables of a
theorized model by conducting linear and non-linear (or “warped”) regression analysis (Kock,
2012).
4.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis
This study examined 121 countries which are listed in Table 3-1. This study used multiyear dataset for these key and control variables collected over a period of five years (i.e. 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010). To address the missing Hofstede Cultural Dimensions data, two
missing data treatments were applied to the data in this study. The missing data treatments that
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were applied are listwise deletion (LD) and a modified version of mean substitution called
regional group mean substitution (RMS).
This listwise deletion treatment resulted in the removal of 145 rows (23.967%) from the
data. Table 4-1 presents the descriptive statistics of the data across all years for the key and
control variables, including the Hofstede Cultural Dimension control variables, using the LD
treatment.

Table 4-1. Descriptive statistics of data using LD.
Variable
Transparency
Corruption
Internet diffusion
Mobile diffusion
FDI
NRI
GDP per capita
H-PDI
H-UAI
H-LTO
H-IDV

N

Mean
460
457
455
454
455
455
455
375
375
375
375

0.332
-4.843
40.681
91.600
19.408
4.109
17325.771
59.680
66.307
46.592
42.933

SD
0.873
2.303
26.793
38.418
10.453
0.824
20683.797
21.077
22.815
22.951
23.411

The other missing data treatment (the regional group mean substitution) resulted in
reducing missing data amounts to within recommended thresholds. Table 4-2 presents the
descriptive statistics of the data across all years for the key and control variables in the study’s
data, including the Hofstede Cultural Dimension control variables, using the RMS treatment. The
descriptive statistics by year and in total for the key variables are also presented in Table 4-3.
The results and findings in this section examine and describe the descriptive statistics of the data
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using the RMS missing data treatment except where noted. Microsoft Excel 2010 was utilized to
calculate the descriptive statistics.

Table 4-2. Descriptive statistics of data using RMS.
Variable
Transparency
Corruption
Internet diffusion
Mobile diffusion
FDI
NRI
GDP per capita
H-PDI
H-UAI
H-LTO
H-IDV

N

Mean
605
602
596
595
600
594
600
580
580
580
580

SD

0.173
-4.525
34.148
84.070
18.949
3.939
14697.774
61.586
65.724
41.812
40.302

0.879
2.221
27.372
40.962
10.196
0.841
19686.245
18.094
20.829
22.486
20.756

The mean across all years for the governance variable of Transparency was 0.173 using
the RMS missing data treatment. The data for the variable Transparency was captured through
the World Bank’s Voice of Accountability (VA) Governance indicator. The VA indicator,
ranging from ‐2.5 to 2.5, measures countries’ accountability and citizen participation in relation
to a global average (equaling zero). Negative values in this indicator point toward less
transparency through public voice and accountability. Positive values in this indicator point
toward more transparency. This result of 0.173 indicated that the countries examined in the study
were generally above the global average in terms of transparency. Interestingly, the mean by year
for the governance variable Transparency decreased from 0.190 in 2006 to 0.160 in 2010. This
signifies that the gap between the average of countries used in this study and the global average
gradually became smaller over the time period examined.

Table 4-3. Descriptive statistics of the data.
Year and Statistic

Transparency

Corruption

Internet
diffusion

Mobile
diffusion

FDI

NRI

GDP per
capita

2006
N
Mean
SD
2007
N
Mean
SD
2008
N
Mean
SD
2009
N
Mean
SD
2010
N
Mean
SD
Total
N
Mean
SD

121
0.190
0.876

120
-4.527
2.278

119
27.631
25.736

119
64.660
38.593

120
18.015
11.548

121
3.851
0.910

120
13366.578
17875.565

121
0.181
0.878

120
-4.523
2.232

119
30.474
26.474

119
75.724
39.547

120
20.365
7.873

118
3.963
0.855

120
15333.754
20340.096

121
0.170
0.882

121
-4.546
2.194

119
33.785
27.077

119
86.219
39.445

120
19.588
9.380

120
4.000
0.869

120
16806.692
21973.413

121
0.165
0.885

121
-4.509
2.211

119
37.327
27.687

118
93.464
40.142

120
19.281
9.145

119
3.910
0.810

120
14873.445
19136.946

121
0.160
0.889

120
-4.518
2.230

120
41.464
28.053

120
100.229
37.663

120
17.495
12.277

116
3.971
0.757

120
13108.401
18952.751

605
0.173
0.879

602
-4.525
2.221

596
34.148
27.372

595
84.070
40.961

600
18.949
10.195

594
3.939
0.841

600
14697.774
19686.275
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This finding can be interpreted in a couple of different ways. The countries used in this
study were a subset of the total countries examined by the VA indicator. Therefore, one
interpretation is that countries used in this study became less transparent over time.
Alternatively, another interpretation is that countries, on average, became more transparent over
time. If countries did become more transparent, the gap between the global average and the
country average calculated in this study would tend to contract.
The standard deviation for the governance variable Transparency increased from 0.876 in
2006 to 0.889 in 2010 using the RMS missing data treatment. This finding indicated that the
difference between countries, in terms of transparency, increased. Indeed, in 2006, there were 52
countries below the global average. In 2010, the number of countries below the global average
increased to 58. However, the mean for countries below the global average in 2006 was -0.658.
In 2010 this mean was -0.657, remaining relatively unchanged for countries below the global
average. This relatively small change in standard deviation by year signified very little change
among countries below the global average even though additional countries fell below this
average. However, there was an increase in transparency among countries that were above the
global average. The mean for countries above the world average in 2006 was 0.829. In 2010, this
mean increased to 0.856. One interpretation of this finding is that countries above the global
average study experienced significant positive changes in the apparent level of transparency.
The mean across all years for the governance variable of Corruption was -4.525 using the
RMS missing data treatment. The data for the variable Corruption was captured through the
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International. The CPI ranks countries on
a scale from 10 (representing a very clean/minimally corrupt government) to 0 (representing high
level of corruption). Thus, higher scores on the CPI scale can be interpreted as ‘the absence of
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corruption’. In order to make the higher CPI values reflect the presence of corruption, a data
transformation was performed. This data transformation was performed on the CPI data by
multiplying the original values by negative 1. This data transformation was done to inverse the
scale of the values while preserving their rank.
Therefore, the mean for the governance variable Corruption after reversing the data
transformation across all years was 4.525 using the RMS missing data treatment. Between 2006
and 2010, the highest value for the CPI was 9.6 for Finland, Iceland, and New Zealand in 2006.
During this same time period, the lowest value for the CPI was 1.6 for Chad in 2006 and 2007.
Most country values for Corruption fall below 5.0. In this study, 64.784% of data values (390 of
602) for Corruption fell below 5.0. This signifies that several countries examined in this study
have relatively medium to high levels of corruption between 2006 and 2010. The standard
deviation across all years for the variable Corruption was 2.221 using the RMS missing data
treatment. The standard deviation between years remained relatively unchanged ranging from
2.278 in 2006 to 2.211 in 2009. The mean for the variable Corruption between years remained
relatively unchanged as well. This mean ranged from 4.527 in 2006 to 4.509 in 2009
The mean across all years for the ICT variable of Internet diffusion was 34.148 using the
RMS missing data treatment. Data for the variable Internet diffusion was captured through the
World Bank World Development Internet users (per 100 people) indicator. The mean for
Internet diffusion was 34.148 which indicated that approximately one-third of the people in the
countries studied had access to the Internet. Access to the Internet increased steadily during the
period examined in this study. The mean by year increased from 27.631 in 2006 to 41.464 in
2010. This indicated that there was a significant increase in Internet access in the countries used
in this study. In 2010, Internet access increased over 61.111% over the 2006 level. The standard
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deviation by year slightly increased from 25.736 in 2006 to 28.053 in 2010 using the RMS
missing data treatment. This finding indicated that there was a slight increase in the variance of
Internet access among countries in this study.
The mean across all years for the ICT variable of Mobile diffusion was 84.070 using the
RMS missing data treatment. Data for the variable Mobile diffusion was captured through the
World Bank World Development Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) indicator. The
mean for Mobile diffusion was 84.070, indicating that approximately 5 in 6 persons (84 per 100
people), on average, had mobile cellular access/subscriptions in the countries of this study for the
time period examined. Mobile diffusion increased at a significantly faster rate than Internet
diffusion during the period examined in this study. The mean by year increased from 64.660 in
2006 to 100.229 in 2010. This finding indicated a large increase in the usage of mobile cellular
technology in the countries during the time period of this study. Interestingly, the mean for
Mobile diffusion in 2010 was over 100. Indeed, several country values for Mobile diffusion were
above 100. In this study, 39.496% of data values (235 of 595) for Mobile diffusion were above
100. This signifies that several countries in this study had more than 100 mobile subscriptions
per 100 people. In fact, Estonia had 202.984 mobile subscriptions per 100 people in 2009. The
standard deviation across all years for the variable Mobile diffusion was 40.961 using the RMS
missing data treatment. The standard deviation between years remained relatively unchanged,
ranging from 38.593 in 2006 to 40.142 in 2009 and decreasing to 37.663 in 2010.
The mean across all years for the macroeconomic variable of FDI was 18.949 using the
RMS missing data treatment. The data for the variable FDI was captured through the World
Bank World Development foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) indicator.
Since the FDI data values are quite large and varied, a logarithmic data transformation was
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performed. A general logarithmic transformation could not be performed as a small percentage
of the FDI data values were negative. Therefore, the logarithmic transformation was performed
on the absolute value of the FDI data values. Depending on the sign of the original FDI data
value, a logarithmic transformed value was multiplied by a constant of +1 or -1 to represent its
original sign.
The mean across all years for the macroeconomic variable FDI was 18.949 using the
RMS missing data treatment (after reverse logarithmic transformation: $169,607,923.67US).
This was interpreted as the average FDI inflow of the countries in the study across the years for
the time period examined. The mean by year increased from 18.015 ($66,652,292.49US) in 2006
to 20.365 ($698,887,260.25US) in 2007. This finding indicated a large surge in the FDI into
countries during this period. Interestingly, in 2007, FDI showed a sharp decline from its highest
level of 20.365 ($698,887,260.25US) to its lowest level of 17.495 ($39,626,157.46US) in 2010.
This finding was indicative of the overall global financial crisis occurring in 2007 (Crotty, 2009).
The aftereffects of the global financial crises continued to affect FDI levels into 2010.
The standard deviation across all years for the macroeconomic variable FDI was 10.195
using the RMS missing data treatment ($26,769.01US). The standard deviation for the variable
FDI decreased from 11.548 ($103,569.69US) to 7.873 ($2,625.43US) in 2007. This finding
suggests that while the amount of FDI increased dramatically in 2007, the differences between
countries decreased. After the global financial crisis of 2007, the standard deviation of FDI
began to increase. The standard deviation for the variable FDI increased from 7.873
($2,625.43US) in 2007 to 12.277 ($214,700.65US) in 2010. These findings, including the
increase in standard deviation and the decrease in mean, suggest two things. First, after the
global financial crisis in 2007, the amount of FDI into countries on average decreased. Secondly,
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differences among countries, in terms of FDI inflows, increased dramatically. These differences
in FDI inflow among countries may suggest that foreign investors shifted their investments into
more profitable countries.
The mean across all years for the ICT variable of NRI was 3.939 using the RMS missing
data treatment. The data for the variable NRI was captured through the Networked Readiness
Index from the Global Information Technology Report indices by the World Economic Forum.
The NRI ranges from 1.0 (worst) to 7.0 (best) and provides a method for calculating the relative
and overall development and use of ICT in countries and understanding the strengths and
weaknesses of a country’s ICT readiness to compete in a global environment. The finding of
3.939 for the mean across all years signifies that the average among countries in this study fell
just below the midpoint mark of 4.0. The mean between all years increased from 3.851 in 2006
to 3.971 in 2010. Also, the mean between all years was at its highest of 4.000 in 2008. These
findings suggest that that networked readiness among countries gradually increased from 2006 to
2010 with a slight spike in 2008. The standard deviation across all years for the variable NRI was
0.841 using the RMS missing data treatment. The standard deviation for the variable NRI
decreased from 0.910 in 2006 to 0.757 in 2010. This finding suggests that differences between
countries in networked readiness decreased from 2006 to 2010.
The mean across all years of the study for the macroeconomic variable of GDP per capita
was 14,697.774 using the RMS missing data treatment. The data for the variable GDP per capita
was captured through the gross domestic product per capita (current US$) indicator from the
World Bank World Development Indicators. The gross domestic product per capita (current
US$) indicator is measured in current US dollars. GDP per capita measures the gross domestic
product divided by the midyear population. GDP per capita is the most widely used
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macroeconomic indicator of a country’s standard of living and level of economic production
(Ringen, 1991). The mean across all years of the study for the variable of GDP per capita was
14,697.774. This number indicated that the average GDP per capita in the countries used in this
study was approximately $14,697.77US.
The mean for the macroeconomic variable of GDP per capita by year increased from
13366.578 ($13,366.58US) in 2006 to 16806.692 ($16,806.69US) in 2008. This finding
indicated a 25.737% increase ($3,440.11US) in the GDP per capita between 2006 and 2008.
However, GDP per capita decreased from its peak of 16806.692 ($16,806.69US) in 2008 to
13108.401 ($13,108.40) in 2010. This finding indicated a decrease in GDP per capita of
approximately 22.005% ($3,698.29US) between 2008 and 2010. The average GDP per capita in
2010 was actually lower than the average GDP per capita in 2006 by $258.18. These changes in
GDP were similar to the effect shown in the FDI data and are indicative of the aftereffects of the
overall global financial crisis occurring in 2007 (Crotty, 2009).
The standard deviation for the variable of GDP per capita by year increased from
17875.565 in 2006 to 21973.413 in 2008 using the RMS missing data treatment. However,
standard deviation decreased 21973.413 in 2008 to 18952.751. These findings indicate that the
difference in GDP per capita from 2006 to 2008 increased, reflecting a wide difference between
persons in different countries. These findings also indicated that differences between persons in
terms of GDP per capita decreased from 2008 to 2010. However, differences between persons in
different countries did not decrease at the same rate as FDI. Surprisingly, the pattern of increase
and decrease were relatively the same among FDI and GDP per capita.
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The Hofstede Cultural Dimensions have been utilized to examine cultural similarities or
differences in various studies examining culture and technology adoption (Erumban & de Jong,
2006; Hofstede, 2001; Moghadam & Assar, 2008). Four of the Hofstede Cultural Dimension
indices of Power Distance, Individualism vs. Collectivism, Long- vs. Short-Term Orientation,
and Uncertainty Avoidance were used as national culture control variables to examine potential
cultural factors influencing the main dependent variable in this study. The data for the cultural
dimension variables used in this study were captured from the Geert Hofstede Dimension Data
Matrix as presented in Cultures and Organizations 3rd edition (Hofstede et al., 2010). Similar to
the CPI, the values of the Hofstede Cultural Dimension Indexes are best used to compare relative
characteristics of countries to one another. For example, in the power distance index, Austria has
a score of 11 and Malaysia has a score of 104. This disparity in score suggests that there exists a
significant difference in power distance between these two countries. However, it would not
necessarily signify that the power distance in Malaysia is over nine times greater than in Austria.
The national culture dimension control variables used in this study did not vary by year.
The mean scores and standard deviations for each cultural dimension variable used in the study
were calculated using both missing data treatments. These mean scores and standard deviations
are present below.
The national culture control variable of H-PDI represented the Hofstede Cultural
Dimension of power distance. Power distance measures the extent to which less powerful
members of society accept and/or expect unequal distribution of power (Hofstede, 1984). Higher
scores in this variable suggest that societal inequality is more widely accepted by those who are
governed. The minimum score in this cultural dimension was 11 (Austria) and the maximum
score was 104 (Malaysia). Using the LD missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-
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PDI was 59.680. The standard deviation for the variable H-PDI using the LD missing data
treatment was 1.088. Using the RMS missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-PDI
was 61.586. The standard deviation for the variable H-PDI using the RMS missing data
treatment was 0.751. There was a slight difference in means and standard deviations among
missing data treatments. This slight difference suggests that the power distance cultural variable
is consistent in both missing data treatments.
The national culture control variable of H-IDV represented the Hofstede Cultural
Dimension of Individualism vs. Collectivism. Individuality versus collectivism measures the
extent to which individuals are incorporated into groups. Higher scores in this variable are
associated with societies valuing personal rights and freedoms over collectivistic value. The
minimum score in this cultural dimension was 6 (Guatemala) and the maximum score was 91
(United States). Using the LD missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-IDV was
42.933. The standard deviation for the variable H-IDV using the LD missing data treatment was
1.209. Using the RMS missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-IDV was 40.302.
The standard deviation for the variable H-IDV using the RMS missing data treatment was 0.862.
There was a slight difference in means and standard deviations among missing data treatments.
This slight difference suggests that the individuality versus collectivism cultural variable is
consistent in both missing data treatments.
The national culture control variable of H-LTO represented the Hofstede Cultural
Dimension of Long- vs. Short-Term Orientation. Long- versus short-term orientation measures
the future orientation of a society. Higher scores in this variable suggest that societies are more
future-oriented and foster more pragmatic views such as persistence. Lower scores in this
variable suggest that societies promote past and present values such as tradition and saving face.
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The minimum score in this cultural dimension was 4 (Ghana) and the maximum score was 100
(South Korea). Using the LD missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-LTO was
46.592. The standard deviation for the variable H-LTO using the LD missing data treatment was
1.107. Using the RMS missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-LTO was 41.812.
The standard deviation for the variable H-LTO using the RMS missing data treatment was 0.928.
There was a slight difference in means and standard deviations among missing data treatments.
This slight difference suggests that the long- versus short-term orientation cultural variable is
consistent in both missing data treatments.
The national culture control variable of H-UAI represented the Hofstede Cultural
Dimension of uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty avoidance measures the degree of tolerance for
uncertainty and ambiguity that exists within a society. Higher scores in this variable indicate
societies with more rules and laws; these societies are less tolerant to unplanned change. The
minimum score in this cultural dimension was 8 (Singapore) and the maximum score was 112
(Greece).
Using the LD missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-UAI was 66.307.
The standard deviation for the variable H-UAI using the LD missing data treatment was 1.178.
Using the RMS missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-UAI was 65.724. The
standard deviation for the variable H-UAI using the RMS missing data treatment was 0.865.
There was a slight difference in means and standard deviations among missing data
treatments. This slight difference suggests that the uncertainty avoidance cultural variable is
consistent in both missing data treatments.
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4.2 Structural Model Analysis
The theoretical model used in this study as presented in Figure 2.1 was statistically
analyzed using path analysis with WarpPLS 3.0. A SEM package, WarpPLS 3.0 possesses
multiple algorithms to analyze structural models. This software is specially designed to identify
nonlinear relationships among variables of a theorized model by conducting linear and non-linear
(or “warped”) regression analysis (Kock, 2012).
WarpPLS 3.0 is a powerful SEM package that can be used to conduct path analysis. Path
analysis is a special case of structural equation modeling (SEM) (Maruyama, 1998). In path
analysis, the measurement model found in SEM is excluded. The measurement model is not
required since only one indicator is associated upon one construct. The structural model found in
SEM is basically a path model with constructs as variables and the association between variables
as paths within the model. In order to use WarpPLS 3.0 to conduct a path analysis using the
Warp2 regression algorithm, each variable used in this study was entered into the software as an
indicator. Each indicator was used as a solitary indicator for each construct.
The majority of social and economic phenomena exhibit non-linear relationships (Kock,
2011b; A. Rosenberg, 1992). Therefore, WarpPLS 3.0 was utilized to do the path analysis.
WarpPLS 3.0 possesses algorithms that attempt to identify such non-linear or U-curve
relationships between variables within a model. This study utilized WarpPLS 3.0’s non-linear
(e.g. Warp2) algorithm to calculate statistical results such as path coefficients denoted as
standardized betas with related P values and R-squared (R2) coefficients for the path model. The
overall strength and predictive power of the model can be determined by examining these path
and R2 coefficients of the path model. Also, the software allows for three methods of resampling:
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bootstrapping, jackknifing, and blindfolding. Bootstrapping – with WarpPLS 3.0’s default setting
of 100 resamples – and jackknifing resampling techniques were applied to the data using
WarpPLS 3.0 before analysis. In addition, both missing data treatments were used in preparing
the data for analysis.
As noted in the WarpPLS 3.0 software manual, the non-linear (e.g. Warp2) algorithm is
sensitive to outliers present in the data. As recommended by the WarpPLS 3.0 software manual,
P values were estimated using both the bootstrapping and jackknifing resampling techniques.
Therefore, the data using two missing data treatments and two different resampling techniques
was analyzed using path analysis which yielded four sets of results. Figure 4-1 presents the
study’s structural model with results of the Warp2 algorithm with the RMS missing data
treatment and bootstrapping resampling technique applied. Figure 4-2 presents the study’s
structural model with results of the Warp2 algorithm with the RMS missing data treatment and
the jackknifing resampling technique applied. Figure 4-3 presents the study’s structural model
with results of the Warp2 algorithm with the LD missing data treatment and the bootstrapping
resampling technique applied. Figure 4-4 presents the study’s structural model with results of the
Warp2 algorithm with the LD missing data treatment and the jackknifing resampling technique
applied.
Each set of results shows path coefficients as standardized betas (β) and R-squared (R2)
coefficients of explained variance. Beta values followed by three asterisks (***) are significant at
P < 0.001. Beta values followed by two asterisks (**) are significant at P < 0.01. Beta values
followed by one asterisk (*) are significant at P < 0.05. Beta values followed by no asterisk are
not statistically significant. The P=0.05 level can be seen as the upper threshold of acceptability
of significance (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991).
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Figure 4-1. Structural model with RMS and bootstrapping.
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indicates p-value of <0.01
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indicates p-value of <0.05
Solid lines indicate significant paths; dotted lines indicate insignificant paths.
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indicates p-value of <0.001
**
indicates p-value of <0.01
*
indicates p-value of <0.05
Solid lines indicate significant paths; dotted lines indicate insignificant paths.
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Solid lines indicate significant paths; dotted lines indicate insignificant paths.
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The WarpPLS 3.0 software manual recommends using “the P values associated with the
most stable [path] coefficients” (Kock, 2012, p. 13). The significant path coefficients along with the
related P values were estimated for each missing data treatment and bootstrapping and jackknifing
resampling techniques as shown in Table 4-4.

Table 4-4. Number of significant paths by P-value level.
Number of significant paths
Significance level
P<0.05
P<0.01
P<0.001

RMS
bootstrapping
jackknifing
11
9
10
6
9
6

LD
bootstrapping
jackknifing
10
10
10
7
7
5

As predicted by the WarpPLS 3.0 manual, results with large samples and those that used
bootstrapping resampling gave more stable path coefficients. (Kock, 2012). Consequently, the data
with the RMS missing data treatment and bootstrapping resampling technique demonstrated the
higher number of significant paths with stronger associated P values, indicating a higher overall
predictive and explanatory quality of this particular model.
4.3 Model Fit Indices
WarpPLS 3.0 conducts a model fitness test as part of its structural model analysis. The
results of these model fitness tests are outlined in this section. The following model fitness tests
indices were calculated: average path coefficient (APC), average R-squared value (ARS), and
average variance inflation factor (AVIF). The APC index is the average of the absolute values of
the model’s path coefficients. ARS index is the absolute value of the R2 coefficients for the model.
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The AVIF index is the overall measure of multicollinearity of the model. Model fit indices are
useful when comparing the quality of a model with different data. In this study, the quality of the
model was assessed by comparing the APC, ARS, and AVIF values of the data using different
missing data treatments. The ARS and AVIF indices are more important when comparing models
(Kock, 2011b, 2012).
The results of the model fitness tests along with associated P-values are shown in Table 4.3.
It is recommended that APC and ARS are significant at the P<0.05 level and AVIF is less than 5
(Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2010; Kock, 2012). The APC and ARS indices’ P-values for the data with
both missing data treatments were significant at the P<.001 level. The AVIF index for the data with
both missing data treatments was less than 5. The model using data with the RMS missing data
treatment demonstrated a higher ARS. This indicated that the study’s model had more explanatory
power using data with the RMS treatment. The data with the LD missing data treatment had a
slightly lower AVIF index (1.953) than the data with the RMS missing data treatment (2.145).
However, these AVIF indices had values below the recommended threshold.

Table 4-5. Model fit indices with associated P-values.
Fit Index
Data with LD
APC
ARS
AVIF
Note: * indicates P-value < 0.001

Data with RMS
0.309*
0.657*
1.953

0.300*
0.664*
2.145
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4.4 Hypotheses Testing
The ARS values for data using the RMS missing data treatment were higher than the LD
missing data treatment as shown in Table 4-5. Also, the data using the RMS missing data treatment
and bootstrapping resampling demonstrated the higher number of significant paths with stronger
associated P values. Given these results of the model fit and significant path tests, data with the
RMS missing data treatment and bootstrapping resampling were used in the hypotheses testing. The
results of the hypotheses testing are presented in Table 4-6. A detailed review of these results for
each hypothesis follows.

Table 4-6: Summary results of hypotheses testing
Hypotheses
Supported
H1a: FDI has a positive effect on networked readiness.
Accept(a)
H1b: GDP per capita has a positive effect on networked readiness.
Accept(a)
H2a: Networked readiness has a positive effect on Internet diffusion.
Accept(a)
H2b: Networked readiness has a positive effect on mobile phone diffusion.
Accept(a)
H2c: Mobile phone diffusion has a positive effect on Internet diffusion.
Accept(a)
H3a: Internet diffusion has a positive effect on transparency.
Accept(a)
H3b: Mobile phone diffusion has a positive effect on transparency.
Reject
H4a: Internet diffusion has a negative effect on corruption.
Accept
H4b: Transparency has a negative effect on corruption.
Accept
H4c: Mobile phone diffusion has a negative effect on corruption.
Accept
Note: (a) Results significant at P<0.01 across all missing data treatments and resampling analyses.

Hypothesis 1a stated that foreign direct investment (FDI) has a positive effect on networked
readiness (NRI). The results showed that FDI has a significant (P<0.001) and positive (β=0.179)
effect on NRI. Thus, Hypothesis 1a was supported. Figure 4-5 shows the relationship between FDI
and NRI in the data. As shown, the relationship between FDI and NRI was non-linear. WarpPLS
3.0 denoted such relationships as “warped” (Kock, 2012, p. 47). Such relationships are known as U-
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, J- or Kuznet-curves depending on the direction of the curve and the amount of non-linearity
(Selden & Song, 1995). These non-linear relationships have been found in other studies related to
FDI and international trade (D. K. Backus, Kehoe, & Kydland, 1994; Rose & Yellen, 1989).

Figure 4-5. Relationship between FDI and NRI.

Hypothesis 1b stated that GDP per capita, as measured in current US dollars from gross
domestic product per capita (current US$) indicator through the World Bank World Development
Indicators, has a positive effect on networked readiness. GDP per capita had a significant (P<0.001)
and positive (β=0.750) effect on corruption, as measured through the Corruption Perceptions Index
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(CPI) from Transparency International. Thus, Hypothesis 1b was supported. Figure 4-6 shows the
relationship between GDP per capita and NRI in the data. As shown, this relationship was nonlinear.

Figure 4-6. Relationship between GDP per capita and NRI

Hypothesis 2a stated that networked readiness (NRI) has a positive effect on Internet
diffusion as measured through World Bank World Development Internet users (per 100 people)
indicator. The results showed that NRI had a significant (P<0.001) and positive (β=0.578) effect on
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Internet diffusion. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported. Figure 4-7 shows the relationship between
NRI and Internet diffusion in the data. As shown, this relationship was relatively linear.

Figure 4-7. Relationship between NRI and Internet diffusion.

Hypothesis 2b stated that networked readiness (NRI) has a positive effect on mobile phone
diffusion (Mobile diffusion). The results showed that NRI had significant (P<0.001) and positive
(β=0.687) effects on mobile diffusion as measured through World Bank World Development
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) indicator. Thus, Hypothesis 2b was supported.
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Figure 4-8 shows the relationship between NRI and mobile diffusion. As shown, this relationship
was non-linear.

Figure 4-8. Relationship between NRI and Mobile diffusion.

Hypothesis 2c stated that mobile phone diffusion (Mobile diffusion) has a positive effect on
Internet diffusion. Mobile diffusion, as measured through the World Bank World Development
indicator of Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people), had a significant (P<0.001) and positive
(β=0.396) effect on Internet diffusion, as measured through the World Bank World Development
indicator of Internet users (per 100 people). Thus, Hypothesis 2c was supported. Figure 4-9 shows
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the relationship between mobile diffusion and Internet diffusion in the data. As shown, this
relationship was non-linear.

Figure 4-9. Relationship between Mobile and Internet diffusion.

Hypothesis 3a stated that Internet diffusion has a positive effect on transparency. Internet
diffusion, as measured through the World Bank World Development indicator of Internet users (per
100 people), had a significant (P<0.001) and positive (β=0.675) effect on transparency, as measured
through the World Bank Governance index of Voice of Accountability. Thus, Hypothesis 3a was
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supported. Figure 4-10 shows the relationship between Internet diffusion and transparency in the
data. As shown, this relationship was non-linear.

Figure 4-10. Relationship between Internet diffusion and transparency.

Hypothesis 3b stated that mobile phone diffusion (Mobile diffusion) had a positive effect on
transparency. Mobile diffusion, as measured through the World Bank World Development indicator
of Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people), did not have a significant (P=0.182) or positive
(β=-0.055) effect on transparency, as measured through the World Bank Governance index of
Voice of Accountability. Thus, Hypothesis 3b was not supported. Figure 4-11 shows the
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relationship between mobile diffusion and transparency in the data using group-mean substitution
with bootstrapping resampling. As shown, this relationship was non-linear.

Figure 4-11. Relationship between mobile diffusion and transparency.

Hypothesis 4a stated that Internet diffusion has a negative effect on corruption. Internet
diffusion, as measured through the World Bank World Development indicator of Internet users (per
100 people), had a significant (P<0.001) and negative (β=-0.410) effect on corruption as measured
through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International. Thus, Hypothesis
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4a was supported. Figure 4-12 shows the relationship between Internet diffusion and corruption in
the data. As shown, this relationship was non-linear.

Figure 4-12. Relationship between Internet diffusion and corruption.

Hypothesis 4b stated that transparency has a negative effect on corruption. Transparency, as
measured through the World Bank Governance index of Voice of Accountability, had a significant
(P<0.001) and negative (β=-0.408) effect on corruption, as measured through the Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International. Thus, Hypothesis 4b was supported.
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Figure 4-13 shows the relationship between transparency and corruption in the data. As shown, this
relationship was a non-linear or J-curve.

Figure 4-13. Relationship between transparency and corruption.

Hypothesis 4c stated that mobile phone diffusion (Mobile diffusion) has a negative effect on
corruption. Mobile diffusion, as measured through the World Bank World Development indicator
of Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people), did have a significant (P<0.05) and negative (β=0.092) effect on corruption, as measured through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from
Transparency International. Thus, Hypothesis 4c was supported. Figure 4-14 shows the relationship
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between mobile phone diffusion and corruption in the data. As shown, this relationship was nonlinear.

Figure 4-14. Relationship between mobile diffusion and corruption.

In this study, four control variables were used as national culture control variables to
examine potential cultural factors influencing the main dependent variable. These four national
culture control variables included the Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices of Power Distance,
Individualism vs. Collectivism, Long- vs. Short-Term Orientation, and Uncertainty Avoidance. The
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year was also used as a control variable in order to control for potential multiple year effects. The
year variable did not prove statistically significant (β=0.081, P=0.190) in the data analysis.
The national culture control variable of H-PDI represented the Hofstede Cultural Dimension
of power distance. H-PDI had a significant (P<0.01) and positive (β=0.065) effect on corruption as
measured through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International. The
national culture control variable of H-UAI represented the Hofstede Cultural Dimension of
uncertainty avoidance. H-UAI had a significant (P<0.01) and positive (β=0.085) effect on
corruption as measured through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency
International.
The national culture control variable of H-IDV represented the Hofstede Cultural
Dimension of Individualism vs. Collectivism. H-IDV did not have a significant (P=0.447, β=0.003) effect on corruption as measured through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from
Transparency International. The national culture control variable of H-LTO represented the
Hofstede Cultural Dimension of Long- vs. Short-Term Orientation. H-LTO did not have a
significant (P=0.072, β=-0.031) effect on corruption as measured through the Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International.
4.4 Direct, Indirect and Total Effects
The J. Cohen (1988) f-squared effect size coefficients were calculated for the paths in this
study’s model. Direct, indirect and total effect coefficients were calculated using WarpPLS 3.0.
Calculation of such indirect, direct and total effect coefficients can prove crucial to evaluating and
explaining mediating effects of variables in the model. Effect size is the contribution by a predictor
variable on the R2 coefficient of a criterion variable.

108
WarpPLS 3.0 calculates these effects for variables linked by one or more paths in the
following manner: “the path coefficients associated with the effects, the number of paths that make
up the effects, the P values associated with effects (calculated via resampling, using the selected
resampling method), the standard errors associated with the effects, and effect sizes associated with
the effects” (Kock, 2012, p. 50). According to J. Cohen (1988), effect sizes can be small (0.02),
medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients (ƒ2) below 0.02 are considered too small for
relevancy.
Direct effects for each variable relationship in the model along with the effect size with
respective P values and standard error are shown in Table 4-7. Direct effects are analogous to the
path coefficients for each variable-to-variable relationship. It is important to note effect size when
examining direct effects. While a direct effect may be significant (P<0.001), magnitude of that
effect (i.e. effect size) may be small. FDI showed a positive and significant direct effect on NRI
(direct effect=0.179, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of FDI on NRI was small (effect
size=0.104). GDP per capita showed a positive and significant direct effect on NRI (direct
effect=0.750, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of GDP per capita on NRI was large
(effect size=0.634).
NRI showed a positive and significant direct effect on Internet diffusion (direct
effect=0.578, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of NRI on Internet diffusion was large
(effect size=0.491). NRI showed a positive and significant direct effect on Mobile diffusion (direct
effect=0.678, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of NRI on Mobile diffusion was large
(effect size=0.472). Mobile diffusion showed a positive and significant direct effect on Internet
diffusion (direct effect=0.396, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of Mobile diffusion on
Internet diffusion was medium (effect size=0.314). Mobile diffusion showed a negative but not
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significant direct effect on Transparency (direct effect=-0.055, p=0.182). The magnitude of the
direct effect of Mobile diffusion on Transparency was small (effect size=0.028). Mobile diffusion
showed a negative and significant direct effect on Corruption (direct effect=-0.092, P<0.05,
p=0.015). The magnitude of the direct effect of Mobile diffusion on Corruption was small (effect
size=0.053).
Internet diffusion showed a positive and significant direct effect on Transparency (direct
effect=0.675, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of Internet diffusion on Transparency
was large (effect size=0.481). Internet diffusion showed a positive and significant direct effect on
Corruption (direct effect=-0.410, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of Internet diffusion
on Corruption was medium (effect size=0.348). Transparency showed a negative and significant
direct effect on Corruption (direct effect=-0.408, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of
Transparency on Corruption was medium (effect size=0.348).
The control variables were also analyzed for their direct effect on Corruption. Hofstede’s
power distance index (H-PDI) showed a positive and significant direct effect on Corruption (direct
effect=0.065, P<0.01, p=0.008). The magnitude of the direct effect of H-PDI on Corruption was
small (effect size=0.045). Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index (H-UAI) showed a positive and
significant direct effect on Corruption (direct effect=0.085, P<0.01, p=0.002). The magnitude of the
direct effect of H-UAI on Corruption was small (effect size=0.045). Hofstede’s long-term
orientation (H-LTO) showed a negative but not significant direct effect on Corruption (direct
effect=-0.031, p=0.072). The magnitude of the direct effect of H-LTO on Corruption was below
Cohen’s recommended effect size threshold for relevancy (effect size=0.008). Hofstede’s
individuality index (H-IDV) showed a negative but not significant direct effect on Corruption
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(direct effect=-0.003, p=0.447). The magnitude of the direct effect of H-IDV on Corruption was
below Cohen’s recommended effect size threshold for relevancy (effect size=0.002).

Table 4-7. Direct effects for each variable relationship.
Relationship

Total
Effect
0.179
0.750
0.578
0.687

P-value

Effect Size
Coefficient*
0.104
0.634
0.491
0.472

Effect
Size*
small
large
large
large

Std. Err.

FDI → NRI
<0.001
0.030
GDP per capita → NRI
<0.001
0.025
NRI → Internet diffusion
<0.001
0.023
NRI → Mobile diffusion
<0.001
0.018
Mobile diffusion → Internet
0.396
<0.001
0.314
medium
0.026
diffusion
Mobile diffusion → Transparency
-0.055
0.182
0.028
small
0.061
Mobile diffusion → Corruption
-0.092
0.015
0.053
small
0.042
Internet diffusion → Transparency
0.675
<0.001
0.481
large
0.028
Internet diffusion → Corruption
-0.410
<0.001
0.347
medium
0.061
Transparency → Corruption
-0.408
<0.001
0.348
medium
0.061
H-PDI → Corruption
0.065
0.008
0.045
small
0.027
H-UAI → Corruption
0.085
0.002
0.024
small
0.030
H-LTO → Corruption
-0.031
0.072
0.008
no rel.
0.021
H-IDV → Corruption
-0.003
0.447
0.002
no rel.
0.025
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.).

Indirect effects are introduced when the path from an initial variable to an outcome variable
has other intervening variables. The intervening variables in a model can have a mediation effect on
the relationship between the initial and outcome variables. The indirect effects by number of
aggregated segments and summation of indirect effects for each variable relationship in the model
along with the effect size with respective P values and standard error were also calculated.
The indirect effects of initial variables on outcome variables with two aggregated segments,
along with associate P values, effect size, and standard errors are shown in Table 4-8. Internet
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diffusion, which had one two-segment path to Corruption (Internet diffusion → Transparency →
Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (indirect effect=-0.275,
P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of Internet diffusion on Corruption was medium
(effect size=0.233).

Table 4-8. Indirect effects for relationships with two aggregated segments.
Relationship

Paths N

Indirect
Effect

P-value

Effect Size
Coefficient*

Effect
Size*

Std.
Err.

Internet diffusion →
1
-0.275
<0.001
0.233
medium
0.045
Transparency → Corruption
Mobile diffusion → Internet
1
0.268
<0.001
0.138
small
0.019
diffusion → Transparency
Mobile diffusion →
Transparency →
Corruption; Mobile
2
-0.140
<0.001
0.081
small
0.031
diffusion → Internet
diffusion → Corruption
FDI → NRI → Internet
1
0.103
<0.001
0.051
small
0.017
diffusion
FDI → NRI → Mobile
1
0.123
<0.001
0.048
small
0.021
diffusion
NRI → Internet diffusion →
Transparency; NRI →
2
0.352
<0.001
0.237
medium
0.047
Mobile diffusion →
Transparency
NRI → Internet diffusion →
Corruption; NRI → Mobile
2
-0.300
<0.001
0.274
medium
0.045
diffusion → Corruption
NRI → Mobile diffusion →
1
0.272
<0.001
0.231
medium
0.018
Internet diffusion
GDP per capita → NRI →
1
0.434
<0.001
0.361
large
0.025
Internet diffusion
GDP per capita → NRI →
1
0.515
<0.001
0.375
large
0.023
mobile diffusion
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.).
Mobile diffusion, which had one two-segment path to Transparency (Mobile diffusion →
Internet diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on
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Transparency (indirect effect=0.268, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of Mobile
diffusion on Transparency was small (effect size=0.138). Mobile diffusion, which had two twosegment path to Corruption (Mobile diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; Mobile diffusion →
Internet diffusion → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption
(indirect effect=-0.140, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of Mobile diffusion on
Corruption was small (effect size=0.081). FDI, which had one two-segment path to Internet
diffusion (FDI → NRI → Internet diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on
Internet diffusion (indirect effect=0.103, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on
Internet diffusion was small (effect size=0.051).
FDI, which had one two-segment path to Mobile diffusion (FDI → NRI → Mobile
diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on mobile diffusion (indirect
effect=0.123, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on Mobile diffusion was small
(effect size=0.048). NRI, which had two two-segment path to Transparency (NRI → Internet
diffusion → Transparency; NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive and
significant indirect effect on Transparency (indirect effect=0.352, P<0.001). The magnitude of the
indirect effect of NRI on Transparency was medium (effect size=0.237). NRI, which had two twosegment path to Corruption (NRI → Internet diffusion → Corruption; NRI → Mobile diffusion →
Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (indirect effect=-0.300,
P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on Corruption was medium (effect
size=0.274). NRI, which had one two-segment path to Internet diffusion (NRI → Mobile diffusion
→ Internet diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on Internet diffusion
(indirect effect=0.272, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on Internet diffusion
was medium (effect size=0.231). GDP per capita, which had one two-segment path to Internet
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diffusion (GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect
effect on Internet diffusion (indirect effect=0.434, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of
GDP per capita on Internet diffusion was large (effect size=0.361). GDP per capita, which had one
two-segment path to Mobile diffusion (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion), showed a
positive and significant indirect effect on Mobile diffusion (indirect effect=0.515, P<0.001). The
magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Mobile diffusion was large (effect
size=0.375).
The indirect effects of initial variables on outcome variables with three aggregated
segments, along with associate P values, effect size, and standard errors are shown in Table 4-9.
Mobile diffusion, which had one three-segment path to Corruption (Mobile diffusion → Internet
diffusion → Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on
Corruption (indirect effect=-0.109, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of Mobile
diffusion on Corruption was small (effect size=0.063).
FDI, which had two three-segment path to Transparency (FDI → NRI → Internet diffusion
→ Transparency; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive and
significant indirect effect on Transparency (indirect effect=0.063, P<0.001). The magnitude of the
indirect effect of FDI on Transparency was small (effect size=0.021). FDI, which had two threesegment path to Corruption (FDI → NRI → Internet diffusion → Corruption; FDI → NRI →
Mobile diffusion → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption
(indirect effect=-0.054, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on Corruption was
small (effect size=0.026).
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Table 4-9. Indirect effects for relationships with three aggregated segments.
Relationship (aggregate
Indirect
PEffect Size
Effect
Std.
Paths N
paths)
Effect
value Coefficient*
Size*
Err.
Mobile diffusion →
Internet diffusion →
1
-0.109 <0.001
0.063
small
0.020
Transparency →
Corruption
FDI → NRI → Internet
diffusion → Transparency;
2
0.063
<0.001
0.021
small
0.013
FDI → NRI → Mobile
diffusion → Transparency
FDI → NRI → Internet
diffusion → corruption;
2
-0.054 <0.001
0.026
small
0.012
FDI → NRI → mobile
diffusion → corruption
FDI → NRI → Mobile
diffusion → Internet
1
0.049
<0.001
0.024
small
0.010
diffusion
NRI → Mobile diffusion
→ Internet diffusion →
1
0.184
<0.001
0.124
small
0.014
Transparency
NRI → Mobile diffusion
→ Transparency →
Corruption; NRI →
Internet diffusion →
3
-0.256 <0.001
0.233
medium 0.025
Transparency →
Corruption; NRI → Mobile
diffusion → Internet
diffusion → Corruption
GDP per capita → NRI →
Mobile diffusion →
Transparency; GDP per
2
0.264
<0.001
0.186
medium 0.038
capita → NRI → Internet
diffusion→ Transparency
GDP per capita → NRI →
Mobile diffusion →
Corruption; GDP per capita
2
-0.225 <0.001
0.193
medium 0.033
→ NRI → Internet
diffusion → Corruption
GDP per capita → NRI →
Mobile diffusion →
1
0.204
<0.001
0.170
medium 0.014
Internet diffusion
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988),
effect sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below
0.02 are considered too small for relevancy (no rel.).
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FDI, which had one three-segment path to Internet diffusion (FDI → NRI → Mobile
diffusion → Internet diffusion), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Internet
diffusion (indirect effect=-0.049, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on Internet
diffusion was small (effect size=0.024). NRI, which had one three-segment path to Transparency
(NRI → mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive and significant
indirect effect on Transparency (indirect effect=0.184, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect
effect of NRI on Transparency was small (effect size=0.124). NRI, which had three three-segment
path to Corruption (NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; NRI → Internet
diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion →
Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (indirect effect=-0.256,
P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on corruption was medium (effect
size=0.233). GDP per capita, which had two three-segment path to Transparency (GDP per capita
→ NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency; GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion→
Transparency), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on Transparency (indirect
effect=0.264, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Transparency
was medium (effect size=0.186). GDP per capita, which had two three-segment path to Corruption
(GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Corruption; GDP per capita → NRI → Internet
diffusion → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (indirect
effect=-0.225, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Corruption was
medium (effect size=0.193). GDP per capita, which had one three-segment path to Internet
diffusion (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion), showed a negative
and significant indirect effect on Internet diffusion (indirect effect=0.204, P<0.001). The magnitude
of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Internet diffusion was medium (effect size=0.170).
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The indirect effects of initial variables on outcome variables with four aggregated segments,
along with associate P values, effect size, and standard errors are shown in Table 4-10.

Table 4-10. Indirect effects for relationships with four aggregated segments.
Relationship (aggregate
Paths Indirect
Effect Size
Effect
Std.
P-value
paths)
N
Effect
Coefficient*
Size*
Err.
FDI → NRI → Mobile
diffusion → Internet
1
0.033
<0.001
0.011
no rel.
0.006
diffusion → Transparency
FDI → NRI → Mobile
diffusion → Internet
diffusion → Corruption; FDI
→ NRI → Mobile diffusion
3
-0.046
<0.001
0.022
small
0.008
→ Transparency →
Corruption; FDI → NRI →
Mobile diffusion →
Transparency → Corruption
NRI → Mobile diffusion →
Internet diffusion →
1
-0.075
<0.001
0.069
small
0.013
Transparency→ Corruption
GDP per capita → NRI →
Mobile diffusion → Internet
1
0.138
<0.001
0.097
small
0.011
diffusion → Transparency
GDP per capita → NRI →
Mobile diffusion → Internet
diffusion → Corruption;
GDP per capita → NRI →
Mobile diffusion →
3
-0.192
<0.001
0.164
medium
0.021
Transparency → Corruption;
GDP per capita → NRI →
Internet diffusion →
Transparency →Corruption
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.).

FDI, which had one four-segment path to Transparency (FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion
→ Internet diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on
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Transparency (indirect effect=0.033, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on
Transparency was below Cohen’s recommended effect size threshold for relevancy (effect
size=0.011). FDI, which had three four-segment path to Corruption (FDI → NRI → Mobile
diffusion → Internet diffusion → Corruption; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → transparency →
Corruption; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative
and significant indirect effect on Corruption (indirect effect=-0.046, P<0.001). The magnitude of
the indirect effect of FDI on Corruption was small (effect size=0.022).
NRI, which had one four-segment path to Corruption (NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet
diffusion → Transparency→ Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on
Corruption (indirect effect=0.033, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on
Corruption was small (effect size=0.069). GDP per capita, which had one four-segment path to
Transparency (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Transparency),
showed a positive and significant indirect effect on Transparency (indirect effect=0.138, P<0.001).
The magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Transparency was small (effect
size=0.097). GDP per capita, which had three four-segment path to Corruption (GDP per capita →
NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Corruption; GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile
diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion →
Transparency →Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption
(indirect effect=-0.192, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on
Corruption was medium (effect size=0.164).
The indirect effects of initial variables on outcome variables with five aggregated segments,
along with associate P values, effect size, and standard errors are shown in Table 4-11. FDI, which
had one five-segment path to Corruption (FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion →
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Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption
(indirect effect=-0.013, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on corruption was
below Cohen’s recommended effect size threshold for relevancy (effect size=0.007). GDP per
capita, which had one five-segment path (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet
diffusion → Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on
Corruption (indirect effect=-0.013, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per
capita on Corruption was below Cohen’s recommended effect size threshold for relevancy (effect
size=0.007).

Table 4-11. Indirect effects for relationships with five aggregated segments.
Relationship (aggregate
Indirect
Effect Size
Effect
Std.
Paths N
P-value
paths)
Effect
Coefficient*
Size*
Err.
FDI → NRI → Mobile
diffusion → Internet
1
-0.013
<0.001
0.007
no rel. 0.003
diffusion → Transparency
→ Corruption
GDP per capita → NRI →
Mobile diffusion →
Internet diffusion →
1
-0.056
<0.001
0.048
small 0.011
Transparency →
Corruption
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988),
effect sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below
0.02 are considered too small for relevancy (no rel.).

The sum of indirect effects of initial variables on outcome variables in the model, along with
the number of paths, the effect size with respective P values and standard error are shown in Table
4-12. Internet diffusion, which had one path to Corruption (Internet diffusion → Corruption),
showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (sum of indirect effect=-0.275,
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P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect effect of Internet diffusion on Corruption was
medium (effect size=0.233).

Table 4-12. Sum of indirect effects.
Relationship

Paths N

Indirect
Effect

P-value

Effect Size
Coefficient*

Effect
Size*

Std.
Err.

Internet diffusion →
1
-0.275
<0.001
0.233
medium
0.045
Corruption
Mobile diffusion →
1
0.268
<0.001
0.138
small
0.019
Transparency
Mobile diffusion →…→
3
-0.249
<0.001
0.144
small
0.033
Corruption
FDI → …→
3
0.096
<0.001
0.032
small
0.019
Transparency
FDI → …→ Corruption
6
-0.113
<0.001
0.055
small
0.033
FDI →… → Internet
2
0.152
<0.001
0.075
small
0.019
diffusion
FDI → Mobile diffusion
1
0.123
<0.001
0.048
small
0.033
NRI → …→
3
0.536
<0.001
0.361
large
0.048
Transparency
NRI → …→ Corruption
6
-0.631
<0.001
0.576
large
0.033
NRI → Internet diffusion
1
0.272
<0.001
0.231
medium
0.018
GDP per capita →… →
3
0.402
<0.001
0.283
medium
0.040
Transparency
GDP per capita → …→
6
-0.473
<0.001
0.406
large
0.029
Corruption
GDP per capita →…→
2
0.638
<0.001
0.530
large
0.024
Internet diffusion
GDP per capita →
1
0.515
<0.001
0.375
large
0.023
Mobile diffusion
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.).

Mobile diffusion, which had one path to Transparency (Mobile diffusion → Transparency),
showed a positive and significant indirect effect on Transparency (sum of indirect effect=0.268,
P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect effect of Mobile diffusion on Transparency was
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small (effect size=0.138). Mobile diffusion, which had three paths to Corruption (Mobile diffusion
→ Transparency → Corruption; Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Corruption; Mobile
diffusion → Internet diffusion → Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative and significant
indirect effect on Corruption (sum of indirect effect=-0.249, P<0.001). The summative magnitude
of the indirect effect of Mobile diffusion on Corruption was small (effect size=0.144).
FDI, which had three paths to Transparency (FDI → NRI → Internet diffusion →
Transparency; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion
→ Internet diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on
Transparency (sum of indirect effect=0.096, P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect
effect of FDI on Transparency was small (effect size=0.032). FDI, which had six paths to
Corruption (FDI → NRI → Internet diffusion → Corruption; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion →
Corruption; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Corruption; FDI → NRI →
Mobile diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion →
Transparency → Corruption; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion →
Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (sum
of indirect effect=-0.113, P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on
Corruption was small (effect size=0.055).
FDI, which had two paths to Internet diffusion (FDI → NRI → Internet diffusion; FDI →
NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on
Internet diffusion (sum of indirect effect=0.152, P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the
indirect effect of FDI on Internet diffusion was small (effect size=0.075). FDI, which had one path
to Mobile diffusion (FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect
effect on Mobile diffusion (sum of indirect effect=0.123, P<0.001). The summative magnitude of
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the indirect effect of FDI on Mobile diffusion was small (effect size=0.048). NRI, which had three
paths to Transparency (NRI → Internet diffusion → Transparency; NRI → Mobile diffusion →
Transparency; NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive
and significant indirect effect on Transparency (sum of indirect effect=0.536, P<0.001). The
summative magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on Transparency was large (effect size=0.361).
NRI, which had six paths to Corruption (NRI → Internet diffusion → Corruption; NRI →
Mobile diffusion → Corruption; NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; NRI →
Internet diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion →
Corruption; NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Transparency→ Corruption), showed
a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (sum of indirect effect=-0.631, P<0.001).
The summative magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on Corruption was large (effect size=0.576).
NRI, which had one path to Internet diffusion (NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion),
showed a positive and significant indirect effect on Internet diffusion (sum of indirect effect=0.272,
P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on Internet diffusion was medium
(effect size=0.231).
GDP per capita, which had three paths to Transparency (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile
diffusion → Transparency; GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion→ Transparency; GDP per
capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive and
significant indirect effect on Transparency (sum of indirect effect=0.402, P<0.001). The summative
magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Transparency was medium (effect
size=0.283). GDP per capita, which had six paths to Corruption (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile
diffusion → Corruption; GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion → Corruption; GDP per
capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Corruption; GDP per capita → NRI →
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Mobile diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion →
Transparency →Corruption; GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion →
Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (sum
of indirect effect=-0.473, P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per
capita on Corruption was large (effect size=0.406). GDP per capita, which had two paths to Internet
diffusion (GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion; GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile
diffusion → Internet diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on Internet
diffusion (sum of indirect effect=0.638, P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect effect
of GDP per capita on Internet diffusion was large (effect size=0.530). GDP per capita, which had
one path to Mobile diffusion (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion), showed a positive and
significant indirect effect on Mobile diffusion (sum of indirect effect=0.515, P<0.001). The
summative magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Mobile diffusion was large (effect
size=0.375).
The total effect of FDI, along with the number of paths, the effect size with respective P
values and standard error are shown in Table 4-13. FDI showed a positive and significant total
effect on Transparency (total effect=0.096, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of FDI on
Transparency was small (effect size=0.032). FDI showed a negative and significant total effect on
Corruption (total effect=-0.113, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of FDI on Corruption
was small (effect size=0.055). FDI showed a positive and significant total effect on Internet
diffusion (total effect=0.152, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of FDI on Internet
diffusion was small (effect size=0.075). FDI showed a positive and significant total effect on
Mobile diffusion (total effect=0.123, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of FDI on Mobile
diffusion was small (effect size=0.048). FDI showed a positive and significant total effect on NRI
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(total effect=0.179, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of FDI on NRI was small (effect
size=0.104).

Table 4-13. Total effect of FDI.
Paths N

Total
Effect
0.096
-0.113

P-value

Effect Size
Coefficient*
0.032
0.055

Effect
Size*
small
small

Std. Err.

Transparency
3
<0.001
0.017
Corruption
6
<0.001
0.019
Internet
2
0.152
<0.001
0.075
small
0.026
Diffusion
Mobile
1
0.123
<0.001
0.048
small
0.021
Diffusion
NRI
1
0.179
<0.001
0.104
small
0.030
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.).

The total effect of GDP per capita, along with the number of paths, the effect size with
respective P values, and standard error are shown in Table 4-14. GDP per capita showed a positive
and significant total effect on Transparency (total effect=0.402, P<0.001). The magnitude of the
total effect of GDP per capita on Transparency was medium (effect size=0.283). GDP per capita
showed a negative and significant total effect on Corruption (total effect=-0.473, P<0.001). The
magnitude of the total effect of GDP per capita on Corruption was large (effect size=0.406). GDP
per capita showed a positive and significant total effect on Internet diffusion (total effect=0.638,
P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of GDP per capita on Internet diffusion was large
(effect size=0.530). GDP per capita showed a positive and significant total effect on Mobile
diffusion (total effect=0.515, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of GDP per capita on
mobile diffusion was large (effect size=0.375). GDP per capita showed a positive and significant
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total effect on NRI (total effect=0.750, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of GDP per
capita on NRI was large (effect size=0.634).

Table 4-14. Total effect of GDP per capita.
Paths N

Total Effect

P-value

Effect Size
Coefficient*
0.283
0.406

Effect
Size*
medium
large

Std. Err.

Transparency
3
0.402
<0.001
0.040
Corruption
6
-0.473
<0.001
0.029
Internet
2
0.638
<0.001
0.530
large
0.024
Diffusion
Mobile
1
0.515
<0.001
0.375
large
0.023
Diffusion
NRI
1
0.750
<0.001
0.634
large
0.025
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.).

The total effect of NRI, along with the number of paths, the effect size with respective P
values and standard error are shown in Table 4-15. NRI showed a positive and significant total
effect on Transparency (total effect=0.536, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of NRI on
Transparency was large (effect size=0.361). NRI showed a negative and significant total effect on
Corruption (total effect=-0.631, P<0.001).
The magnitude of the total effect of NRI on Corruption was large (effect size=0.576). NRI
showed a positive and significant total effect on Internet diffusion (total effect=0.851, P<0.001).
The magnitude of the total effect of NRI on Internet diffusion was large (effect size=0.723). NRI
showed a positive and significant total effect on Mobile diffusion (total effect=0.687, P<0.001). The
magnitude of the total effect of NRI on Mobile diffusion was large (effect size=0.472).
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Table 4-15. Total effect of NRI.
Paths N

Total
Effect
0.536
-0.631

P- value

Effect Size
Coefficient*
0.361
0.576

Effect
Size*
large
large

Std. Err.

Transparency
3
<0.001
0.048
Corruption
6
<0.001
0.033
Internet
2
0.851
<0.001
0.723
large
0.010
Diffusion
Mobile
1
0.687
<0.001
0.472
large
0.018
Diffusion
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.).

The total effect of Internet diffusion, along with the number of paths, the effect size with
respective P values, and standard error are shown in Table 4-16. Internet diffusion showed a
positive and significant total effect on Transparency (total effect=0.675, P<0.001). The magnitude
of the total effect of Internet diffusion on transparency was large (effect size=0.481). Internet
diffusion showed a negative and significant total effect on Corruption (total effect=-0.686,
P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of Internet diffusion on Corruption was large (effect
size=0.579).

Table 4-16. Total effect of Internet diffusion.
Total
Effect Size
Effect
P-value
Std. Err.
Effect
Coefficient*
Size*
large
Transparency
1
0.675
<0.001
0.481
0.028
large
Corruption
2
-0.686
<0.001
0.579
0.042
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.).
Paths N

The total effect of Mobile diffusion, along with the number of paths, the effect size with
respective P values and standard error are shown in Table 4-17. Mobile diffusion showed a positive
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and significant total effect on Transparency (total effect=0.212, P<0.001). The magnitude of the
total effect of Mobile diffusion on Transparency was small (effect size=0.109). Mobile diffusion
showed a negative and significant total effect on Corruption (total effect=-0.341, P<0.001). The
magnitude of the total effect of Mobile diffusion on Corruption was medium (effect size=0.197).
Mobile diffusion showed a positive and significant total effect on Internet diffusion (total
effect=0.396, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of Mobile diffusion on Internet diffusion
was medium (effect size=0.314).

Table 4-17. Total effect of Mobile diffusion.
Paths N

Total
Effect
0.212
-0.341

P-value

Effect Size
Coefficient*
0.109
0.197

Effect
Size*
small
medium

Std. Err.

Transparency
2
<0.001
0.064
Corruption
4
<0.001
0.044
Internet
1
0.396
<0.001
0.314
medium
0.026
Diffusion
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.).

The total effect of transparency, along with the number of paths, the effect size with
respective P values and standard error are shown in Table 4-18. Transparency showed a negative
and significant total effect on corruption (total effect=-0.408, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total
effect of transparency on corruption was medium (effect size=0.348).

Table 4-18. Total effect size of Transparency.
Effect Size
Effect Size* Std. Err.
Coefficient*
Corruption
1
-0.408
<0.001
0.348
medium
0.061
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect
Paths N

Total Effect

P-value
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sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.).
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of the hypothesized relationships of
key macroeconomic, ICT and sociocultural variables on corruption and transparency. Specifically,
this study explored the relationship between the ICT environment, diffusion of specific ICTs (e.g.
Internet diffusion and mobile cellular diffusion), and the two macroeconomic variables of FDI and
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and its potential effects on increasing transparency and
reducing corruption. This chapter presents a discussion and interpretation of the statistical results
and path analysis of these relationships. In the first section of this chapter, a brief overview of the
study is provided. The second section provides a detailed discussion of each set of variables with
their related effects.
5.1 Overview of the Study
This study tested the hypothesized relationships among the key macroeconomic, ICT,
governance and sociocultural variables. These variables are listed in Table 3-3. The testing of these
hypothesized relationships was statistically analyzed using path analysis with WarpPLS 3.0, a
structural equation modeling software package. The path model representing these relationships is
formalized as demonstrated in Figure 2.1. WarpPLS 3.0 was used to statistically analyze this path
model because the software was specially designed to identify nonlinear relationships among
variables. WarpPLS identifies such nonlinear relationships by conducting linear and non-linear (or
“warped”) regression analysis (Kock, 2012).
The data for the key variables in this study was drawn from several data sources such as the
World Bank, the World Economic Forum, Transparency International and Hofstede Cultural
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Dimension Data Matrix. The independent and mediating variables in the theoretical model are
Foreign Direct Investment, Gross Domestic Product per capita, Networked Readiness Index,
Internet diffusion, Mobile diffusion, and Transparency. The intervening or mediating variables in
the theoretical model are Networked Readiness Index, Internet diffusion, Mobile diffusion, and
Transparency. Finally, the main dependent variable in the theoretical model is Corruption. The
national culture control variables used in this study were Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices of
Power Distance, Individuality, Long-Term Orientation, and Uncertainty Avoidance.
A missing data analysis was performed prior to the statistical analysis. The independent,
mediating, and dependent variables were within the 10% missing data threshold as suggested by
Hair et al. (1987). However, several Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices exceed the missing data
threshold. To address the missing data, this study utilized two missing data treatments: listwise
deletion (LD) and a modified version of mean substitution called regional mean substitution (RMS)
imputation which uses the calculated mean Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores of UN geoscheme
regional groups. The LD treatment removed all data rows which contained missing data elements
for all four Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices. This resulted in the removal of 145 rows
(23.967% of the dataset) using the LD treatment. Using the RMS imputation treatment, all
independent and dependent variables were within a 10% missing data threshold.
The data with each missing data treatment was analyzed for multicollinearity. One possible
indicator of multicollinearity is a high Pearson correlation coefficient (r) between two or more
variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). High correlation coefficients among variables in the model
may signify multicollinearity (Kock, 2012). A general “rule of thumb” (Farrar & Glauber, 1967, p.
82) indicating possible multicollinearity is correlation coefficients where r ≥ 0.8. Using WarpPLS
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3.0, a correlation matrix was generated with the data using both missing data treatments as part of
its analysis (Kock, 2012).
The correlation matrices with corresponding coefficients and associated p-values for data
using each missing data treatment are presented in Table 3-10 and Table 3-11. Analysis of the
correlation matrixes using both missing data treatments showed correlation coefficients among
variables greater than r = 0.800. Based on the RMS missing data treatment, NRI and corruption had
a correlation coefficient of r = -0.888 with a significance level of p <.001. NRI and Internet
diffusion had a correlation coefficient of r = 0.849 with a significance level of p <.001. GDP per
capita and Internet diffusion had a correlation coefficient of r = 0.828 with a significance level of p
<.001. Also, GDP per capita and NRI had a correlation coefficient of r = 0.829 with a significance
level of p <.001. Using the LD missing data treatment, NRI and corruption had a correlation
coefficient of r = -0.907 with a significance level of p <.001. NRI and Internet diffusion had a
correlation coefficient of r = 0.857 with a significance level of p <.001.
The presence of a high correlation coefficient between two or more variables is a possible
indicator of multicollinearity. While high correlation coefficients do not conclusively signify
multicollinearity, such high correlation coefficients are generally conflated with collinearity
(Douglass et al., 2003 & Michaels, 2003; Graham, 2003). Therefore, additional tests for
multicollinearity were performed.
A full collinearity test was performed on the data using each missing data treatment that
calculated the VIF values of each variable. Table 3-12 presents the VIF values for each variable in
the data using both missing data treatments. Using the more relaxed threshold of a VIF=10 as
suggested by Hair et al. (1987) and O'Brien (2007), the VIF values for data using both missing data
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treatments did not exhibit serious bias due to multicollinearity problems. Additionally, block VIF
values which measure the degree of vertical collinearity were calculated for each variable using
each missing data treatment. Table 3-13 presents the block VIF values for each variable block with
data using the RMS missing data treatment. Table 3-14 presents the block VIF values for each
variable block with data using the LD missing data treatment. In the multivariate analysis literature,
a conservative recommended threshold for VIF values when analyzing models without latent
variables is VIF=5 as suggested by Hair et al. (1987). Using this recommended threshold of VIF=5,
the VIF values for the data using both missing data treatments suggest that no vertical
multicollinearity exist.
The descriptive statistics for the data using each missing data treatment were calculated
using Microsoft Excel 2010. The study’s theoretical model was analyzed using path model analysis
with WarpPLS 3.0. The study’s theoretical model was analyzed using WarpPLS’s Warp2 algorithm
which looks for non-linear relationships among variables. The data using both missing data
treatments and two different resampling techniques (e.g. bootstrapping and jackknifing) was
analyzed yielding four sets of results of the path model. The data with the RMS missing data
treatment and bootstrapping resampling technique demonstrated the higher number of significant
paths with stronger associated P values, indicating a higher overall predictive and explanatory
quality of this particular model. The results of this model and data were used to test the hypotheses
of the study. The results of the hypotheses testing are outlined in Table 4.6.
The results of the data analysis were presented in Chapter IV. In this chapter, the
interpretation of the results will be provided.

132
5.2 Overview of Findings
The goal of this study was to investigate the relationships between the ICT environment,
diffusion of two specific ICTs, and the two macroeconomic variables of FDI and Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) per capita and their potential effects on increasing transparency and reducing
corruption. The five main independent variables, namely Foreign Direct Investment, Gross
Domestic Product per capita, Networked Readiness Index, Internet diffusion, Mobile diffusion, as
well as the intervening variable of Transparency explained 80.8% (R2= 0.808) the variance in the
governance variable of Corruption. Furthermore, the five main independent variables explained
49.7% (R2= 0.497) of the variance in the governance variable of Transparency.
5.2.1 Macroeconomic Variable Findings
One of the primary focuses of this study was to explore how the macroeconomic
independent variables affected transparency and corruption. Indeed, this study did find that FDI had
a significant effect on corruption and transparency. The macroeconomic variable of FDI did
increase transparency and reduce corruption. For each increase of $26,795.79 (1 SD) in FDI, there
was an evident increase in transparency by 1.688% (0.096 SD) and a decrease in corruption by
2.510% (-0.113 SD). This finding is congruent with similar findings from other studies. Larraín and
Tavares (2004) found that FDI, as a share of GDP, is significantly associated with lower corruption
levels. However, in this study, the effect sizes of FDI on these variables were relatively small. FDI
accounted for the variance in transparency of only 3.2% (ƒ2 = 0.032) and 5.5% (ƒ2 = 0.055) in
corruption.
The small effect of FDI on corruption and transparency may be attributed to the unique
relationship between FDI and corruption. Most studies have investigated how levels of corruption
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affect inward FDI flows (Addison & Heshmati, 2004; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Habib & Zurawicki,
2002; Wei, 2000). Generally, these studies have demonstrated that the higher levels of corruption
reduce FDI inflows. Also, these studies have given this corruption-to-FDI relationship some degree
of specificity. In these studies, the effect of FDI on corruption has been found to be moderated or
mediated by such country factors such as resource richness (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009), concentration
of bureaucratic power (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002), democratization and ICT (Addison & Heshmati,
2004), and the difference between host and source countries (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002).
On the contrary, the effect of FDI on corruption is often less studied. However, Larraín and
Tavares (2004) and Pinto and Zhu (2008) studied this particular relationship. Larraín and Tavares
(2004) found that FDI is associated with lower corruption levels. Their findings are harmonious
with the results of this study: increases in FDI leads to decreases in corruption. However, Pinto and
Zhu (2008) found that this relationship is not so straightforward. Pinto and Zhu (2008) found that
FDI actually contributed to corruption in authoritarian and poor countries. However, FDI reduces
corruption as countries become more democratic. Furthermore, FDI inflows had a negligible effect
on more developed economies. The small effect on corruption by FDI may be attributed to the
differentiated effects found by Pinto and Zhu (2008).
GDP per capita had a large effect on levels of transparency and corruption. This study found
that the macroeconomic variable of GDP per capita increased transparency and reduced corruption.
For each increase of $19,686.27 (1 SD) of GDP per capita, there was an elevation in transparency
by 7.068% (0.402 SD) and a decrease in corruption by 10.507% (-0.473 SD). The effect sizes of
GDP per capita on corruption and transparency variables were relatively large. GDP per capita
accounted for the variance in transparency of 28.3% (ƒ2 = 0.283) and 40.6% (ƒ2 = 0.406) in
corruption. These findings correspond with other studies investigating the relationship between
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GDP per capita and corruption. Arvas and Ata (2011) found that increases in GDP per capita are
significantly associated with lower levels of corruption. Paldam (2004) also found that as countries
transfer from poor to rich economies, in terms of increase in GDP per capita, significant reductions
in corruption are produced. These findings add confirming evidence to the suggestions by Vinod
(1999) that corruption can be reduced by increasing per capita income.
This study also found that FDI and GDP per capita had a significant and positive effect on
NRI. This finding is consistent with previous research which demonstrates that macroeconomic
variables such as FDI and GDP per capita have a significant impact on ICT investment and capacity
(Gholami et al., 2006; Kshetri & Cheung, 2002; OECD, 1991; Suh & Khan, 2003). FDI has been
shown to present host countries with access to newer technology (OECD, 1991) and has increased
domestic investment in ICT (Agrawal, 2003). Additionally, Gholami et al. (2006) found that
increases in FDI lead to growth in ICT investment and capacity.
In this study, it is demonstrated that each FDI increase of $26,795.79 (1 SD) accounts for an
increase in the NRI by 2.510% (0.151 SD). However, FDI has a small yet significant effect (ƒ2 =
.104 or 10.4%) on explaining the variance of NRI. Similarly, FDI had small but statistically
significant effects on Internet diffusion and mobile diffusion. This study found that each FDI
increase of $26,795.79 (1 SD) accounts for an increase in Internet diffusion of 4.160 people per 100
persons (0.152 SD) and an increase in mobile diffusion of 5.038 people per 100 persons (0.123 SD).
The effect of FDI on the explained variance of Internet diffusion was 7.5% (ƒ2 = 0.075). Also, FDI
has explained a small amount of the variance (ƒ2= 0.048 or 4.8%) of Mobile diffusion. This finding
is somewhat at odds with Kshetri and Cheung (2002) who showed that rapid mobile cellular phone
diffusion in China was due, in part, to large FDI inflows.
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FDI has been considered as an influential factor in corruption and ICT infrastructure.
However, income inequality, usually measured in GDP per capita, has been put forth as important
factor as well (Dasgupta et al., 2001; Erumban & de Jong, 2006). Interestingly, this study showed
that GDP per capita, rather than FDI, has larger effects. In this study, it is demonstrated that each
GDP per capita increase of $19,686.25 (1 SD) accounts for an increase in the NRI by 10.518%
(0.750 SD). Also, GDP per capita has a large and significant effect (ƒ2 = 0.634 or 63.4%) on
explaining the variance of NRI. Similarly, GDP per capita had a large and statistically significant
effect on Internet diffusion and mobile diffusion. This study found that each GDP per capita
increase of $19,686.25 (1 SD) accounts for an increase in Internet diffusion of 17.463 people per
100 persons (0.638 SD) and an increase in mobile diffusion of 21.095 people per 100 persons
(0.515 SD). Furthermore, the effect of GDP per capita on the explained variance of Internet
diffusion was 53.0% (ƒ2 = 0.530). Likewise, GDP per capita had a large effect on the explained
variance (ƒ2 = 0.375 or 37.5%) of mobile diffusion. These findings add confirming evidence to the
research by Dewan et al. (2005) and Gholami et al. (2006) which demonstrated that GDP per capita
and FDI have a positive effect on NRI.
The findings in this study are consistent with existing research on the effects of GDP on ICT
variables. Rasiah (2006) found that growth in GDP precedes growth in ICT. GDP per capita,
considered a surrogate for the standard of living in a country (Easterlin, 2000; Ringen, 1991),
increases as overall GDP rises. Dewan et al. (2005) found that GDP per capita had a positive effect
on ICT diffusion. As the standard of living rises via increases in income, a large portion of
disposable income becomes available. This disposable income can be used to acquire access to
ICTs. Moreover, Billon, Marco, and Lera-Lopez (2009) found that, in developing countries,
Internet costs have a negative impact on ICT adoption. According to ITU (2011), prices for
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broadband Internet access dropped, on average, by 18% from 2008 to 2010. Also, prices for mobile
cellular services decreased by 22% during the same time period. The most significant price
decreases occurred in African nations where prices for broadband access fell by over 55% and
mobile cellular prices decreased by over 25%. It is quite likely that increases in per capita income
also provide governments with more tax revenues to invest in ICT infrastructure. Singh, Das, and
Joseph (2007), using a model where GDP and e-governance maturity was mediated by ICT
infrastructure and other factors, found that GDP strongly influenced e-governance maturity and
readiness through ICT infrastructure. Also, Billon et al. (2009) found that GDP was one of the
major explanatory factors in countries with higher levels of ICT adoption.
5.2.2 ICT Variable Findings
This study investigated how three ICT variables affected transparency and corruption. The
three variables included NRI, Internet diffusion, and mobile cellular diffusion. Indeed, this study
did find that NRI had a significant effect on corruption and transparency. The ICT variable of NRI
did increase transparency and reduce corruption. For each increase of 0.841 (1 SD) in NRI, there
was a demonstrated increase in transparency by 9.423% (0.536 SD) and a decrease in corruption by
14.017% (-0.631 SD). Furthermore, the effect of NRI on the explained variance of transparency
was 36.1% (ƒ2 = 0.361). Likewise, NRI had a large effect on the explained variance (ƒ2 = 0.576 or
57.6%) of corruption. This finding is congruent with similar findings from other studies. OpokuMensah (2000) found that ICTs such as Internet access improved access to information, thereby
increasing transparency. Soper (2007) also found that ICT investments facilitate future levels of
increased democracy and reduce corruption. Similarly, Charoensukmongkol and Moqbel (2012)
found that increased ICT investment reduces corruption, and Sturges (2004) revealed that access to
ICT promotes greater governmental transparency by removing information barriers and asymmetry.
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NRI also had large positive effects on Internet and mobile diffusion. For each increase of
0.841 (1 SD) in NRI, there was an increase on Internet diffusion of 23.296 people per 100 persons
(0.851 SD). This effect of NRI on Internet diffusion was large (ƒ2 = 0.723 or 72.3%). For each
increase of 0.841 (1 SD) in NRI, there was an increase in mobile cellular diffusion of 24.141 people
per 100 persons (0.687 SD). The effect of NRI on mobile cellular diffusion was large (ƒ2 = 0.472 or
47.2%). These findings are similar to other studies investigating ICT environment and ICT
diffusion. Jakopin and Klein (2011) established that two components of the NRI, regulatory quality
and market environment, significantly benefit Internet diffusion.
The ICT variable of Internet diffusion had a large and significant effect on transparency and
corruption. For each increase of 27.372 per 100 persons on Internet diffusion (1 SD), there was a
demonstrated increase in transparency by 11.867% (0.675 SD). Furthermore, the effect of Internet
diffusion on the explained variance of transparency was 48.1% (ƒ2 = 0.481). Also, for each increase
of 27.372 people per 100 person on Internet diffusion (1 SD), there was a marked reduction in
corruption by 15.239% (-0.686 SD). Likewise, Internet diffusion had a large effect on the explained
variance (ƒ2 = 0.579 or 57.9%) of corruption. The results of this study mirror the findings of similar
studies on Internet access and transparency. García-Murillo (2010) found that several developed
countries have moved toward greater transparency by publishing information on the Internet
concerning governmental issues. Similarly, S. M. Johnson (1998) and Cuillier and Piotrowski
(2009) showed that the Internet expands public access to government information.
Interestingly, mobile cellular diffusion had a weaker effect on transparency and corruption.
For each increase of 40.961 people per 100 persons in mobile cellular diffusion (1 SD), there was a
marginal increase in transparency by 3.727 % (0.212 SD). Furthermore, the effect of mobile cellular
diffusion on the explained variance of transparency diffusion was 10.9% (ƒ2 = 0.109). Also, for
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each increase of 40.961 people per 100 person in mobile cellular diffusion (1 SD), there was a
notable reduction in corruption by 7.575% (-0.341 SD). Likewise, mobile cellular diffusion had a
medium effect on the explained variance (ƒ2 = 0.197 or 19.7%) of corruption. Additionally, for each
increase of 40.961 people per 100 persons in mobile cellular diffusion (1 SD), there was a marginal
increase on Internet diffusion by 10.839 people per 100 persons (0.396 SD). Furthermore, the effect
of mobile cellular diffusion on the explained variance of Internet diffusion was 31.4% (ƒ2 = 0.314).
These results seem to point to the fact that mobile cellular access has a greater impact on the
diffusion of Internet access. Indeed, according to Kenichi (2004), mobile cellular phone diffusion
leads to increased diffusion of Internet access.
However, it is important to note that for each increase of 40 people having mobile cellular
subscriptions, there are only 10 additional people acquiring Internet access. Baliamoune-Lutz
(2003) suggested that differences between communication technology (e.g. mobile phones) and
information technology (e.g. the Internet) have become blurred. Many mobile cellular consumers
can now access data and information via mobile phones (H.-W. Kim et al., 2007). For instance, in
Japan, approximately 40% of the population accesses the Internet via mobile phones (Kenichi,
2004). However, this dissertation did not find strong evidence to support the convergence of these
two ICTs. In fact, this dissertation shows that the two ICTs are distinctly different in their effects on
transparency and corruption.
5.2.3 Control Variable Findings
Given the potential influences of national cultural differences, four dimensions of the
Hofstede Cultural Dimensions framework were used as national culture control variables. Only
Hofstede’s power distance index and uncertainty avoidance index demonstrated any significant
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effect on corruption. For each 18.094 point increase in power distance (1 SD), there was a small
increase in corruption by 1.444% (0.065 SD). Furthermore, the effect of power distance on the
explained variance of corruption was 4.5% (ƒ2 = 0.045). Additionally, for each 20.829 point
increase in uncertainty avoidance (1 SD), there was a small increase in corruption by 1.888% (0.085
SD). Similarly, the effect of uncertainty avoidance on the explained variance of corruption was
2.4% (ƒ2 = 0.024).
The effects of these two Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices are very small compared to
the effects of other variables within the study’s theoretical model. These effects may be explained
through their relationships with corruption and other ICT variables within the model. Some studies
have found that Hofstede Cultural Dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity are
associated with higher levels of corruption (Husted, 1999; Kimbro, 2002; Robertson & Watson,
2004). Similarly, Getz and Volkema (2001) showed that power distance and uncertainty avoidance
were positively associated with corruption. Also, other studies have demonstrated how these two
Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices affect ICT usage and adoption. For example, Erumban and de
Jong (2006) showed that power distance and uncertainty avoidance influence ICT adoption.
Likewise, Straub et al. (1997) suggested that power distance and uncertainty avoidance accounts for
differences in e-mail usage. Lastly, de Mooij and Hofstede (2002) stated that uncertainty avoidance
affects such ICT variables as embracement of the Internet and the ownership of computers and
mobile cellular phones. The effect of these two Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices on corruption
may be a result of their effect on the ICT variables within the model. The year was also used as a
control variable in order to control for potential multiple year effects. However, the year variable
did not prove statistically significant (β=0.081, P=0.190) in the data analysis, indicating that no
multiple year effects were found in this study.
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5.2.4 Transparency’s effect on Corruption
One focus of this study was to augment the existing body of research on how transparency
affects levels of corruption. Indeed, this study did find that transparency had a significant negative
effect on corruption. For each increase of 0.879 (1 SD) in transparency, there was a demonstrated
decrease in corruption by 9.063% (-0.408 SD). Furthermore, the effect of transparency on the
explained variance of corruption was 34.8% (ƒ2 = 0.348). This finding was expected and consistent
with similar findings from other studies. Initiatives that increase transparency have been shown to
be an effective anti-corruption tool (Bertot et al., 2010). Similarly, Brunetti and Weder (2003)
found a strong association between transparency through greater press freedom and reduced
corruption. Conversely, a lack of transparency tends to exacerbate corruption-related problems
(Kolstad & Wiig, 2009).
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The focus of this study was to investigate how ICTs affect levels of transparency and
corruption. This study significantly adds to the existing body of research by confirming the effects
of ICTs on improving transparency and governance (Avgerou, 1998; Krueger, 2002; OpokuMensah, 2000; Soper, 2007). Additionally, this study explores the interrelated effects of ICT,
macroeconomic, and national sociocultural variables on transparency and corruption. Specifically,
this study increases the existing body of research on corruption by providing confirmatory evidence
of how corruption and transparency are affected by three ICT variables: NRI, Internet diffusion, and
mobile cellular diffusion. In the first section of this chapter, a summary of the study’s key findings
is provided. The second section provides a brief discussion of the study’s limitations. The third
section of this chapter outlines theoretical and practical implications with directions for further
research. The fourth section provides a summary of this chapter.
6.1 Summary
Indeed, this study found that the degree to which a country is positioned to use its ICT
infrastructure for international competitiveness, as measured through the Networked Readiness
Index (NRI) published in the Global Information Technology Report by the World Economic
Forum, has a strong effect on the levels of corruption and transparency. A 0.841 increase in the NRI
resulted in a decrease in corruption by 14.017%. Also, an increase in NRI by 0.841 resulted in an
increase in transparency by 9.423%. These findings reinforce what other scholars have found
concerning the positive effect of ICT infrastructure in reducing corruption and increasing
transparency (Charoensukmongkol & Moqbel, 2012; Soper, 2007; Soper & Demirkan, 2012). ICTs
have been shown to be a tool in democratization (Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Soper, 2007) and a device
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that facilities and improves political involvement (Krueger, 2002, 2006; Norris, 2001), thereby
increasing transparency.
Not surprisingly, the NRI also had a large positive effect on Internet and mobile diffusion.
Each increase in the NRI by 0.841 resulted in an increase of Internet diffusion of 23.296 people per
100 persons. Similarly, each increase in the NRI by 0.841 resulted in an increase of mobile cellular
diffusion by 24.141 people per 100 persons. Kshetri and Cheung (2002) found that two components
of the NRI, market openness and government initiatives, stimulated the diffusion of mobile
communications in China. In this study, the NRI had large exploratory power on levels of Internet
diffusion (ƒ2 = 0.723 or 72.3%) and mobile diffusion (ƒ2 = 0.472 or 47.2%). Jakopin and Klein
(2011) found that two components of the NRI, regulatory quality and market environment,
significantly benefit Internet diffusion. Improvements in infrastructure intensify market competition
and reduce costs of goods and services (Aghion & Schankerman, 1999) such as Internet access and
mobile cellular services.
Interestingly, the rate of mobile phone diffusion diminishes as units of NRI increased as
shown in Figure 4.8. In the data analysis, the rate of mobile cellular diffusion plateaued and
eventually began to decrease as levels of NRI increased. This behavior of mobile cellular diffusion
suggests a saturation point. This mobile cellular diffusion saturation point occurs between 1.5 and 2
standard deviations above the mean of NRI. Such a saturation point suggests that countries with a
higher level of NRI have barriers that prevent higher rates of mobile cellular diffusion. These
barriers are most likely to be technological and market-driven. Gruber and Verboven (2001) found
that spectrum capacity had a major impact on diffusion of mobile cellular communication.
Additionally, Boretos (2007) found that, apart from the very young or very old, almost every
European was using a mobile phone. Europe has reached an apparent saturation peak despite being
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one of the early adopters of mobile communication technology and leaders in active mobile
accounts (Boretos, 2007).
The NRI is a composite index of three component indexes: environment, readiness, and
usage. Given the amalgamated nature of such an index, it is important to examine particular
elements within the index’s components. In any discussion that investigates the effects of ICT
infrastructure, it is important to explore how particular technologies within the ICT domain
moderate or mediate such relationships. This study explored two particular ICTs: Internet diffusion
and Mobile diffusion.
Internet diffusion, as measured through the Internet users (per 100 people) indicator from
the World Bank World Development Indicators, had a significant effect on transparency and
corruption. Internet diffusion had a strong positive effect on levels of transparency. By increasing
Internet diffusion by 27.372 per 100 persons, there was an increase in transparency by 17.581%. In
this study, Internet diffusion had large exploratory power (48.1%) on levels of transparency.
Furthermore, Internet diffusion had a strong negative effect on levels of corruption. By increasing
Internet diffusion by 27.372 people per 100 persons, corruption was reduced by 15.239%.
Additionally, Internet diffusion had large exploratory power (57.9%) on levels of corruption. These
results confirm what other scholars have found on the effects of Internet access on transparency and
corruption (Cuillier & Piotrowski, 2009; García-Murillo, 2010; S. M. Johnson, 1998; Sturges,
2004).
Unexpectedly, mobile cellular diffusion, as measured through the Mobile cellular
subscriptions (per 100 people) indicator of the World Bank World Development indicators, had
much weaker effects on transparency and corruption. Increasing mobile cellular diffusion by 40.961
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people per 100 persons resulted in a negligible increase in transparency by 3.727%. Likewise,
increasing mobile cellular diffusion by 40.961 people per 100 persons resulted in a reduction in
corruption by 7.575%. It is possible that such minor effects on transparency and corruption are
related to the nature of mobile cellular use. Kenichi (2004) found that mobile Internet usage was a
more time-enhancing activity (e.g. access augmented some other activity). In other words, mobile
Internet usage was not primarily for information seeking. Rather, it was for entertainment. Such a
postulation would explain the marginal effect of mobile cellular diffusion on transparency.
Although mobile cellular diffusion has a negligible positive effect on transparency, mobile cellular
diffusion has a moderate negative effect on corruption. This negative effect may be the result of
mobile cellular diffusion, including mobile Internet usage on other devices such as computers,
laptops, and tablets.
This study found that for each increase of 40.961 people per 100 persons in mobile cellular
diffusion, there was a moderate increase in Internet diffusion of 10.839 people per 100 persons.
Additionally, mobile cellular diffusion explained the level of Internet diffusion by 31.4%. This
study found results similar to Beilock and Dimitrova (2003) in which openness of infrastructure—
namely, densities of mobile telephones and personal computers— proved to be an important
determinant of Internet usage. Many mobile cellular customers access data and information via
mobile cellular technologies such as phones and cellular data cards (H.-W. Kim et al., 2007). In
Japan, for instance, approximately two-fifths of the population accesses the Internet via mobile
cellular technology (Kenichi, 2004). As seen in this study’s results, increased access to the Internet
leads to significant decreases in corruption. It is possible that the effects of mobile cellular diffusion
on transparency and corruption are mediated through Internet diffusion. However, the results in this
study do not conclusively demonstrate this. In this study, the effect of mobile cellular diffusion on
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transparency, when meditated through Internet diffusion, was slightly greater (β = 0.268, ƒ2=0.109)
than the direct effect of mobile cellular diffusion on transparency (β = 0.212, ƒ2=0.138). On the
contrary, the effect of mobile cellular diffusion on corruption, when meditated through Internet
diffusion, was much lower (β = -0.140, ƒ2=0.081) than the direct effect of mobile cellular diffusion
on corruption (β = -0.341, ƒ2=0.197).
As shown in the descriptive statistics in Table 4.3, diffusion of mobile cellular phone
subscriptions has dramatically increased. Geiger and Mia (2009) detailed that, based on ITU data,
mobile communications have boomed in developing countries. The data in this study mirrors the
finding of Geiger and Mia (2009); mobile cellular diffusion greatly surpassed Internet diffusion.
The diffusion of mobile cellular coupled with such things as mobile commerce (m-commerce) has
become an important modality for receiving information (Geiger & Mia, 2009). Mobile
communication has facilitated access to the Internet in developed and developing countries as well
(Kenichi, 2004).
Several macroeconomic factors influence ICT infrastructure and diffusion (Gholami et al.,
2006; Kshetri & Cheung, 2002; OECD, 1991; Suh & Khan, 2003). This study also examined how
FDI and GDP per capita affected ICT infrastructure and diffusion. The results of this study showed
that FDI has a marginal positive effect on ICT infrastructure. For example, increasing FDI by
$26,795.79 only accounted for an increase in the NRI by 2.510%. Similarly, this study found that
each FDI increase of $26,795.79 only accounted for marginal increases in Internet diffusion (4.160
people per 100 persons) and mobile diffusion (5.038 people per 100 persons). FDI has been shown
to present host countries with access to newer technology (OECD, 1991). In addition, Gholami et
al. (2006) found that increases in FDI lead to growth in ICT investment and capacity. As
demonstrated by Agrawal (2003), increased foreign investment fosters domestic investment which
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translates to improvements in physical infrastructure and the political and business environment
promoting ICT growth. However, this study did not demonstrate that the availability of newer
technologies or the increase in ICT capacities through FDI inflows equate to the utilization or
diffusion of such technologies.
Another important finding in this study is that GDP per capita demonstrates a larger effect
on ICT infrastructure and diffusion. For example, each GDP per capita increase of $19,686.25
accounted for an increase in the NRI by 10.518%, Internet diffusion of 17.463 people per 100
persons, and an increase in mobile diffusion of 21.095 people per 100 persons. Furthermore, GDP
per capita had large exploratory power on the NRI (63.4%). Similarly, GDP per capita had large
exploratory power on Internet diffusion (53.0%) and mobile diffusion (37.5%). These results
confirm findings by Dewan et al. (2005) and Gholami et al. (2006) which demonstrated that GDP
per capita have a positive effect on ICT infrastructure and diffusion. Similarly, Billon et al. (2009)
showed that GDP was a major explanatory factor in countries with higher levels of ICT adoption.
Additionally, Norris (2001) stated that economic development increases civil engagement and
stimulates diffusion of technologies, including the Internet.
Income inequality may be a possible cause for the strong effect of GDP per capita on ICT
infrastructure and diffusion. In developing countries, Internet costs negatively impact ICT adoption
(Billon et al., 2009). GDP per capita is considered a surrogate for the standard of living and
economic output in a country (Easterlin, 2000; Ringen, 1991). As the standard of living rises, a
greater proportion of income becomes available to acquire access to ICTs. This growth in GDP, and
hence GDP per capita, precedes growth in ICT infrastructure and diffusion (Rasiah, 2006; Ringen,
1991). Furthermore, prices for broadband Internet access and mobile cellular services have dropped.
According to ITU (2011), Internet access prices have dropped by 18%, on average, from 2008 to
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2010. During this same time period, prices for mobile cellular services decreased by 22%. In
African nations, where the most significant price decreases occurred, broadband access fell by over
55% and mobile cellular prices decreased by over 25%. Additionally, this increase in per capita
income may provide more tax revenues to governments to invest in ICT infrastructure. For
governments, GDP strongly influenced e-governance maturity and readiness through ICT
infrastructure (Singh et al., 2007).
It has been suggested by Baliamoune-Lutz (2003) that differences between communication
technology (e.g. mobile cellular phones) and information technology (e.g. the Internet) have
become blurred. However, this study did not find strong evidence to support the convergence of
these two ICTs in terms of their effects on transparency and corruption.
Some scholars have explored how potential influences of national cultural differences
influence ICT adoption (de Mooij & Hofstede, 2002; Erumban & de Jong, 2006; Straub et al.,
1997). This study found that power distance and uncertainty avoidance had a negligible effect on
corruption. In this study, power distance had a marginal positive effect on corruption. Corruption
increased by 1.444% for each 18.094 point increase in power distance. This finding is consistent
with Getz and Volkema (2001) who showed that power distance and uncertainty avoidance were
positively associated with corruption. However, in this study, power distance had a negligible
explanatory power on corruption (ƒ2 = 0.045 or 4.5%). Similarly, uncertainty avoidance had a
marginal positive effect on corruption. Corruption increased by 1.888% for each 20.829 point
increase in uncertainty avoidance. Likewise, other studies have found that greater levels of
uncertainty avoidance are positively associated with higher levels of corruption (Husted, 1999;
Kimbro, 2002; Robertson & Watson, 2004). However, in this study, uncertainty avoidance had a
negligible explanatory power on corruption (ƒ2 = 0.024 or 2.4%).
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The effects of these two Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices on corruption may be a result
of their effects on the ICT variables within the model. Other studies have demonstrated that national
cultural differences have effects on ICT usage and adoption. Erumban and de Jong (2006) showed
that power distance and uncertainty avoidance influence ICT adoption. Similarly, Straub et al.
(1997) put forward that power distance and uncertainty avoidance accounts for differences in e-mail
usage. Additionally, de Mooij and Hofstede (2002) identified that uncertainty avoidance was related
to such things as embracement of the Internet and the ownership of computers and mobile cellular
phones.
A secondary focus of this study was to add to the existing literature on how transparency
affects levels of corruption. This study did find that transparency had a significant negative effect
on corruption. Increasing transparency by 0.879 reduces corruption by 9.063%. Furthermore, the
effect of transparency has moderate explanatory power on corruption (ƒ2 = 0.348 or 34.8%). Such a
finding was expected and consistent with similar findings from other studies. Transparency makes it
more difficult to hide corrupt practices (Akpan-Obong, Alozie, & Foster, 2010; Bertot et al., 2010;
Cho & Choi, 2005; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Transparency initiatives have been shown to be an
effective anti-corruption instrument (Bertot et al., 2010). Also, there is a strong association between
transparency through greater press freedom and lower levels of corruption (Brunetti & Weder,
2003). On the contrary, a lack of transparency has been shown to intensify corruption-related
problems (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009).

6.2 Limitations
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This study examined the effects of macroeconomic and ICT variables on corruption and
transparency. However, there are more avenues of research on this topic. This study did not
separate the countries into distant clusters by geographic region, languages, Hofstede Cultural
Dimension rankings, or other sociocultural variables such as levels of literacy or poverty. Such
factors, in addition to ICT infrastructure and diffusion, could have an effect on transparency and
corruption. Vinod (1999) found that schooling and income inequality are more relevant in fighting
corruption rather than Internet use. Corruption is not merely a factor of available information.
However, the finding of Vinod (1999) did not diminish other studies which found that access to
information via the Internet was effective in reducing corruption (DiRienzo, Das, Cort, &
Burbridge, 2007; García-Murillo, 2010). It does suggest, however, that the Internet and similar
information technologies provide some intervening effect on corruption (Schroth & Sharma, 2003).
It is possible that the reduction of corruption requires more fundamental changes in other aspects of
a society coupled with improvements in ICT infrastructure and diffusion.
In this study, extra statistical and explanatory power may have been achieved by examining
additional years of the Networked Readiness Index; however between 2004 and 2005, the method
for calculating the NRI changed significantly. Additionally, other ICT indicators could have been
added for robustness such as number of radios, televisions, or personal computers per inhabitants.
Since this study focuses on Internet and mobile cellular diffusion indicators, it was decided not to
use other such indicators. In future research on this topic, the use of other such indicators may
increase additional understanding of the relationships between ICT variables, transparency and
corruption.
6.3 Implications and Future Research
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The results of this study lead to several practical implications. As stated by Vinod (1999),
the Internet’s potential for increasing transparency and reducing corruption is “promising and
obviously vast” (p. 10). Similarly, Soper (2007) found that ICT diffusion, which includes Internet
access, is negatively related to levels of corruption. This study has shown that ICT infrastructure
and diffusion of Internet access does reduce corruption and increase transparency. Government
officials and citizens wishing for more transparency in their governance should campaign for
development in their country’s ICT infrastructure with a focus on providing access to information
via the Internet.
Vinod (1999) put forth that the top five actions in reducing corruption, in order of
importance, are as follows: 1) reducing bureaucratic overhead (e.g. red tape), 2) increasing judiciary
efficiency, 3) increasing GNP per capita, 4), increasing education and economic freedoms, and 5)
reducing inequalities in income. Government officials can use ICTs in the following ways to
achieve some of the actions suggested by Vinod (1999) to promote increases in transparency and
reductions in corruption.
First, the diffusion of ICTs can reduce bureaucratic overhead through such initiatives as egovernance (Bertot et al., 2010). Specifically, the Internet expands public access to government
information (Cuillier & Piotrowski, 2009; S. M. Johnson, 1998). Secondly, reduced judiciary
efficiency impacts economic growth and infrastructure development by adding additional costs to
private transaction disputes (Buscaglia & Ulen, 1997). One way ICTs can improve judiciary
efficiency is by modernizing (e.g. computerizing) the court case system, thereby giving litigants
better access to the status of their cases (Buscaglia & Ulen, 1997). Diffusion of ICTs coupled with
computerization of the judicial system can also assist attorneys and other legal representatives in
accessing case law and legal opinions of the courts (Shuldberg, 1997).
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Diffusion of ICTs may have some effect on increasing GNP per capita. ICTs have been
found to be a contributing factor in economic growth (Avgerou, 1998). For example, mobile phone
diffusion has been shown to have a positive effect on economic growth and poverty reduction
(Geiger & Mia, 2009). ICTs can not only reduce poverty, but they can also meditate the effects of
poverty by reducing information asymmetry (Sturges, 2004) and improve the quality of life
(Forestier et al., 2002) of the poor. The diffusion of ICTs can also increase education and economic
freedoms by informing citizens of relevant information on government and society. ICTs facilitate
and improve political involvement (Krueger, 2002, 2006; Norris, 2001), and they foster civil and
political freedoms (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003). Access to ICTs allows citizens to become lifelong
learners who can acquire new skills to meet the demands of changing economic markets (Noe &
Peacock, 2002).
Additionally, Kiiski and Pohjola (2002) found that, in OECD countries, GDP per capita and
Internet access cost explained most of the growth in computer hosts per capita. Beilock and
Dimitrova (2003) also found that Internet usage rates were significantly determined by per capita
income. Future studies should explain GDP per capita as an independent variable effecting the NRI
and Internet and mobile diffusion.
In this study, mobile cellular diffusion did find a negligible negative effect on corruption
and a moderate positive effect on transparency. However, Akpan-Obong et al. (2010) and Bailard
(2009) found that mobile communication technologies significantly accounted for political
development in Africa. Future research should use geographical region as a control variable.
6.4 Conclusion
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The findings presented in this study are mostly consistent with those of other scholars on the
effects of ICTs on improving transparency and governance. (Avgerou, 1998; Krueger, 2002;
Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Soper, 2007). There is no doubt that corruption and transparency need to be
addressed worldwide. As countries and their citizens rapidly adopt ICTs, there is hope that
corruption will be exposed and eradicated through the increased transparency brought about by
access to information. Increased transparency offers the promise of participatory governance, and
technology is one avenue in fulfilling this promise. The results of this study should be taken as a
positive message that ICT diffusion and adoption can decrease corruption and increase transparency
as citizens have access to more information via the Internet.
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